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SUMMARY 
The relationship between ownership structure and firm performance has become a key 
issue in understanding the effectiveness of different corporate govemance mechanisms. it 
has been suggested that when the ownership of a firm is dispersed, its managers will 
deviate from profit-maximizing behaviour. Managers' utility tends to increase with firm 
size. According to managerial theory, manager-controlled firms will be less profitable, will 
tend more to avoid risky decisions and grow faster than owned-controlled firms. Some 
scholars have pointed out that there are also benefits associated with the dispersed 
ownership structures. Many researches have been conducted seeking for performance 
differences between firms with different ownership structures. Some of these researches 
found evidence for performance differences between firms with different ownership 
structures, while the others detected no differences in performance between firms with 
different ownership structures. 
The maın objective of this study is to examıne the relationship between ownership 
structure and firm performance of 141 industrial and merchandising companies whose 
stocks are traded in the Istanbul Stock Exchange over the period 1997-2002. Ownership 
structure and financial statement data are obtained from the Istanbul Stock Exchange (iSE) 
web sites and publications. All data has been employed as annual data. Ownership 
structure has been explained according to ownership concentration, public stake, and the 
percentage of shares held by different owner identity. Ownership concentration is 
measured by the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder, and held by the three 
largest shareholders. Ownership dispersion is measured by the percentage of public stake. 
Owner identity is measured by the percentage of shares held by state-owner, manager-
owners, institutional-owners, and foreign-owners. Firm performance is measured by retum 
on asset, retum on equity, net operating profit margin, market-to-book value, and price 
earnings ratio. Debt-equity ratio, the logarithm of total asset, and systematic risk of 
company's stock are used as control variables. The basic method used in this thesis is 
multiple regression analysis through backward stepwise estimations. Cross-sectional data 
is used in multiple regression analysis. SPSS 1 O.O has been used to statistical analysis. The 
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variables being referred to are calculated as averages of 6 years of anıma! da ta, from 1997 
to 2002. 
The findings present that Turkish companies have concentrated ownership characteristics 
rather than dispersed ownership characteristics. The important portion of Turkish 
companies is managed by institutional owners. While the percentage of shares held by 
foreign owners and the number of companies in which foreign owners have stake are 
increasing; the percentage of shares held by state owner and the number of companies in 
which state owner have stake are decreasing. Also, managerial ownership has decreasing 
trend in Turkish companies. The percentage of shares held by institutional owners and the 
number of companies in which institutional owners have a consistent trend over the period 
1997-2002. Using regression analysis and AN OVA, we fınd that as ownership 
concentration increases, retum on equity increases. However, as public ownership 
increases, both retum on asset and return on equity decrease. We indicate that there is a 
positive connection between foreign ownership and return on equity; but state ownership, 
institutional ownership, and managerial ownership have a negative effect on return on 
equity. There appeared to be no relationship between ownership variables and firm 
performance when using market-to-book value, net operating profit margin, and price-
earnings ratio. Our results highlight that size has a negative influence on the perfom1ance 
measured by return on equit . Debt-to-equity variable, measuring leverage, is positive and 
igni fıcant in return on asset and market-to-book value regressions , but is negative and 
s ignificant in retum on equity regression. Return on equity and systematic risk of 
company's stock have a negative and significant relationship . 
T his study contributes to open debate about the link between ownership structure and firm 
performance. Finally in light of our findings, we propose for further research that this study 
rnay lead to a more comprehensive analysis of the relationship between ownership 
s tructure and firm performance. 
Key Wortls : Ownership Structure, Corporate Performance, and Corporate Governance. 
ııı 
ÖZET 
Mülkiyet yapısı ve şirket performansı arasındaki ilişki, farklı şirket yönetim 
mekanizmalarının etkilerini anlamada temel konudur. Şirketlerin ortaklıkları yaygın 
olduğu zaman yöneticilerin kar maksimizasyonu davranışından sapacakları öne 
sürülmüştür. Yöneticilerin firmadan edindikleri toplam fayda da firmanın büyüklüğü ile 
artmaktadır. Şirketlerin yönetimsel kuramına göre; yönetici kontrollü şirketler hissedar 
kontrollü şirketlerden daha az karlı , riskli kararlardan daha çok kaçan ve daha hızlı 
büyüyen şirketlerdir. Bazı araştırmacılar yaygın mülkiyetli şirketlerinde çeşitli yararlan 
olduğuna işaret etmişlerdir. Ortaklık yapısının firma performansı üzerindeki etkilerini 
inceleyen pekçok farklı çalışma yapılmıştır. Bu araştırmalardan bazıları mülkiyet yapısının 
şirket performansını etkilediğini bulurken, diğerleri ise mülkiyet yapısının şirket 
performansı üzerinde bir etkisi olmadığını bulmuşlardır. 
Bu çalışma, hisse senetleri 1997-2002 yılları arasında İstanbul Menkul Kıymetler 
Borsası ' nda işlem gören 141 sanayi ve ticaret şirketinin mülkiyet yapısı ile mülkiyet 
yapılarının şirket performansına olan etkilerini incelemektir. Mülkiyet yapısı ve mali 
durum verileri İstanbul Menkul Kıymetler Borsası ' nın web sitesi ve yayınlarından elde 
edilmiştir. Tüm veriler yıllık kullanılmıştır. En büyük hi ssedarın sermaye payı ile en büyük 
üç hissedarın sermaye paylan mülkiyet yoğunluğu ölçütü olarak kullanılmıştır. Halka 
açıklık oranı ise mülkiyet dağılımı ölçütü olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Devletin, 
yöneticilerin, yabancıların ve kurumsal ortağın paylan sahiplik kimliği ölçütleri olark 
kullanılmıştır. Şirketlerin performansı ise toplam varlıkların verimliliği, öz sermayenin 
verimliliği , net işletme kan, piyasa değerinin defter değerine oranı ve fiyat kazanç oranlan 
ile ölçülmüştür. Borç/varlık oranı , toplam varlıkların logaritması, ve sistematik risk kontrol 
değişkenleri olarak kullanılmıştır. Bu çalışmada, temel method olarak çoklu regresyon 
modeli seçilmiştir ve istatistik analizleri için SPSS 1 O.O kullanılmıştır. 
Sonuçlar Türk şirketlerinin dağılmış mülkiyet yapısından çok yoğunlaşmış mülkiyet 
yapısına sahip olduğunu göstermiştir. Kurumsal yatırımcılar ve holdingler şirketlerin 
önemli payına sahiptir. Yabancı yatmmcılann sermaye payı ile yabancı yatmmcılann 
payının bulunduğu şirketlerin sayısı artarken, devletin sermaye payı ile devletin payının 
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bulunduğu şirketlerin sayısının azaldığı görülmüştür. Bundan başka, yönetici mülkiyetinin 
Türk şirketlerinde azalan bir eğilime sahip oldukları bulunmuştur. ANOV A ve çoklu 
regresyon analizleri, mülkiyet yoğunluğu arttıkça öz sermayenın verimliliğinin 
yükseldiğini göstermiştir. Halka açıklık oranı yükseldikçe toplam varlıkların verimliliği ve 
öz sermayenin verimliliği azalmaktadır. Yabancı mülkiyet ile öz sermayenin verimliliği 
arasında pozitif bir ilişki bulurken; devlet , yönetici ve kurumsal ortak mülkiyeti ile öz 
sermayenin verimliliği arasında negatif bir ilişki ortaya çıkmıştır. Diğer performans 
ölçütleri ile mülkiyet yapısı değişkenleri arasında bir ilişki bulunamamıştır. Sonuçlar öz 
sermayenin verimliliği ile firma büyüklüğü ve sistematik risk arasında negatif ilişki 
olduğunu göstermiştir. Ayrıca, borç/varlık oranı ile toplam varlıkların verimliliği ve piyasa 
değerinin defter değerine oranı arasında pozitif ilişki bulunurken, öz sermayenin 
verimliliği ile negatif ilişki bulunmuştur. 
Son olarak yapılan çalışmanın bulguları doğrultusunda, ileride mülkiyet yapısı ve şirket 
performansı arasındaki ilişki konusunda daha kapsamlı bir araştırma ıçın öneri 
geliştirilmiştir. 
Anahtar Kelimeler : Mülkiyet yapıs ı , şirket performansı ve ş irket yönetimi 
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1.1 Introductory Comments 
CHAPTERI 
INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between ownership structure and fınancial performance has been the 
subject of an important and ongoing debate in the corporate finance literature since the 
seminal work of Berle and Means (1932). Understanding the behaviour of corporate 
organization requires a deeper knowledge of its govemance and the factors that determine 
the distribution of power among corporate managers, shareholders, and directors. Some 
main hypotheses explain the relationship between ownership structure and performance. 
Agency theory has provided a useful tool for detailed analysis of the determinants of the 
complex contractual arrangement called the modem corporation. The survival of 
organizational forms is explanied by Fama and Jensen in terms of the comparative 
advantages of characteristics of residual claims in controlling the agency problems of an 
activity. Conflicts of interest generate agency problems between managers and residual 
claimants when risk bearing is separated from management- in the language of Berle and 
Means (1932), when "ownership" is separated from "control". Berle and Means (1932) 
argue that ownership of firms is typically dispersed among many small shareholders, while 
control rights are concentrated in the hands of managers. Such a state of affairs implies a 
principal-agent problem, as suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Jensen and 
Meckling's "convergence in interest hypothesis" contends that, as managerial ownership 
increases in a fırın, a firm ' s performance increases uniformly, as managers are less likely 
to divert resources away from value maximization. In contrast, Demsetz's (1983) 
"neutrality hypothesis" contends that market discipline will force managers to adhere to 
value maximization at very low levels of ownership. Morck et al. (1988) argue that at 
certain levels of ownership, managers find it worthwhile to consume perquisites which 
reduces the firrn's value and, they have sufficient control to follow their own objectives 
without fear of discipline form other ownership interests. 
There are many researches which examine the connection between ownership structure and 
performance. Some studies indicate that corporate performance is a nonlinear function of 
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management ownership such as; for the US market, Morck et al. (1988), McConnell and 
Servaes (1990), ( 1995), Holdemess et al. ( 1999). Similar results are reported for the Czech 
Republic by Claessens and Djankov (1999); for the UK market by Short and Keasey 
(1999), Davies et al.(2002); for France by Severin (2000), for German by Mueller and 
Spitz (2001). Gedajlovic and Shapiro (1998) find direct nonlinear relation betweeri 
ownership concentrated and profitability in the US, and find no nonlinear relation between 
ownership concentration and profitability in the UK. However, some studies indicate that 
there is no relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. ( Demsetz and 
Lehn, 1985; Agrawal and Knoeber. 1996 for US.) For the US market, Cho (1998), 
Himmelberg et al. (1999), Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) indicate that when controlling 
for endogeneity, managerial ownership is determined by corporate value, but not vice-
versa. For Spain, Mendez and Anson (2000) do not find the relationship between 
ownership structure and firm value. Some researches explain the relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm performance by compensation. Because, the primary goal 
that shareholders use to minimize agency costs is the compensation plan. Typical 
compensation plans are salary and bonus agreements. But, compensation plans do not 
adequately interrelate the desires of the managers with the desires of the shareholder when 
they are based upon imperfect measures of performance. Core et al. (1999) explains when 
fırms have weaker govemance structure, firms have greater agency problems and when 
govemance structure are less effective, CEOs earn greater compensation. Denis and Sarin 
( 1999) argue with ownership and board structure changes are related to extemal corporate 
control threats, firm performance, and the attributes of specific owners. 
Some studies show that corporate performance is high with ownership concentration. Xu 
and Wong (1997), Cole and Mehran (1998), Claessens and Djankov (1999) find that berter 
performance is associated with greater ownership concentrated. Gedajlovic and Shapiro 
(2002) find that this positive relationship is connected with agency theory. Thomsen and 
Pedersen (2000) find a positive effect of ownership concentration on shareholder value. 
Repei (2000), Wei and Varela (2003) indicate that state ownership has a negative on fırın 
performance. Repei (2000) argues that state ownership leads to lower performance than 
private ownership. A summary of the most relevant research is given in Appendix A. 
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Turkey is bound to become an important commercial and financial center in the region. 
Within this active environment, Turkey is committed to pursuing a free-market oriented 
development. In the last 1 O years, Turkey initiated an economic development program that 
included the liberalization of import restrictions fostering greater domestic competition, the 
privatization of state enterprises. This rapid growth policy promoted extensive 
industrialization, and major liberalization policies have been fully adopted by the 
government to define its firm commitment to an open-market oriented economy. Major 
policies include 100% foreign ownership permission, 100% repatriation of profits and 
dividends, permission (even support) for management control by foreigners, active 
financial sector (Istanbul Stock Exchange ), ongoing privatization of State Owned 
Enterprises. The Turkish market offers a very rich combination of corporate govemance 
schemes to be compared. Moreover, privatization of publicly owned companies is still 
being debated on the basis of the impact of ownership mix on performance. A related issue 
surfaces with respect to the method of privatization. The merits of public offering of equity 
which leads to a more diffuse ownership versus private placement through block sales that 
results in a concentrated ownership is another controversy to be resolved. 
The recurring crises in emerging economies and the business scandals in the developed 
world stimulated a global interest in corporate govemance. This trend has both extemal 
and intemal causes. The extemal influence stems form the dictates of the intemational 
financial flows and from the tendecy of imitating current business trends of the Westem 
World by domestic businesses. However, these extemal influences are not being enough to 
raise interest on corporate govemance practices in the emerging markets, if they do not 
match with an appropriate institutional setting. Turkey constitutes an interesting example 
of the interaction between the extemal and intemal drives. Recent economic restructuring 
creates an institutional setting which is suitable for corporate govemance, but also it 
necessitates good corporate govemance practices. 
1.2. The Purpose, Scope, and Methodology of The Thesis 
This thesis aıms to analyse the relationship between ownership structure and firm 
performance. Ownership structure and financial statement data are obtained from the 
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Istanbul Stock Exchange (iSE) web sites and publications. Our <lata are annual <lata. The 
sample consists of 141 industrial and merchandising companies which traded on the ISE 
over the period 1997-2002. Ownership structure has been explained according to 
ownership concentration, public stake, and the percentage of shares held by different 
owner identity. Ownership concentration is measured by the percentage of shares held by 
the largest shareholder, and held by the three largest shareholders. Ownership dispersion is 
measured by the percentage of public stake. Owner identity is measured by the percentage 
of shares held by state-owner, manager-owners, institutional-owners, and foreign-owners. 
Firm performance is measured by retum on asset, retum on equity, net operating profıt 
margin, market-to-book value, and price eamings ratio. Debt-equity ratio, the logarithm of 
total asset, and systematic risk of companies are used as control variables. The basic 
method used in this thesis is multiple regression analysis through backward stepwise 
estimations. Cross-sectional data is used in multiple regression analysis. The variables 
being referred to are calculated as averages of 6 years of annual data, from 1997 to 2002. 
Several main results appear: 
Firstly, our results suggest that Turkish companies on the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) 
ha ve highly concentrated and centralization ownership structures. The important portion of 
Turkish companies is managed by institutional owners. We measured institutional 
ownership under two sub-categories: the percentage of shares held by holdings or another 
companies, and the percentage of shares held by institutional investors, including banks. 
For Turkish companies, previous studies indicate that many companies are managed by 
holdings and families. The board of Turkish holdings is often composed of family 
members and relatives. (Yurtoğlu , 1998; Önder, 2000 ; Özer and Yamak, 2001; Saraç 
2002). The separation of ownership and control is mostly achieved through pyramidal or 
complex ownership structure, moreover many Turkish companies coalition with other 
families and foreign companies (Yurtoğlu, 1998). 
The largest shareholder owns more than 40% of all equity, and the three largest 
shareholder own more than 60% of ali equity. When we look at the percentage of 
shareholdings of the largest shareholder, most of the fırın are owned by relatively small 
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number of owners on the contrary developed countries. While the percentage of shares 
held by foreign owners and the number of companies in which foreign owners have stake 
are increasing; the percentage of shares held by state owner and the number of companies 
in which state owner have stake are decreasing. Also, managerial ownership have 
decreasing trend in Turkish companies. Institutional ownership does not show an 
important change. It has showed a consistent trend during the period 1997-2002. 
Secondly, as ownership concentration, measured by the percentage of shares held by the 
three largest shareholders, increases, retum on equity increases. However, as public stake 
increases , both retum on asset and retum on equity decreases. We indicate that there is a 
positive connection between foreign ownership and retum on equity; but managerial 
ownership, state ownership, and institutional ownership have a negative effect on retum on 
equity. There appeared to be no relationship between ownership variables and fırın 
perfonnance when using market-to-book value, net operating profıt margin, and price-
eamings ratio . We fınd that size hasa negative influence on the perforınance measured by 
retum on equity. The debt-to-equity vari able, measuring leverage, is positive and 
signifıcant in retum on asset and market-to-book value regression models, but is negative 
and s i gnifıcant in retum on equity. Return on equity and systematic risk of company ' s 
stock have a negati ve and s i gnifı cant relationship , consistent with risk-averse 
di vers ifıcation by investors. 
1.3 The Plan of The Thesis 
T.his study is structured as follows . Chapter II outlines briefly the extant literature 
concerning the relation between the ownership structure and the performance of fırms. 
Previous research into corporate govemance and perfonnance measures is discussed in this 
chapter. Moreover, the different schools of thought on the effects of ownership structure on 
corporate performance are summarized. Chapter III describes the empirical test of the 
relationship between ownership structure and fırın performance. In this chapter, we present 
hypotheses and we describe our sample, variables and methodology. Then we show the 
fındings . Chapter IV presents summary and conclusions. 
CHAPTERII 
LITERATURE SURVEY 
2.1. The Three Basic Forms of Business Organization 
o 
The three primary types of legal fırın organizations are sole proprietorship, partnership and 
corporation. All these fırms have emerged through voluntary contractual agreements and 
survived competition from other types of fırms; that is, law mandated none of these types 
of business fırms. They reflect the freedom of individuals to write any contract they wish 
each other and bear the costs (risk) of their choice. One primary difference between these 
three legal types are number of owners. Sole proprietorship is the simplest form of 
business. It is not a separate entity itself. A sole proprietorship directly owns the business 
and is directly responsible for its debts. Proprietorship has one, partnership has two or 
more (but usually a small number), and corporation can have anywhere from one or to 
millions. A second difference is the liability of the owners. Proprietorship and partnership 
owners have unlimited liability, whereas corporation owners have limited liability. Limited 
liability a condition in which owners are not personally held responsible for the debts of by 
a fırın. 
The corporate fırın is a product of this competitive environment. It is the best example of 
the wealth-creating consequences of stable and credible property rights. A corporation is a 
business established through ownership shares (termed corporate stock). A corporation is 
considered a distinct legal person, that can be sued, forced to pay taxes, ete., just like a 
human person. Unlike proprietorships and partnerships businesses, a corporation business 
exists separately from it's owners. As such, the owners have what lawyer-types term 
limited liability. Owners can not be held personally responsible for corporate debts. Their 
owners can only lose the value of their ownership shares, but no more. The primary benefit 
of limited liability is that it makes it possible for a business to accumulate large amounts of 
productive resources that lets it take advantage of large scale production. 
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2.1.1. Corporation 
The corporation is the most important form of fırın organization. But, the corporation has 
its own problem related to the separation of ownership and control. This is the principal-
agent problem. Corporate govemance deals with the ways in which this problem is solved. 
Agency problems arise in corporations because the agents stop bearing the full wealth 
effects of their on decisions if they do not own a substantial part of the corporations' 
equity. Under those conditions, the agents are likely to engage in behaviour that benefits 
their personal wealth or power but that is opportunistic and inefficient form the principals' 
point of view. When managers pursue self-serving behaviour rather than the maximization 
of shareholder wealth, several symptoms may become apparent : low stock returns, below-
average operating performance. The likelihood of agency problem is higher when there is 
less ability to monitor and discipline management or when managerial incentive system do 
not coincide with shareholder wealth maximization. Asa result, corporate shareholders are 
in need of reliable means of control over managerial behaviour. Corporate govemance is a 
set of intemal and extemal arrangements that define and enforce the discipline in relations 
between managers and shareholders. Boards of directors also have a fiduciary 
responsibility to monitor fırın strategy and performance. 
2.1.2. The Board of Directors 
The board of directors represents the interests of the shareholders in the affairs of the 
corporation. Every corporation is required by law to have a board of directors. Its legal 
function is to govem the affairs of the corporation. But, in a small corporation whose chief 
executive officer is also the controlling shareholder, the chief executive offıcer (CEO) 
actually govems and the board acts primarily as an advisor. When a corporation grows to a 
size where it needs outside capital, it may go public by selling shares of stock, and the 
board then represents the interests of these shareholders. The shareholders, who are the 
owners of the corporation, have a say in the way their company is run. lf the company is 
profitable, they expect to receive dividends. If the company has problems, the owners need 
to know about them, so that they can take remedial action, if necessary. it is common 
practice for organizations to have boards of directors consisting of both outsiders and 
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insiders. The inside directors are corporate executives employed by the organization or 
retired executives of the corporation. They are assumed to be familiar with the fırın and are 
champions of stability. Most of the members ofa typical board are "outside directors'', that 
is they are not employees of the corporation. They are assumed to be in a better position 
than insiders to provide counsel to management. It is argued that board outsiders, by 
providing expert knowledge and monitoring services, add value to firms. Outside directors 
are supposed to be guardians of the shareholders' interests through monitoring. Fama and 
Jensen (1983a) describe the role of the board of directors as an information system that the 
stockholders within large corporations could use to monitor the opportunism of top 
executives. The trend toward outside directors results from the fact that shareholders 
believe it is in their best interests for the board to have an important degree of 
independence from the company's management. The outside directors (nonexecutive) may 
not do a very good jobs of monitoring for several reasons. Firts, they may not have an 
important financial interest in the company. Second, they are busy people and may have 
little time to consider the company's affairs or to collect information about the company. 
The principal sources of outside board members are CEOs and senior officers of other 
corporations (but not competitors). Other outsiders are lawyers, bankers, engineers (on 
high technology boards), retired government officials and academics. 
Board members are elected at the annual meeting of shareholders. Shareholders elect the 
board to act on their behalf and the board in tum monitors top management and ratifies 
major decisions. After all, the board is responsible for selecting, appraising and 
compensating management; if the board and management are the same people, the board 
can hardly perform its govemance role in an objective manner. The role of board is viewed 
in the context of agency theory, whereby the owners implement mechanisms to monitor the 
actions of management. 
The board selects the CEO. The CEO is accountable to the board and is subject to 
termination if the board decides that his or her performance is unsatisfactory. The board 
determines compensation of the CEO and the other principal corporate officers. The 
CEO's compensation should (a) be related to performance, (b) be competitive, and (c) 
provide motivation. 
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Finally, The board of directors is essentially the management body for the corporation. 
Responsibilities of the board of directors include establishing all business policies and 
approving major contracts and undertakings. 
2.1.3. Finance Committee 
The board is responsible for the shareholders for monitoring the corporation's financial 
health and for assuring that its financial viability is maintanied. The fınance committee 
makes recommendations on these matters. Financial policies are recommended by 
management. Management, not finance committee, is responsible for using tools to 
evaluate risk and return. The committee's responsibility is to probe management's 
rationale for its policies and thereby assure itself that management has thought them 
through and that the policies are within acceptable limits. 
2.1.4. Corporate Governance 
Corporate govemance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations 
assure themselves of getting a return an their investment (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997, 
pp.737.). "Corporate govemance is the system by which business corporations are directed 
and controlled. The corporate govemance structure specifies the distribution of rights and 
responsibilities among different participants in the corporation, such as the board, 
managers, shareholders and the stakeholders, and spells out the rules and procedures for 
making decisions on corporate affairs. By doing this, it also provides the structure through 
which the company objectives are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and 
monitoring performance" (OECD April 1999). Corporate govemance is concemed with 
holding the balance between economic and social goals and between individual and 
communal goals. It framework is there to encourage the efficient use of resources and 
equally to require accountability for the stewardship of those resources. The aim is to align 
as nearly as possible the interests of individuals, corporations and society (Sir Adrian 
Cadbury in "Global Corporate Govemance Forum", World Bank, 2000). 
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Corporate govemance is the relationship between various participants in deterınining the 
direction and perforınance of organizations. Shareholders, management and the board of ~ 
directors are primary participants. It encircles how organizations respond and report to 
various stakeholder groups, such as govemrnents, special interest groups, customer, 
creditors, comrnunities, trade associations, competitors, employees, suppliers, how they are 
financed (including ownership structure) and how they are regulated. For this reason, 
corporate govemance includes financial decisions such as capital structure, which have 
direct implications for the set of govemance mechanisms in place. Major events such as 
takeovers and corporate distress also have imlications for corporate govemance, as well as 
possibly reflecting the failure of certain govemance mechanisms. It also includes the role 
of financial reporting, including auditing. It helps companies and economies attract 
investment, and strengthens the foundation for long-terın economic perforınance and 
competitiveness in several ways. First, by demanding transparency in corporate 
transactions, in accounting and auditing procedures, in purchasing, and in ali of the myriad 
individual business transactions corporate govemance attacks the supply side of the 
corruption relationship. Corruption drains companies' resources and erodes 
competitiveness driving away investors. Second, corporate govemance procedures improve 
the management of the fırın by helping fırın managers and boards to develop a sound 
company strategy, and by ensuring that mergers and acquisitions are undertaken for sound 
business reasons, and that compensation systems reflect performance. This helps 
companies to attract investment on favorable terms and enhances fırın perforınance . 
Corporate govemance is typically perceived by academic literature as dealing with 
"problems that result from the separation of ownership and control". From this perpective, 
corporate govemance would focus on; the intemal structure and rules of the board of 
directors, the creation of independent audit committees, rules for disclosure of inforınation 
to shareholders and creditors, and control of management. Corporate govemance deals 
with the ways in which suppliers of fınance to corporations assure themselves of getting a 
return on their investment. From this point of view, corporate govemance tends to focus on 
a simple model: 
1) Shareholders elect directors who represent them. 
2) Directors vote on key matters and adopt the majority decision. 
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3) Decisi ons are made in a transparent manner so that shareholders and others can 
hold directors accountable. 
4) The company adopts accounting standards to generate the information necessary 
for directors, investors and other stakeholders to make decisions. 
5) The company's policies and practices adhere to applicable national, state and local 
laws. 
2.2. Agency Theory 
The corporations consists of various sets of distinct interest. For example; the managers 
(agents), and the stakeholders (shareholders, governments, customers, creditors, 
competitors, employees, suppliers, communities et al.). The relationship between 
stakeholders and marı-agement is called on agency relationship. 
An agencv relationship exists when: 
Shareholders 
(Principals) 
Firm Owners 
Managers 
{Agents) 
Decisi on 
Makers 
Agency 
Relationship 
Risk Bearing Specialist 
(Principal) 
Managerial Decision-
Making Specialist 
(Agent) 
Figure 2.1 An agency relationship (www.altavista.com; M. Hitt, 2001 Nelson 
Thompson Learning) 
Agency theory considers the delegation of work from one person ( the principal) to another 
(the agent) who carries it out. (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency Theory tries to deal 
with the conflicts of interests between stakehôlders and managers within the firm. These 
conflicts result from differing goals. The primary goal of shareholders is to maximize their 
wealth (i.e. , the discounted net present value of dividends and share price changes times 
the number of shares owned). The primary goal of managers is to increase their welfare 
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maximization. For example; job security, high wages, a pleasant life style, attractive 
officies, freedom from pressures, and taking long lunch breakes. The shareholders and 
managers have their own interest. Thus, the goal of agency theory is to find the contract 
between shareholders and managers. (see Figure 2.1) 
Agency theory is based on two key assumptions about agents: effort aversion and risk 
aversion (Phelps, 1996). Managers manage the company to maximize their own welfare. 
They have several interests which usually different from interests of shareholders. For 
example; luxury officies. They may decide to act in their own self-interest. Managers 
might want to make decisions that one in their best interests, while not serving 
shareholders interests; when they do make decisions in the shareholders' interests, they 
may make lenders unhappy. This is effort aversion. Managers are held to be more risk 
averse than shareholders. The manager, contracted to one task, cannot afford to take this 
long run view but needs to ensure that her particular task succeeds. Therefore the manager 
will be willing to take less risk. This is risk aversion. 
When the managers enforce the orders, they don't have to take any risk because their 
behaviour is programmable and observable, so there is no conflict between managers and 
owners for their risk attitudes. Finally, behaviour based control is optimal. The goal of 
conflict between principals and agents is negatively connected with behaviour-based 
contracts. But, if the managers' behaviour is not programmable, outcome based control can 
be feasible . The managers are being evaluated on the basis of outcomes which are not 
completely within their control. The managers will avoid taking risky decisions. In this 
cases, a conflict exists between managers and owners for their risk attitudes. Finally, the 
goal of conflict between principals and agents is positively connected with outcome-based 
contracts (Levinthal, 1988). 
Agency theory provides a good descriptions of compensation. It depends on a trade-off 
between the costs of evaluating behaviour and the costs of risk bearing. Eisenhardt (1988) 
use the agency theory to explain the sales-compensation policies of 54 retail specialthy 
stores. This analysis's agency variables are job programmability, span of control, and 
outcome uncertanity and dependent variables are salary and commission. Programmability 
is defined as the degree to which appropriate behaviour by the agents can be specified in 
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advance (Eisenhardt, 1989). If behaviours can easy to evaluate, stores will pay directly via 
salaries, but if behaviours can not easy to evaluate, stores will use commissions to motivate 
employees. Stores prefer to salaries to commissions, they ignore outcome uncertanity or 
span of control at high levels of programmability, and a high level of information is 
unnecessary because behaviours are observable; whereas at low levels of programmability, 
outcome uncertanity and span of control are important. Because, when outcome 
uncertanity is high, commissions are very risky for employees. Thus, outcome uncertanity 
will be negatively related to use of commissions. Eisenhardt (1989) explains this analysis 
under the principal-agent theory. The principal-agent theory determines the optimal 
contract betweeen principals and agents. it points to which contract is the most efficient 
under varying levels of information, outcome uncertanity, risk aversion, and other 
variables. When principals know what agents have done, behaviour-based contract is most 
efficient. Control on the basis of measured behaviour ensures that agents are committing 
their full effort to the assigned tasks. But, when principals do not verify what agents are 
actually doing, outcome-based contract is attractive. Because agents are self-interest people 
who may or may not have performed as agreed. Because of unobservable behaviour, 
principals has two options to reduce agency problems. (1) They can discover the agent's 
behaviour by investing in information systems; for example, boards of directors, reporting 
procedures. Information systems are positively connected with behaviour-based contracts 
and negatively connected with outcome-based contracts. (2) They contract on the outcomes 
of the agent ' s behaviour. Outcome-based contract depends on the trade-off between the 
cost of measuring behaviour and the cost of transferring risk from principals to agents. If 
the contract between principals and agents is outcome-based, agents are likely to behave in 
the interests of principals. Because agents become increasingly less risk averse. The 
problem of risk arises because outcomes are only partly a function of behaviours. For 
example, if outcome control is applied to a salesperson and sales fall, she is likely to be 
punished. But, the fall in sales may be result of economic conditions, competitor actions, 
technological changes, and such uncontrollable variables. When outcome uncertanity is 
low, the costs of shifting risk to agents are low, and outcome-based contracts are attractive. 
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2.2.1. The Separation of Ownership and Control 
The separation of ownership and control and resulting agency problems are widely 
recognized across the financial economics literature, such as Berle and Means (1932), 
Jensen and Meckling (1976). When managers pursue self-serving behaviour rather than the 
maximization of shareholder wealth, several symptoms may become apparent: low stock 
returns, below-average operating performance, and suboptimal investment decisions. The 
likelihood of agency problems is higher when there is less ability to monitor and discipline 
management or when managerial incentive systems do not coincide with shareholder 
wealth maximization. According to Berle and Means (1932) when shareholders are too 
diffuse to monitor managers, corporate assets can be used for the benefit of managers 
rather than for maximizing shareholder wealth. it is well known that a solution to this 
problem is to give managers an equity stake in the fırın. Doing so helps to resolve the 
moral hazard problem by aligning managerial interests with shareholders' interests. 
Therefore, Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that managers with small levels of 
ownership fail to maximize shareholder wealth because they have an incentive to consume 
perquisites. In terms of agency theory, separation of ownership and control gives rise to 
agency costs, which worsen performance of companies. Since the interests of management 
(agents) need not and normally do not coincide with those of owners (principals), there is a 
considerable risk that corporate resources will be used not in the pursuit of shareholder 
profit. As a result, corporate shareholders are in need of reliable means of control over 
managerial behaviour. Jensen and Meckling (1976) characterize the separation of 
ownership and control as an agency problem. In the agency approach, shareholders are 
modeled as principals and managers are modeled as agents. Agents, in this model, 
maximize personal utility. The issue is how to provide the agent with incentives to induce 
behaviour benefical to the principals, the shareholders. Agency analysis studies the cost of 
providing such incentives and the costs resulting form the extent to which agents will still 
deviate from the interests of the principal even in the presence of such incentives. The cost 
of separation ownership and control are thus the usual principal-agent costs: the monitoring 
expenditures by shareholders, the bonding expenditures by managers and the residual loss 
from the divergence of behaviour ( even with monitoring and bonding) from the ideal. 
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The separation of ownership and control refers to the phenomenan associated with publicly 
held business corporations in which the shareholders (the residual claimants) possess little 
or no direct control over management decisions. This separation is generally attributed to 
collective action problems associated with dispersed share ownership. The separation of 
ownership and control permits hierarchical decision making which, for some types of 
decisions, is superior to the market. The separation of ownership and control creates costs 
due to adverse selection and moral hazard. These costs are potentially mitigated by a 
number of mechanisms including business failure, the market for corporate control, the 
enforcement of fiduciary duties, corporate govemance oversight, managerial financial 
incentives and institutional shareholder activism. The benefits of separating ownership and 
control come from the interaction of three factors. First, under conditions and for certain 
types of decisions, hierarchical decision making may be more efficient than market 
allocation. Second, due to economies of scale in both production and decision making, 
optimal fırın size can be quite large. Third, optimal investment strategy requires investors 
to be able to diversify and pool and to be able to change their allocations in response to 
changing market conditions. 
Fama and Jensen (1983a) analyze only private organizations and nature of residual claims 
and the separation of management and risk bearing in differrent organization forms . Their 
theory is based on trade-offs of the risk sharing and other advantages of the corporate form 
with its agency cost. They contrast the relatively unrestricted residual claims of open 
corporations with the restricted residual claims or proprietorship, partnership, and closed 
corporations. They emphasize that common stock residual claims of open corporations are 
unrestricted in the sense that (1) They are freely alienable, (2) They are rights in net cash 
flows for the life of the organization, and (3) Stockholders are not required to have any 
other role in the organization. The most important disadvantages of the unrestricted nature 
of the common stock residual claims of open corporations is agency cost. Because 
managers whose interests are not same interests of residual claimants. This agency 
problem is controlled by decision system that separate the management and control of 
important decisions at all levels of the organization. Decision managemet includes the 
initiation and implementation and decision control includes the ratification and monitoring 
of decisions (Fama and Jensen, 1983b). When decision management is separated from 
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decision control, there are some devices: (a) hierarchical structures in which the decision 
initiatives of lower-level agents are passed on to agents above them in the hierarches, first 
for ratifıcation and then for monitoring, (b) boards of directors choise of the decision 
initiatives and they measure the performance of decision agents, and ( c) incentive 
structures encourage mutual monitoring among decision agents. 
2.2.2. Agency Costs 
The separation of fırın ownership form control rights is a much debated issue of corporate 
govemance. This separation is said to create agency costs, because owners and managers 
have different objectives. Agency costs come in two form. (1) Direct agency cost. [a] a 
corporate expenditure that benefits management but costs the shareholders. [b] 
shareholders need to monitor management actions. (2) Indirect agency cost. For example; 
the new investment is expected to favorably impact the share value, but it is also a 
relatively risk venture. The owners will want to take the investment; whereas managers 
may not. The stock value will rise for owners' interest but management may think that 
things will tum out badly and they will lose their job. Indirect agency costs arise when the 
shareholders and managers have different attitudes toward risk. 
There are no costs when a fırın managed by a 100 percent owner. That is one of the 
advantage of a sole proprietorship. The fırın owned solely by a single owner-manager 
which is called zero agency-cost (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The owner-manager can 
take actions to maximize his or her own utility. The owner-manager can measure utility 
primarily by personal wealth and he or she can also bear all of the costs of leisure time and 
perquisite consumption. If the owner-manager sells off a portion of his or her ownership to 
outside investors, there is a potential conflict of interest and it is called an agency conflicts. 
In most large corporations, agency conflicts are important, because large fırm's managers 
own only a small percentage of the stock. The theoretical model of agency costs was 
developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
1. When managers do not own 100 percent of the fırın, agency cost are higher and 
these costs increase as the equity share of the owner-manager declines. For this 
reason, agency costs increase with a reduction in managerial ownership. 
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2. Agency costs are an inverse function of the managers' ownership stake. When 
managers have zero ownership, they gain 100 percent of perquisite consumption 
but they have zero percent of fırın profits. (when salary is independent of fırın 
performance) They would rather than consume perks than maximize to value of 
the fırın to a.11 shareholders. 
3. Agency costs are an increasing functions of the number of nonmanager 
shareholders. When the number of shareholders is large and each shareholding is 
small, individual investors cannot give much time for monitoring. Everybody 
prefers to leave the task to others, taking a free ride on others' efforts so 
monitoring cannot be effective. A nonmonitoring shareholder enjoys the full 
benefits ofa monitoring shareholder's activity without incurring any monitoring 
cost. Thus, as the number of nonmanager sharaholders increases, aggregate 
expenditure on monitoring declines, and the owner-manager agency costs 
problems increase. 
Arıg et al., (2000) examine how agency costs change from the separation of ownership and 
management. The sample consists of 1708 small corporations. Their analysis is under two 
types of fırms. First, the fırın is managed by owners ( owner-manager). Second, the fırın is 
managed by an outsider (outsider-manager). Their ownership variables are (1) the 
ownership share of the primary owner, (2) a single family controls more than 50% of the 
fırm's shares which is an indicator variable, (3) the number of non-manager shareholders, 
( 4) firms managed by a shareholder rather than an outsider which is an indicator variable. 
They suggest that agency costs should be inversely related to the ownership share of the 
primary owner. For a primary owner who is also the firm 's manager, the incentive to 
consume perquisites declines as his ownership while his benefits from perquisite 
consumption are constant. From a primary owner who employs an outside manger, the 
gains from monitoring in the form of reduced agency costs increase with his ownership 
stake. The primary owner fulfılls the monitoring role that large blockholders perform at 
publicly traded corportions. Agency costs should be lower at firms where a single family 
controls more than 50 percent of the fırm's equity. At a small, closely-held corporation 
where a single family controls of fırın , the controlling family also fulfılls the monitoring 
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role that large blockholders perforın at publicly traded corporations. Finally, agency costs 
are higher at fırıns managed by an outsider. They use fırın age and annual sales as control 
variables. They include banks as an extemal monitoring variable, because banks have an 
important role in the small business due to source of extemal funds. The extemal 
monitoring variables are length of the largest banking relationship, number of banking 
relationships, and debt-to-asset ratio. They build multivariate regression. They use two 
ratios to measure agency costs. (1) The expense ratio, and (2) The asset utilization ratio. 
Agency costs are inversely related the sales-to-asset ratios. Managers want to purchase 
fancy office space, offıce furnishing, and automobiles, that is, unproductive assets. 
Therefore, they may make poor investment decisions because of their self interests. Higher 
sales-to-assets ratios are associated with greater efficiency and lower agency costs, 
whereas higher expense-to-sales ratios are associated with less efficiency and higher 
agency costs. Their analysis shows that the sales-to-asset ratios are higher in shareholder-
managed fırıns versus outsider-managed fırıns. So, agency costs are at fırms managed by 
an outsider (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The expense ratio is a measure of how 
effectively the fırın's management controls operating costs, and other direct agency costs. 
They provide that the high-expense and low-efficiency fırms are less likely to be managed 
by a shareholder, have fewer nonmanaging shareholder. Finally, their results support the 
theories of Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
2.3. Types of Ownership Structure 
We explain two ownership structure; concentrated and dispersed ownership structures. 
2.3.1. Concentrated Ownership Structure 
Concentrated ownership structures are referred to as insider systems. Ownership 
concentration represents a potential commitment to monitoring fırın managers. When 
managers are owners, concentration represents their alignment with other owners. It 
provides large owners with incentives to take an active interest in the fırın and to monitor 
its managers and ownership concentration has been identifıed as an important tool to 
curtail managers ' propensity to pursue inefficient strategies (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). 
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Concentrated ownership measures the power of shareholders to influence managers. It is a 
straightforward way to mitigate agency problems between owners and managers. Large 
owners have stronger incentives and better opportunities to exercise control over managers 
than small shareholders. The traditional approach views the main corporate govemance 
problem as the opposition of self-interested managers and weak dispersed shareholder. 
Insiders exercise control over companies in several ways. A common scenario is where 
insiders own the majority of the company shares and voting rights. (Oftentimes, large share 
or vote holders control management through direct representation on the company board). 
Other times, insiders own some shares, but enjoy the majority of the voting rights. This 
happens when there are multiple classes of shares and some shares enjoy more voting 
rights than others. If a few owners own shares with signifıcant voting rights, they can 
effectively control even though they did not provide the majority of the capital. More 
concentrated ownership (eg., a majority shareholder) admittedly lowers the cost of 
disseminating information regarding the effıciency of managerial choices and of 
organizing coalitions, and increases the benefıts to the owner from policing managerial 
choices. A dispersed ownership structure assures the manager that shareholders will 
interfere little, inducing him to show initiative. This gain has to be weighed against the loss 
in control due to inadequate monitoring. Conversely, a concentrated ownership structure 
induces high levels of monitoring and control but renders management less active. Hence, 
it is an instrument to solve the trade-off between control and initiative because it 
determines the shareholders' incentives to monitor. The manager' s effort to become 
informed, his initiative depends on the likelihood of having effective control. Hence, close 
monitoring by the large shareholder inhibits managerial initiative. This is an instance of the 
hold-up problem. The manager can increase fırın value by exerting effort but his incentives 
are reduced by the risk that the large shareholder might prevent him from receiving his 
private benefıts. 
2.3.2. Dispersed Ownership Structure 
It is the other type ownership structure. There is a large number of owners each hold a 
small number of company shares. Small shareholders have little incentive to closely 
monitor a company's activities and tend not to be involved in management decisions or 
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policies. Hence, they are called outsiders, and dispersed ownership structure are referred to 
as outsider system. Common law countries such as the UK and the US tend to have 
dispersed ownership structures. If the largest owner holds less than 20% of the company' s 
votes, its ownership is classified as dispersed ownership-regardless of the owner' s identity 
(Pedersen and Thomsen, 1997). Large firms tend to have more dispersed ownership and 
therefore less effective investors control. If anything, the main control problem for large 
firms seems to be how to get investors or shareholders to exert more control. Dispersion of 
shareholding affects fırın behaviour directly by influencing its objective function given the 
location of control and indirectly through the degree of control. The degree of control is 
defined as the probability of the controlling shareholder securing majority support on the 
assumptions of the probabilistic voting model. Increased dispersion of ownership generally 
does imply a reduction in the ability of any given shareholder to revoke and to reassign the 
decision-making authority normally delegated to managers. Maximum dispersion of shares 
among initial owners increases trading opportunities among those who potentially will pay 
the full price for shares in the bad state, but may lead to a value-reducing lack of control 
because of ownership dispersion. 
The dispersion of shareholding insulates management from the owners. Thus, the right of 
ownership is empty because the shareholders have no control over the use of their 
resources. Managers control resources, make decisions affecting shareholders' wealth, and 
can easily protect themselves by soliciting proxies at the company's expense. The 
dispersion of shareholding leads to (1) withering away of private property rights in the 
corporate firms, (2) the transfer of a part of the residual to managers, and by implication, 
(3) a reduced flow of capital into business firms with dispersed ownership. 
The dispersed ownership is an important source of the efficiency of corporate firms . 
Because the dispersion of shareholding is fully consistent with the law of comparative 
advantage. For example, when people buy shares, they voluntarily separate themselves 
from controlling their property. They buy shares in corporate firms choose to speciliaze in 
bearing the risk. Managers are individuals who specialize in managing the risk. The 
dispersion of shareholding leads to lower capital costs for firms in the economy; and to 
greater innovation, as shareholders are capable of investing in riskier ventures due to their 
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ability to mitigate such risk through diversification. The fact that shareholders have 
incentives to include innovative ventures into their portfolios means that the dispersion of 
shareholding is a source of capital for small start-up companies. But, the dispersed 
ownership has its costs (Berle and Means, 1932). Major costs of the dispersed ownership 
are the transaction costs of monitoring managerial decisi ons that aff ect shareholders' 
wealth and the costs of hiring and firing corporate managers. Transaction costs refer to the 
costs of negotiating the transaction. The dispersion of ownership reduces shareholders' 
desire and ability to control large corporations (Berle and Means, 1932). 
2.4. Going Public 
Most businesses begin life as proprietorship or partnership, and then, as the more 
successful ones grow, at some point they find it desirable to convert into corporations. lf 
growth continues, at some point the company may decide to go public. "Going public" 
refers to the process of transforming a company form a privately owned, often owner-
managed concem to a publicly owned company. The decision to take a company public is 
usually a complex one, and the actual process of going public can be time consuming, 
expensive, and take a substantial amount of key management effort away from the day-to-
day operations of the company. (www.imkb.gov.tr) 
• Advantages of going public: 
1) Permits founder diversification: As a company grows and becomes 
more valuable, its founders often have most of their wealth tied up in the company. By 
selling some of their stocking a public offering, they can diversify their holdings, thereby 
reducing somewhat the riskiness of their personal portfolios. 
2) Increases liquidity: The stock ofa closely held fırın is liquid. It 
has no ready market. lf one of the owners wants to sell some shares to raise cash, it is hard 
to find a ready bu yer, and ever ifa bu yer is located, there is no established price on which 
to base the transaction. These problems do not exist with publicly owned firms. 
3) Facilities raising new corporate cash: lf a privately held company 
wants to raise cash by a sale of new stock, it must either go to its existing owners, who 
may not have any money or not want to put any more eggs in this particular basket, or else 
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shop around for wealthy investors. However, it is usually quite difficult to get outsiders to 
put money into a closely held company, because if the outsiders do not have voting control 
( over 50 percent of the stock), the inside stockholders/managers can run roughshod over 
them. The insiders can even keep the outsiders from knowing the company's actual 
earnings, or its real worth. There are not many positions more vulnerable than that of an 
outside stockholder in a closely held company, and for this reason, it is hard for closely 
held companies to raise new equity capital. Going public, which brings with it both public 
discloure of information and regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), greatly reduces these problems, making people more willing to invest in the 
company and thus making it easier for the fırın to raise capital. 
4) Establishes a value for the fırın: Fora number of reasons, it is 
often useful to establish a fırm's value in the marketplace. For one thing, when the owner 
ofa privately owned business dies, state and federal tax appraisers must set a value on the 
company for estate tax purposes. Often, these appraisers set too high a value, which creates 
an obvious problem. However, a company that is publicly owned has its value established 
with little room for argument. Similarly, if a company wants to give incentive stock 
options to key employees, it is useful to know the exact value of those options. 
• Disadvantages of going public: 
1) Cost of reporting: A publicly owned company must file quarterly 
and annual reports with the SEC and with various state agencies. These reports can be 
costly, especially for small fırms. 
2) Disclosure: Management may not like the idea of reporting 
operating data, because such data will then be available to competitors. Similarly, the 
owners of the company may not want people to know their net worth, and since a publicly 
owned company must disclose the number of shares owned by its officiers, directors, and 
major stockholders, it is easy enough for anyone to multiply shares held by price per share 
to estimate the net worth of the insiders. 
3) Self-dealing: The owners/managers of closely held companies 
have many opportunities for various types of questionable but legal self-dealings, including 
the payment of high salaries, personal transactions with the business (such as a leasing 
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arrangement), and not-truly-necessary fringe benefits. Such self-dealings which are often 
designed to minimize taxes, are much harder to arrange ifa company is publicly owned. 
4) Inactive market/low price: If the fırın is very small, and if its 
shares are not traded with much frequency, its stock will not really be liquid, and the 
market price may not be representative of the stock's true value. Security analyst will not 
follow the stock, because there will just not be sufficient trading activity to generate 
sufficient sales commissions to cover the costs of following the stock. 
5) Control: Because of the recent drarnatic increase in tender offers 
and proxy fıghts , the managers of publicly owned fırıns who do not have voting control 
must be concemed about maintaining control. Further, there is a pressure on such 
managers to produce annual earnings gains, even when it might be in the shareholders' 
best long-terın interests to adopt a strategy that might penalize short terın eamings but 
benefit earnings in future years. These factors have led a nurnber of public companies to 
"go private" in leveraged buyout deals where the managers borrow the money to buy out 
the nonmanagement stockholders. 
2.5. Ownership Structure and Firm Performance Around The World 
Since Berle and Means (1932), the conflict between managers and shareholders has been 
studied by researches seeking to understand the nature of the fırın . Their study encourages 
ongoing discussion of the effect of ownership on fırın performance. They indicate that 
shareholders of publicly-held corporations are so nurnerous and small. They recognize the 
difference between imrnediate and ultimate control. As the fırın size increases, 
shareholding becomes diffused. They argue that diffusion in ownership causes owners of 
shares powerless to constraint professional management. After their analysis, it has been 
common to state that dispersed shareholders are powerless in the face of managerial 
opportunism. They classifıed fırıns into fıve categories: 
1) The dominant shareholder owns more than 80% of the total shares in privately 
owned companies. 
2) The dominant shareholder owns more than 50%, but less than 80% of the total 
shares in majority controlled companies. 
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3) The dominant shareholder owns more than 20%, but less than 50% of the total 
shares in minority controlled companies. 
4) Companies controlled by using a legal device for example pyramiding ete. 
5) There is no dominant shareholder in management controlled companies. 
They find that the firın's perforınance increases uniforınly. They also find that the 
manager-shareholder conflicts are connected with ownership structure ofa fırın, because 
the separation of ownership and control creates the manager-shareholder conflicts. They 
show that a linear relationship between ownership structure and perforınance. 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) show that the level of managerial ownership is deterınined by 
the riskiness of the fırın using cross-sectional data. According to Demsetz (1983), 
ownership concentration is the endogenous and efficient outcome ofa fırın's response to 
its competitive environment. Demsetz ( 1983) suggets neutrality hypothesis. All structure 
are equal and corporate perforınance depends on environmental constraints. Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985) argue the advantages and disadvantages to the fırın's shareholders of greater 
diffuseness in ownership structure. Their model is based on the costs and benefits of 
ownership diffusion. Their study also is based on primarily on concentration of ownership. 
Ownership concentration provides large owners with incentives to take an active interest in 
the fırın and to monitor its managers. Large investors bear costs, as they are not diversifıed 
and bear excessive risk. They fınd that ownership structure is endogenous and depends on 
extemal and intemal environment. They build a symmetrical model of ownership 
concentration and perforınance (measured by accountings profits). The value-maximizing 
size of the fırın, control potential, and systematic regulation effect ownership structure. 
They show a positive association between environmental instability, and stock 
concentration. This is explained with the control potential of a fırın. They believe that a 
control potential of a fırın is directly connected with the noisiness of the environment in 
which it operates, and they also believe that noisier environments give rise to more 
concentrated ownership structure. They suggest that amenity potential ofa fırın's output is 
more speculative explanation of ownership concentration than size, control potential, and 
regulation. The sample consists of 511 large US firıns, including regulated utilities and 
financial institutions for 1976-1980. They use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. 
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Ownership variables are measured by logarithm of an Herfindahl Index, logarithm of 
combined holding by 5 largest shareholders, logarithm of holding by 20 largest 
shareholders, holdings by 5 largest families and individuals, and holdings by 5 largest 
institutional investors. They use accounting profit rate to measure firm performance. They 
also use performance variables as return on equity, standard error of market model 
regressing firm return on market return. Independent variables are measured as industry 
durnmies for utilities, financials, and media; firm size by market value of equity; capital 
expenditure / total sales; advertising / total sales; R&D / total sales; standard deviation of 
accounting ROE; standard deviation of stock return. Important control variables are market 
value and all measures of industry standard deviation. Their findings show that ownership 
by 5 or 20 largest shareholders increases by standard error of market return. Perforınance 
by accounting return is insignificantly decreasing with ownership by 5 or 20 largest 
shareholders or the Herfindahl Index. Stock concentration and fırın perforınance are 
unrelated. They find non-linear relation between accounting rates of return and the 
concentration of ownership, and they also find that a negative relationship between fırın 
size and stock concentration. They document no significant relation between the presence 
of large shareholdings and firın's value. 
Demsetz ( 1986) argues about the insider-investment argument. He uses 56 large US firıns 
in 1980. The first subset consists of the 28 firıns exhibiting the highets degree of ownership 
concentration. The second subset consists of the 28 firıns exhibiting such low 
concentration of ownership that no one shareholder owned more than 0.02 percent of the 
shares. He measures ownership variable using insider ownership by directors and officiers. 
He uses insider trading involvement as insider trading volume to insider ownership as a 
perforınance variable in descriptive statistic. He indicates that insider trading involvement 
is 7 times higher for firıns with high insider ownership. 
Morck et al. (1988) look at the relationship between ownership structure and fırın 
perforınance. They believe that ownership structure is as exogenous. The sample consists 
of 371 largest US firms in 1980. They define managerial ownership as ownership by 
members of the board of directors. They measure ownership variables by combined 
shareholding by all members of the board in the ranges [0-5%], [5-25%], and [25-100%], 
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combined shareholding by top two officiers, and dummy for presence of founder on board. 
They use Tobin's Q ratio and profit rate as performance variables. Tobin's Q relies on 
market value of stock, preferred stock, and debt to replacement cost of plant and 
inventories. Profit rate relies on net cash flow to replacement cost of capital. The other 
variables of their analysis are size by replacement cost of assets, R&D costs to size, 
advertising to size, long-term debt to size, and industry by 3-digit SIC ( Standard Industry 
Classifıcation). They use OLS regression, and they measure Tobin's Q ratio as a proxy for 
corporate performance, and the fraction of shares owned by corporate insiders in a 
piecewise linear regression. 
The incentive theory 
P rformance 
+ 
Ownership 
The entrenchment 
Pe formance 
Ownership 
The Morck et al. 
p 
Ownership 
Figure 2.2. The argument by Morck et al. (1988) (www.encycogov.com) 
They take the incentive alignment theory (see Figure 2.2). At high level of ownership, 
managers are 100% entrenched. They have the most important role for control. At low 
level of ownership, managers' ownerhip stake is too small for control, so entrenchment 
effect influences the incentive effect only for medium concentrated levels of managerial 
ownership. They show that corporate value first rises with increases in inside ownership as 
the incentive alignment affect of share value dominates, then falls as the entrenchment 
affect of insider voting control becomes stronger. Their regression results show that there 
is a positive relationship between managerial ownership and Tobin's Q in the [0-5%], and 
beyond the 25% level, but a negative relationship in the [5-25%] range. Corporate value 
increases first in the [0-5%] range, and then decreases in the [5-25%] range, and finally 
increases when inside ownership exceeds 25%. They explain this relation with an inverted 
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U-shaped. When managerial ownership increases, Tobin's Q ratio ıncreases and then 
decreases. That is, a positive relationship between ownership structure and firm value at 
low levels, a negative relationship at intermediate levels, and then a positive relationship at 
high levels of ownership. Although, they indicate that inside ownership is an important 
control mechanism, and it is positively connected with firm value, they find a non-linear 
relationship between ownership structure and firm value. (Short and Keasey, 1999; 
McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Holdemess et al., 1998; Davies et al., 2002). 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) examine the relationship between insider and blockholder 
ownership, and corporate value. They believe that ownership structure is as exogenous 
(Morck et al.,1988). The sample consists of 1173 US firms in 1976, and 1093 US firms in 
1986. They use Tobin's Q and retum on asset (ROA) as a measure performance. They 
calculate Tobin's Q ratio like Morck et al.,(1988). ROA relies on earnings before 
depreciation, interest and taxes divided by replacement value of assets. They define 
managerial ownership as equity owned by corporate officiers and members of the board of 
directors. They use ownership variables by ( 1) insider ownership by managers and 
directors, (2) institutional ownership, (3) largest single blockholder, (4) combined 
ownership by non-insiders who have more than 5% ownership, (5) durnmy for presence of 
blockholders, (6) insider ownership in the ranges [0-5%], [5-25%], and [25-100%]. Control 
variables of their analysis are size by replacement cost of assets, R&D cost to size, 
advertising to size, long-term debt to size. They use ordinary least squares (OLS) and 
piecewise linear regression. The results suggest that institutional ownership promote firm 
performance, but blockholder ownership does not have any effect on firm performance. 
They find a positive relationship between Tobin's Q and insider ownership in the (0-5%] 
range. But they find no important relation beyond 5%. Although, there is a positive 
relationship between firm performance and managerial ownership when managerial 
ownership is between 0% and 40-50%. They explain the connection between ownership 
and firm value with non-linear relationship. (Short and Keasey, 1999; Morck et al., 1988; 
Holdemess et al., 1998). They indicate that a positive relationship between ownership and 
firm value at low levels, and a negative relationship at high levels of structure. They 
explain it with an inverted U-shaped function (Morck et al., 1988; Mueller and Spitz, 
2001). Finally, they find a concave relation between managerial ownership and Tobin 's Q. 
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McConnell & Servaes (1995) use 990 US firms in 1976, 876 US firms in 1986, and US 
780 firms in 1988. They measure ownership variables using (1) insider stock ownership by 
managers and directors, (2) institutional ownership, (3) blockholders as combined 
ownership by non-insiders who have more than 5% ownership. They construct OLS 
regression with Tobin's Q ratio. This ratio is defined as market value of stock preferred 
stock and debt to replacement value of assets. Control variables are the same as McConnell 
& Servaes (1990). The results are the same as their preceding study. Only difference is that 
Tobin's Q is significantly increasing with blockholder ownership now. 
Oswald and Jahera (1991) measure ownership structure in terms of stockholdings of both 
officiers and directors, and they measure fırın performance in terms of excess stock 
returns. Their sample period covers from 1983 to 1987 with 645 firms. They rank the 
sample according to the percentage of stock held by insiders and then divitle into five equal 
groups. Group O describes manager-controlled firms with the least insider ownership, and 
group 4 describes owner-controlled firms with the greatest insider ownership. They point 
out that all the performance measures ( rate of return on assets, rate of return on equity, 
excess rates of return) are higher with the greatest degree of insider ownership, confirming 
expectations. The higher level of insider ownership intimates improved decision-making 
resulting in higher earnings and dividends. They find a significant relationship between 
ownership and performance even after controlling for size differences. 
Chaganti and Damanpour (1991) investigate the role of institutional owners and 
relationship between outside institutional and both capital structure and performance. They 
use a series of hierarchical multiple regressions using (1) stockholdings by outside 
institutions, (2) stockholdings by corporate executives, (3) stockholdings by family 
owners, and (4) stockholdings by insider institutions. These are their ownership variables. 
They measure capital structure as long-term debt-to-capital ratio (D-C ratio ). Their 
performance variables are (1) return on assets, an accounting measure of the efficiency 
with which corporate assets are managed, (2) retum on equity, a measure of efficiency with 
which shareholders' investments are managed, (3) price-earnings (P-E) ratio, it reflects a 
relative value of the firm's stock in the market, (4) total stock retum, it captures income to 
shareholders in the form of dividends and capital gains due to share price and increases. 
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They use dependent variables as capital structure or performance, and they use 
independent variables as moderator variable, the size of outside institutional stockholding, 
and the interaction between them. Their starting point shows that ownership structure 
influences the relationship between outside institutional holdings and both capital structure 
and firm performance. They collect data from 40 pairs of manufacturing firms in US over a 
3-year period form 1983 to 1985. They compare the highest and lowest percentages of 
stock hold by outside institutional investors. Findings show that the highest group has, on 
average, a higher return on asset, return on equity, price-earnings ratio, and total stock 
return than the lowest group but the lowest group has, on average, higher debt-capital 
ratios than the highest group. So, they support that the degree of stock ownership by 
outside instituitons is inversely related to the long-term-debt-to-capital ratio of the firm. 
Stock hold by outside institutional investors has a positive effect on the financial 
performance of the firm. 
Leech and Leahy (1991) look at ownership structure to determine a firm's performance. 
They analyze ownership structure both in terms of ownership concentration indices and 
control types classifications. The sample consists of 470 UK large, industrial firms over 
1983-1985. They measure ownership variables with two ways; 
1. Five ownership concentration indices 
• Herfindal Index, 
• Largest holding, 
• Combined holding of largest 5, 1 O, 20 shareholders. 
2. Six control type indices for manager control and ownership control.( Control-types are 
based on the concentration of voting power.) 
• Largest shareholding exceeds 5%, 10%, and 20%, 
• Degree of control of largest holding exceeds 90%, 95%, and 99%. 
They define these variables using fixed and variable rules. They use return on sales, return 
on equity, and historical market value divided by ordinary share capital as measures of 
performance. Their dependent variables are (1) valuation ratio, (2) trading profit margin, 
(3) rate of return on shareholders' capital, (4) rate of growth of total sales, (5) rate of 
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growth of net assets, and (6) highest-paid director's salary. They think that ownership 
structure affects behaviour in two ways; 
1. Directly through the effects of ownership structure on owners' incentives, 
2. Indirectly through control type reflecting the concentration of voting power. 
They measure independent variables by; (1) the standard deviation of the rate of retum 
which measures total risk, (2) beta which measures systematic risk, (3) size by the 
logarithm of total sales, ( 4) product diversifıcation, (5) age of fırın , (6) export intensity of 
sales which measures of exposure to competition in world markets, (7) capital intensity of 
technology which is the ratio of capital to labor, and (8) industry. They build multivariate 
regression model. They consider ownership structure endogenously (Demsetz and Lehn, 
1985), and examine that ownership concentration and control type reflect fırın size, risk, 
and age. Their results indicate that ownership-controlled fırıns have more higher profit 
rates and growth rates than manager-controlled fırıns with regard to retum on equity, retum 
on sales, growth of sales, and growth of net assets. More concentration cause signifıcantly 
less perforınance in terıns of historical market value divided by ordinary share capital. A 
variable rule gives a more realistic classifıcation of control type than a fıxed rule, and that 
control is exogenous and independent of fırın size, age, risk while ownership structure is 
endogenous. When they use variables rules rather than fıxed rules, they notice control-type 
effects. U nlike ownership concentration, the greater dispersion of ownership shows a 
higher valuation ratio, profit margin, and growth rate of net assets. Ownership structure 
depends on fırın size, diversifıable risk, and product diversifıcation. Age is important in 
valuation ratio, profit margin, and the highest-paid director's salary. They find that 
corporate perforınance is an increasing function of managerial ownership. They results 
show that older firıns have lower valuation ratio and profit margin, and pay their highest-
paid director less. Leach and Leahy exhibit that corporate perforınance is an increasing 
function of managerial ownership. 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) examıne relationship between ownership structure and 
perforınance using seven mechanisms to control agency problems between managers and 
shareholders. These mechanisms are (1) insider shareholding relies on inside owners, (2) 
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institutional shareholding relies on institutional owners, (3) blockholding relies on large 
outside owners, (4) use of outsiders on the board relies on these board members, (5) the use 
of debt relies on capital market for monitoring, (6) the market for managers relies on 
prospective employers, and (7) the market for corporate control relies on prospective 
acquirers. Their sample consists of 383 large US fırıns in 1987. They use ownership 
variables as percentage of insider ownership by directors and officiers, dummy for 
presence of founding CEO, and percentage of shares held by above 5% blockholders. They 
try to fınd the relationship among the control mechanisms and the relationship between 
fırın perforınance and the control mechanisms using ordinary least squares resression 
(OLS), and two-stage-least squares regression (2SLS). Dependent variables are measured 
by insider shareholding, institutional shareholding, blockholder ownership, years of CEO 
employment, percentage of outside (nonemployee) directors on the board, and leverage by 
debt to fırın value. They measure Tobin's Q as a perforınance variable and Tobin's Q is 
measured as market value of equity at the year-end + book value of long-terın debt + book 
value short-terın debt + preferred stock at liquidating value + book value of convertible 
debt and convertible preferred stock / total assets. Their independent variables are years of 
CEO tenure, number of institutional shareholders, number of offıciers and directors, 
research and development expenditures / total assets, advertising expenditures / total 
assets, dummy for NYSE listing, fırın diversifıcation, cash flow return, dummy for 
regulated fırın, size by assets, and control activity by % of acquired fırıns in each two-digit 
SIC. When they use OLS and 2SLS regressions on Tobin's Q, they fınd that Tobin's Q 
decreases signifıcantly with board outsiders. Using OLS regression, Tobin's O decreases 
with debt fınancing, and corporate control activity, and there is a positive relationship 
between Tobin's Q and insider ownership. They use 2SLS regression without Tobin's Q, 
they fınd that blockholder ownership and institutional ownership increase by corporate 
control. Institutional ownership decreases with blockholder ownership and visa versa. 
Y ears of CEO employment decreases with institutional and blockholder ownership, but not 
visa versa. Their fındings show that there is a positive relationship between greater insider 
ownership and fırın perforınance, and a negative relationship between more outsiders on 
the board, more debt fınancing, greater corporate control activity and fırın perforınance. 
Finally, they report a positive effect of shareholdings of insiders on fırın perforınance 
measured by Tobin's Q. 
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Nickell et al. , ( 1997) try to find the role of three external factors in generating improved 
productivity performance in companies. These are product market competition, financial 
market pressure, and shareholder control. They are important factors, because competition, 
financial pressure, and shareholder control act to discipline managers, and improve 
company performance. They conduct their research ona sample of 580 UK manufacturing 
firms from 1985 to 1994. They make extensive use of ex-post rents (profits less capital 
costs), normalized on value-added, as an inverse measure of competition. They measure 
performance variable by productivity growth as change in logarithm of real sales. 
Shareholder control is a dummy variable. They use dominant shareholder dummies which 
are in three categories. SCl is a financial firm such as insurance company, bank. SC2 is a 
person, a family, a group of linked individuals, a company pension fund or charity. SC3 is 
a non-financial company. Their statistical method is a regression technique by Arellano 
and Bond for dynamic panel data methods. This checks for substitution effects between 
financial pressure, monopoly power, and shareholder control by including interaction 
terms. They use other variables such as; (1 ) lagged productivity growth, (2) change in log 
of employment, (3) change in log of capital stock, ( 4) change in index of industry overtime 
hours, (5) monopoly power by change of market share, or industry concentration, or 
industry import penetration or rent / value added, (6) size by log of employment, (7) 
fi nancial pressure by interest payments / cash flow, (8) industry & time dummies. 
Dummies SC 1, SC2, and SC3 equal to 1, if largest shareholder has 90% or 95% change of 
winning a majotiry vote. When the dominant shareholder is an external financial institution 
(SC 1 ), this has a positive impact on productivity growth. Because external financial 
institutions are able to impose some managerial discipline. When the dominant shareholder 
is an internal (SC2), this has no effect. When the dominant shareholder is an external, but a 
non-financial company, this has a negative effect on productivity growth. When they 
investigate impact of financial pressure and competition on productivity growth, they find 
a strong evidence between financial pressure and competition. Financial pressure 
interacted with rents. When rents fall , that is, competition rises, the impact of financial 
pressure goes down on productivity. Finally, they find that productivity increases 
significantly with SCl and decreases significantly with SC3. Significant substitution effect 
between financial pressure and monopoly power, and SCl and monopoly power. 
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Xu and Wong (1997) investigate the impact of ownership structure on the performance of 
publicly-listed companies in China. The sample consists of 500 companies are listed on the 
two national stock exchanges at the end of 1996. They define companies are owned by fi ve 
groups of agents. These are ; 
1) The legal person (institutions) shares : These shares owned by domestic 
institutions. In China, a legal person a non-individual legal entity or institutions. 
Domestic institutions include stock companies, non-bank-financial institutions ans 
state-owned enterprises that have at least one non-state owners. 
2) The tradable A shares : They are held and traded by individuals and some by 
domestic institutions. 
3) The state shares : They are held by the central, local, or solely govemment-owned 
enterprises. 
4) The employee shares : They are offered to workers and managers of a listed 
company, usually ata substantial discount. 
5) The foreign shares : B-shares are available to foreign investors. 
The state, institutions and A-share are the main shareholders controlling 30% of the 
outstanding shares each. Employees and foreign investors together hold less than 10%. 
Ownership in China is highly concentrated. They use ownership structure by ownership 
mix and ownership concentration. They use Tobin's Q, the market-to-book value ratio, 
ROE and ROA. Tobin's Q is calculated the market value of debt plus the market value of 
equity divided by the replacement cost of all assets, the market-to-book balue ratio is share 
prices on the last trading day of each year time the number of total outstanding shares 
divided by the book value of equity, ROE is after tax profits divided by the book value of 
equity, and ROA is after tax profits divided by the book value of total assets. Ownership 
concentration measures by the percentage of shares controlled by top 1 O shareholders and 
the sum of squared percentage of shares controlled by the each top 1 O shareholders 
(Herfindahl Index). Industry durnmies for manufacturing, trade, utility, real estate 
industries; the debt / asset ratio which equals the book value debt divided by the book 
value of assets; sale by the size effect of firms; and growth of net income are used as 
control variables. Ownership fractions are the fraction of equity owned by the state, legal · 
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person, A-share, employees and foreign. They use regression of perforınance variables on 
concentration ratios without distinguishing different types of shares. They examine the 
ownership concentration and mix-profitability relationships. They fınd that fırın 
perforınance increases with ownership concentration. Because concentration gives the 
incentive and the power to monitor and control the management. Ownership concentration 
has more stronger effects for companies dominated by legal person shareholders than for 
those dominated by the state. The fırın perforınance is positively correlated with the 
fraction of legal person shares and this is important at the 1 % and 5% level. When using 
ROE and ROA as measures of perforınance, individual shareholders do not have any 
important effect on fırın perforınance. Because small individual shareholders do not 
monitor and influence the behaviour of the management in China due to free-rider 
problem. Large legal person shareholders have an important and positive role in corporate 
govemance. 
Pedersen and Thomsen (1997) exarnine relationship between corporate ownership, fırın 
size, industry, and nation. Their primary goal is to analyse differences in ownership 
structure and effects of ownership structure on corporate govemance and behaviour. The 
sample consists of 100 largest non-fınancial companies in European countries. These 
countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Gerınany, Great Britain, Italy, 
The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and Sweden. The database contains one-year (1990) and 
is based only on inforınation the largest owner. They use terıns as minority and majority 
ownership (Pedersen and Thomsen, 1996). Minority ownership is defined as holdings 
votes less than 50% by the largest owner, and majority ownership is defıned as holdings 
votes more than 50% by the largest owner. They exhibit ownership structure differences 
among twelve European nations using ownership variables. These variables are (1) 
dispersed ownership relies on holdings less than 20% of company shares, (2) dominant 
ownership relies on holdings between 20% and 50% of the company shares, (3) family-
owned which is majority ownership, ( 4) foreign-owned which is majority ownership, (5) 
govemment-owned which is majority ownership, and (6) cooperative. Dispersed 
ownership is more higher in Great Britain and The Netherlands than other countries. 
Austria and ltaly do not have dispersed ownership structure. Dominant ownership is 
common in Finland and Gerınany. Family-owned structure is the highest in Denmark. 
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Foreign-owned structure is more higher in Belgium and Spain than other countries. 
Govemment-owned structure is common in France, Italy, and Norway. While Denmark 
has the highest cooperative rate, Italy has zero cooperative rate. They explain these 
ownership structure differences with historical, geographical, and economic development 
differences. They examine effects of fırın size, industry, and nation on corporate 
ownership. Their results show that industry has an important influence on corporate 
ownership (even after controlling for nation and company size). Their analysis is focused 
on the effects of formal institutions on corporate ownership. They explain the nature of the 
nation effect using multinominal logistic regresions. They measure institutional variables 
by; 
• Stock market size ( stock market capitalization as share of gross domestic product) 
• Banking concentration (number of banks maong the world's top 500) 
• Frequently of dual class shares ( are dual class shares used frequently?) 
• Openness of the economy (is authorization required for foreign direct investment?) 
Dispersed ownership is chosen the baseline. There is a positive relationship between 
ownership dispersion and size, liquidity of the stock market. Banking concentration 
reduces the frequency of cooperative and foreign ownership. Dual class shares have a 
positive effect on family ownership, govemment, and dominant minority ownership. The 
openness of the economy has an important positive effect on foreign ownersihp. The 
results indicate that these variables are the most important for ownership distribution. 
Pedersen and Thomsen (1997) suggets that national and industrial differences are as 
important for corporate ownership. 
Denis et al., (1997) investigate the influence of ownership structure on intemal monitoring 
efforts by documenting the rate of nonroutine top executive tumover. The sample consists 
of 1394 firms over the period 1985-1988. They report descriptive statistics for different 
ownership variables. By using ownership of the firms by officiers and directors, by 
institutions, by outside blockholders, the fraction of firms with outside blockholders, with 
founder as chief executive officer, the fraction of insiders on board, the fraction of grey 
directors on board and the fraction of independent outsiders on _board of directors, they find 
that, on average, institutions own 33,3% of the firm's share, over 46% of the firms have 
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outside blockholders and on average, these blockholders own 18, 1 % of the firm' s share. 
Outside blockholders are defined as those holders of at least 5% of the firm's share and 
they are not related to the top management team. Their results indicate that increased 
managerial ownership is connected with a lower incidence of outside block ownership, a 
lower fraction of shares held by institutions and a lower fraction of independent outsiders 
on the board of directors. The probability of tumover is significantly less sensitive to 
performance when officers and directors own between 5% and 25% of the firm's share that 
when officers and directors own less than 5%. After controlling for firm performance, 
there is an important negative relation between managerial ownership and the likelihood of 
tumover. Finally, their results suggest that ownership structure has an important impact on 
intemal monitoring effects. 
Li and Simerly (1998) test the moderating effects of environmental dynamism on the 
insider ownership and performance. They conduct their analysis on a sample of 90 
companies with using 4-year average (1900-1993). They choose the food and beverage, 
and the computer and electronics industry. They use large and established firms . They 
measure ownership as the stock owned by the CEO divided by total common shares 
outstanding in 1992. Their performance measures are retum on asset (ROA), retum on 
equity (ROE), retum on investment (ROI), and operating retum on asset (OROA), and 
these are dependent variables. The OROA measure is operating income divided by the 
book value ofa firm's total assets (Li &Simerly, 1998 page:173). They use this measure 
because, it is a control for systematic risk and monopoly power. They choose control 
variables as CEO stock value, CEO duality, capital structure, institutional holding, firm 
size, firm age, and diversification. CEO stock holding is an important control variables, 
because the actual value of a CEO' stockholding motivates CEO to work for the 
shareholders' interests. Their hypothesis-testing variables are CEO stock ownership and 
industry dummy, and they are independent variables. The emprical tests consists of four 
multiple regression analysis. Their findings indicates that each of four firm performance 
measures at the p<0.05 level. There is a positive relationship between ownership and 
performance and environmental dynamism moderates this relationship. The retum on 
assets have a positive impact on performance but, there is no relationship between the 
market value and performance when using ROE, ROI, and OROA measures. Their study 
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shows that the fırın size has a negative impact on the fırın perforınance. These fındings 
point out that increased insider ownership may lead to betler returns under conditions of 
greater environmental dynamism. 
Han and Suk (1998) examine the relationship between ownership structure and corporate 
perforınance. They use stock returns as a measure of perforınance. They also examine the 
effects of insider ownership and institutional ownership in the regressional framework. 
Inside owners consists of officiers, directors, benefıcal owners and principal stockholders 
owning 10% or more of the company stock. The sample consists of 301 only 
manufacturing fırıns over the period 1988-1992. They measure the square of the level of 
insider ownership as an independent variable. Their control variables are size effect that 
relies on the natural logarithm of the average market value of equity, and the earnings-
price effect that relies on the average earnings-price ratio for the sample period. They 
investigate the ownership structure and stock returns across industries using F-test, and 
they fınd that the insider ownership is much lower than institutional ownership, on 
average, for all industries. Stock returns are signifıcantly different across industries. When 
insider ownership increases, stock returns increases. Their results show that corporate 
perforınance is an increasing function of managerial ownership ( Leach and Leahy, 1991). 
But, the square of the level of insider ownership is inversely connected with stock retums. 
They fınd that there is a negative relationship between excessive insider ownership and its ' 
effects on corporate perforınance. Stock return are positively connected with institutional 
ownership and institutional owners are active in monitoring management. 
Cole and Mehran ( 1998) examine the perforınance of a sample of 94 thrift institutions 
before and after the expiration of an ownership-perforınance restriction over the period 
1983-1987. They use ownership variables by (1) the largest percentage ownership by a 
single officer and director, (2) the largest percentage ownership by a single institutions 
blockholder, (3) the largest percentage ownership by a single non-institutions blockholder, 
and (4) the largest percentage ownership by the fırın's employee stock ownership plans. 
They describe a non-institution blockholder asa non-institution outside investor holding at 
least 5% of the fırın . Industry-adjusted excess return is used as a fırın perforınance variable 
in their regression. Industry-adjusted returns are calculated as the fırın-specifıc annual 
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return, minus the median industry annual return. The change in ownership percentages is 
measured to examine it's effects on fırın perforınance as the mean ownership during the 
post-expiration year, minus the mean ownership in the pre-expiration years. Post-
Conversion Anti-Takeover Rule weakens the connection between perforınance and reward 
by limiting the inside ownership, and the rule also weakens the disciplinary role of the 
market for corporate control by limiting the outside blockholders ownership. In their 
analysis, these restrictions limit ownership by any person or group of person acting in 
concert to 10% of the fırın's outstanding. Their results indicate that industry-adjusted 
retums and changes in insider ownership have a positive relationship. Changes in 
employee stock ownership plan has a negative influence on industry-adjusted returns. The 
relationship between changes in outside blockholder ownership and industry-adjusted 
retums are unrelated. Finally, fırın perforınance is an increasing function of changes in 
insider ownership, and it is a decreasing function of changes in employee stock ownership 
plans. They fınd that fırıns perforın much better after the restriction expire, and better 
perforınance is associated with greater ownership concentrated. 
Klein (1998) examines the relation between the composition of the board of directors and 
fırın perforınance. The sample consists of 485 US fırıns for 1992 and 486 for 1993. Klein 
uses retum on assets, lensen Productivity and market returns as measures of perforınance. 
lensen Productivity measures the investment strategies and productivity of the fırıns' long-
terın assets. It is equal to the change in market value of equity minus a benchmark retum 
on investment. Directors are divided into three categories. The fırst, insiders are the CEO, 
president or a vice president. The second, outsiders have no connection with the fırın 
beyond being a member of the fırıns' board. The third, affiliates are forıner employees, 
interlocking director, retiree of corporations and relative of CEO. The independent 
variables include %Insiders which is the percentage of inside direction on the entire board, 
%0utsiders which is the percentage of outside direction on the entire board. %Director 
Shareholding is the percentage of shares owned by all directors, %5 Outside Director is 
the existence of a 5% equityholder who simultaneously in an outside director. OLS 
regression is used to measure the cross-sectional relation between board composition and 
fırın perforınance for 1992. Klein fınds that no systematic _association between board 
committee structure and fırın perforınance. 
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Cho (1998) tests the relation among ownership structure, investment, and corporate value, 
focusing on the possible role of ownership structure as a determinant of investment. The 
sample consists of 320 of 500 large US fırms in 1991. Cho uses two measures of corporate 
investment; capital expenditures, and R&D expenditures. The capital expenditure model is 
based on data for 326 Fortune 500 fırms, and the R&D expenditure model is based on data 
for 230 Fortune 500 fırms . The performance variable of this analysis is Tobin's Q. All data 
are for 1991, but data is for Tobin's Q calculated at the end of 1990. Cho defınes insider 
ownership as share ownership by officiers and directors of the board, and insider 
ownership is in the ranges : [0%, 7%], [7%, 38], and [28%, 100%]. He uses a statistical 
method as OLS regression. (test for non-monotonic relation by piecewise linear regression 
and fıx the breakpoints by a grid search technique that maximizes signifıcance.) OLS 
regression shows that ownership structure affects investment and corpotare value. The 
relation between insider ownership and Tobin' s Q is signifıcantly positive for ownership 
levels below 7%, signifıcantly negative for levels between 7% and 38%, and positive but 
insignifıcantly for levels above 38%. Capital expenditure and R&D expenditures are 
signifıcantly increasing for insider ownership in the [0%, 7%] range, and significantly 
decreasing in the [7%, 38] range. The relation between insider ownership and investment is 
important for ownership in the range between 0% and 38%, but is not important in the 
range above 38%. Cho uses control variables as fırın size, fınancial leverage, liquidity, 
volatility, and industry dummy. He measures ; (a) fırın size by logarithm of replacement 
cost of assets or market value of equity, (b) fınancial leverage by market value of long-
term debt to replacement cost of assets, (c) liquidity by cash flow to replacement cost of 
capital. Cash flow is defıned as after-tax income plus depreciation and amortization. If 
fırms have higher liquity, they may have higher corporate values and more investment 
opportunities, ( d) volatility by standard deviation of the changes in yearly profit rate over 
the fıve-year period 1986-1991, (e) industry dummy variables based on two-digit SIC 
codes. He makes a remark the potential endogencity effect using the two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) method. He estimates three equations with ownership, performance, and 
investment as the dependent variables. Insider ownership is measured as insider equity 
ownership as fraction of total shares of outstanding equity. Important control variables of 
this statistical method are market value of common equity, and liquidity. Market value of 
common equity is the market value of fırm's common equity in 1991. Findings show that 
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performance increases signifıcantly by capital expenditure. 2SLS regression shows that 
insider ownership increases signifıcantly with Tobin's Q, and Tobin's Q increases 
insignifıcantly with insider ownership. Finally, ownership structure affects investment and 
corporate value by using OLS regression, whereas investment affects corporate value 
which in tum ownership structure, but not vice versa by using 2SLS regression. Cho fınds 
that managerial ownership is an increasing function of corporate performance. 
Gedajlovic and Shapiro (1998) examine the relationship between ownership concentration 
and performance across the nations of Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and 
the United States. They argue that the correlation between ownership concentration and 
fırın profitability differs across countries in a systematic way determined by the national 
system of corporate govemance. The sample consists of 1030 medium to large-sized 
publicly traded, private sector fırms (minimum assets, US $50 million) over the period 
1986-1991 . They indicate cross-national comparison of corporate govemance. Ownership 
dispersion is the highest in the US and in France, Canada and Germany, the ownership of 
fırms is less widely dispersed than in the UK. The US and UK are characterized by 
different types of owners; in the US by individuals, pension, and mutual funds and the UK 
by pension and mutual funds. In Canada by family and nonfinancial corporations; in 
France by nonfınancial corporations and the state; in Germany by banks and nonfinancial 
corporations. In both the US and the UK, board of directors consists of managers and 
outsiders, whereas in both France and Germany, board of directors consists of owners and 
workers. In Canada, board of directors consist of owners, managers and outsiders. They 
measure ownership concentration by the percentage of shares outstanding held by the 
largest shareholder and the square of ownership concentration. Their control variables are; 
(1) diversifıcation, (2) the growth rate of fırın, (3) fırın size by the logarithm of total assets, 
(4) georaphic scope, (5) industry effects and (6) temporal effects (a fırm's year-to-year 
performance will be affected by general economic and business cycle conditions). ROA is 
measured as a performance variable which is defıned the ratio of net income to total assets. 
They build ROA multiple regression. Their fındings indicate that ownership concentration 
varies greatly across countries, with the US and the UK least concentrated and Germany 
the most. The US has strong ownership effects, whereas Germany has weaker ownership 
effects and no effects at all in Canada or France. In the US, ownership concentration does 
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not exert a positive marginal effect on profitability, unless the firm is eithef highly 
concentrated Of highly divefsified. Thefe is a negative connection between divefsification 
and pefformance in the US and in the UK, but no significant connection between them in 
France, Germany Of Canada. They find difect nonlinear felation between ownefship 
concentrated and profitability in the US, and find no nonlinear felation between ownefship 
concentration and profitability in the UK. Theif fesults do suggest that country effects exist 
in the ownefship concentration-profitability felationship. 
Chhibbef and Majumdar (1999) examıne the impact of foreign ownership on the 
pefformance of firms. The sample consists of 1000 Indian firms listed on the Bombay 
Stock Exchange. The period comprises up to-1991 and after-1991. They use three 
ownefship variables. These are fofeign ownef, pfivate ownef and state owner. They define 
foreign ownership in three categories: 
• Foreign share holding up to 25%. This is called foreign low. 
• Foreign share holding between 25% and 40% for the years up to 1991 or between 
25% and 51 % aftef 1991. This is called foreign medium. 
• F oreign share holding 40% and up to 1991 or 51 % and up after 1991. This is called 
foreign high. 
They measure firm pefformance by return on assets and return on sales. ROA is calculated 
the profit before depfeciation, intefest and taxes as a ratio of total assets. Return on sales is 
calculated the profit before depreciation, interest and taxes as a ratio of net sales. They use 
the ratio of exports to total sales, the ratio of imports to total operating expenses, size by 
logarithm of sales, age, divefsity, group, the ratio of advertising, marketing and distfibution 
expenses to total operating expenses, quick ratio, net fixed assets, debt-equity ratio, the 
ratio of excise duties paid to total sales, inventory and sales growth as independent 
variables. Export sales and imports improve competitive conditions. Inventory and sales 
growth captufe general business conditions. Debt-equity ratio and excise control fof the 
impact of govemment policies on pefformance. They construct fegfession of both feturn on 
sales and feturn on assets. In both regfession of fetum on as_set and return on sales, the 
importance of the coefficient for the foreign medium is lower than the coefficient fof the 
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foreign high. The importance of the coefficient for the foreign medium is larger than for 
the foreign low. They show that the foreign high variable has a great impact on 
performance. There is an important relationship between the foreign high variable in the 
after-1991 period and performance measures, whereas the foreign medium and low are not 
important in regression models. The size variable has a positive and significant effect for 
both return on asset and return on sales. Chhibber and Majumdar expect this results, 
because they evaluate the size variable as a competitive condition and an organization 
variable. Age and the debt-equity ratio have a negative and important effect on regression 
models. A negative connection is found between return on asset and net fixed assets. They 
find that foreign-owned firms are berter managers of fixed capital stock. Foreign 
ownership of 51 % or more display superior performance when compared to the other 
firms. 
Denis and Sarin (1999) analyze the equity ownership structure and board composition. The 
sample consists of 583 publicly traded-firms over the period 1983-1992. They examine 
owner-specific characteristics by CEO ownership, ownership of officiers and directors, 
number of directors, fraction of independent outsiders, fraction of inside directors, fraction 
of affiliated outsiders, and fraction with outside-dominated boards. They find that the 
board of directors has nine, on average, 40% of board of directors are insider, 20% are 
affiliated outsiders, and 39% are independent outsiders. They also examine firm-specific 
characteristics by research & development / total asssets, fi.mı size, market value of equity, 
the ratio of total debt to total assets, tenure of CEO, and the standard deviation of daily 
stock returns. They use cross-sectional regressions. The regressions's results indicate that 
larger firms have low inside ownership, large boards anda greater fraction of independent 
outsiders on the board. There is a negative relationship between inside ownership and the 
fraction of independent outsiders on the board of directors, but a positive relationship 
betwen board size and the fraction of independent outsiders. They conduct a time-series 
examination of ownership structure and board composition in individual firms. They 
describe ownership and board changes with fi.ve categories (small changes, medium 
increases, medium decreases, large increases, and large decreases) to examine the 
frequency distribution of changes in ownership structure and board composition. They 
examine ownership and board structure changes because, ownership and board structure 
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changes are related to extemal corporate control threats, fırın perforınance, and the 
attributes of specifıc owners. Their results exhibit that large changes are cornmon in 
ownership structure and board composition, and they are perınanent in corporate 
govemance structures. An important fraction of fırın-years show large changes in 
ownership structure and board composition. Large changes are more comrnon for younger 
fırıns in the ownership of officiers and directors. Large changes are negatively related to 
prior stock price perforınance. Ownership structure and board composition changes are 
most signifıcantly associated with top executive changes, prior stock price perforınance, 
and corporate control threats, but these changes are weakly associated with changes in 
stock retum variance, leverage, fırın age, and growth opportunities. 
La Porta et al. (1999) examine the ownership structure of the 20 largest publicy traded-
fırıns in each of the 27 richest economies. Their ownership defınition relies on voting 
rights rather than cash flow rights. They described fırıns with two ways. First, widely held. 
Second, ultimate owners. Ultimate owners are defıned fıve different types. These are a 
family or an individual; the State; a widely held-financial institutions such as a bank or an 
insurance company; a widely held corporations; and miscellaneous such as a cooperative. 
They construct two sample of fırıns for each country. The fırst sample consists of the top 
20 fırıns at the end of 1995. This sample described large fırıns . The second sample consists 
of the smallest 1 O fırıns in each country. This sample described mediurn fırıns. The 
criterion for control, they use the cutoff of 1 O percent and 20 percent. Using the 20 percent 
defınition of control for the largest traded fırıns, 70 % of the fırıns in Austria are state-
controlled. 65% of the fırıns in Argentina, and 70% of the fırıns in Hong Kong are family-
controlled. 90% of the fırıns in Japan, and 80% of the fırıns in United States are widely-
held. Using the 1 O percent defınition of control for the largest traded fırıns, 70 % of the 
fırıns in Austria are state-controlled. 65% of the fırıns in Argentina, 70% of the fırıns in 
Hong Kong, and 65% of the fırıns in Greece are family-controlled. 90% of the fırıns in 
UK, and 80% of the fırıns in United States are widely-held. Widely-held fırıns and widely 
held corporations are more comrnon in countries with good shareholder protection. Widely 
held fınancial fırıns are more comrnon with poor shareholder protection. That is, dispersion 
of ownership goes together with good shareholder protection. Using the 20% cutoff for the 
mediurn-sized publicy traded fırıns, 83% of the fırıns in Austria are state-controlled. 100% 
of the firms in Greece and Mexico, and 90% of the firıns in Hong Kong are farnily-
controlled. 90% of the firıns in United States, and 63% of the fırıns in Ireland are widely-
held. U sing the 10% cutoff for the medium-sized publicy traded fırıns, farnily-controlled 
fırıns are the sarne with 20% cutoff for Greece, Mexico, Hong Kong. Stock-controlled 
fırıns also are the sarne with 20% cutoff for Austria. 50% of the fırıns are in Ireland and 
United States are widely-held. Widely-held fırıns are more comrnon with good shareholder 
protection, and state-controlled fırıns are more comrnon with poor shareholder protection. 
They exarnine the relationship between shareholder protection and control arrangements, 
including cross-shareholdings, differential voting rights, and pyrarnids. When a fırın has an 
ultimate owner and the controlling shareholder exercises control through at least one 
publicy traded company, the fırın's ownership structure is pyrarnid on the 20% cutoff. If 
the fırın both has a controlling shareholder and owns shares in its controlling shareholder, 
the fırın 's ownership structure is cross-shareholdings. Their results show that farnily-
controlled fırıns are comrnon and important, because farnilies have control rights more 
than cash flow rights, especially through the use of pyrarnid ownership structure. They are 
the controlling shareholders. They take part in management, and the controlling 
shareholders are not controlled by other large shareholders. They indicate countries with 
poor shareholder protection exhibit more concentrated control of fırıns than do countries 
with good shareholder protection. 
Holdemess et al. (1999) look at the relationship between managerial ownership and fırın 
perforınance. Their full sarnple consists of 1419 US firıns in 1935 and 4202 US fırıns in 
1995. Their limited sarnple consists of 120 largest US fırıns in 1935 and in 1995. Their 
ownership variables are (1) the percentage and $ millions ownership by the fırıns offıciers 
and directors both directly and indirectly, (2) the percentage and $ millions ownership by 
CEO, and (3) combined shareholding by officers and directors in the ranges [0-5%], [5-
25% ], and [25-100% ]. They build OLS regression and piecewise linear regression to test 
roof-shaped relation. They investigate changes in the relation between insider ownership 
and fırın perforınance. They use Tobin's Q asa measure of fırın perforınance and the total 
ownership by officers and directors as a measure of insider ownership. Tobin's Q is 
calculated by market value of stock, and book value of debt to book value of assets. Their 
control variables are ( 1) size by total assets, (2) leverage by debt to assets, and (3) industry 
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by one digit SIC codes. Their descriptive statistics show that ownership by officers and 
directors, as mean, increases from 13% in 1935 to 21% in 1995, and it ,as median, 
increases from 7% in 1935 to 14% in 1995. In $ millions it increases both as mean and 
median. The regression results indicate that firm performance increases in the [0-5%] 
range of managerial shareholdings and decreases in the [5-25%] range of managerial 
shareholdings. They find an important positive relation between fırın performance and 
managerial ownership in the [0-5%] range, a negative relation between in the [5-25%] 
range, but they do not find a statistically important relation beyond %5. That is, the relation 
between managerial ownership and Tobin's Q is non-linear in their analysis. (Morck et al., 
1988; Short and Keasey, 1999; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Severin, 2000; Davies et al., 
2002). They suggest no important relation between the presence of large shareholdings and 
firm's value, like Demsetz and Lehn (1985). They do not think that ownership structure is 
as exogenous factor, on the contrary, they confirm the endogeneity of managerial 
shareholdings. They show that managerial ownership in US publicly traded corporations is 
on average higher today than earlier in the century. 
Weigand and Lehman (1999) examıne the impact of corporate govemance on the 
performance. The sample consists of 361 German firms , including mining and 
manufacturing industries, over the period 1991-1996. They focus on especially German 
firms because ownership concentration is a main feature setting the German system of 
corporate govemance apart from the Anglo-Saxon. Ownership concentration as a first 
indicator of the degree of corporate govemance exerted by the owners ofa company. 
Ownership concentration is measured by (1) sum of squared individual shares of 
outstanding shares (Herfindahl Index), (2) the largest shareholders' blockholding. They 
measure fırın performance by ROA which is calculated earnings before interest and taxes 
divided by total assets, and ROE which is calculated earnings before interest and taxes 
divided by shareholders' equity plus reserves. They define five different groups of owners 
to account for the location of control rights. These are (1) individuals or families as large 
shareholders, (2) banks or bank-owned investment companies as large shareholders, (3) 
different independent large shareholders, (4) foreign companies and (5) tumover of owners 
and blockholdings ( changing owners ). A large shareholder controls at least 5% ofa firm's 
voting. They compare govemed firms with managed firms or outsider or insider of 
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shareholders. The role of the owners ofa company play in monitoring and disciplining the 
management is the important difference between govemed and managed firıns. They 
define govemed firıns by using individuals or families, banks or different independent 
shareholders as large shareholders. Their other variables are fırın size by natural logarithm 
of total assets, fırın growth by annual change in the natural logarithrn of real sales, capital 
structure by shareholders' equity plus reserves divided by total capital, market 
concentration by Herfindahl Index of supplier concentration at the two-digit industry level. 
Their descriptive statistic shows that the manager-controlled firıns have lower rates of 
returns. Ownership concentration is the highest for the managed firıns. Family-controlled 
firıns have the highest ROE, foreign-controlled firıns have the highest ROA. Then, they 
examine the companies with tumover of blockholdings and impact of tumover of 
blockholdings on profitability. The results indicate that banks are the main acquirers of 
blockholdings, but families are the main sellers. They build OLS regression. They examine 
the impact of stock market exposure which measures by fırın is traded on the stock 
exchange. Regression results show that ownership concentration affects ROA significantly 
negatively, and it also affects ROE negatively but not significantly at the 10% error level. 
Firın size has a negative effect, but fırın growth, a higher equity share and higher market 
concentration have a positive effect on both ROA and ROE. Board representation, by 
owner is represented on the board of directors, has a weakly important and a positive effect 
on ROA in the cross-sectional model, but is unimportant and a negative effect when fixed 
effects are controlled for. In the cross-section model, ownership concentration has an 
important and negative effect on long-run ROA, but ROA is higher when control rights 
rest with families and foreign owners. Bank-controlled firıns do not have an important 
effect on the fırın perforınance. Finally, they find that corporate governance systematic 
influences on fırın perforınance. Tighter govemance controls managerial discretion and 
expands shareholders' wealth. Identity of owners indicates that the connection between 
ownership concentration and fırın perforınance depends on who owns the fırın. 
Himmelberg et al. ( 1999) examine managerial ownership and fırın perforınance. They use 
a fixed effects panel data model to control for unobserved heterogencities. Unobserved 
fırın heterogencity explain a large fraction of the cross-sectional variation in managerial 
ownership. They look at the deterıninants of managerial ownership as a function of the 
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contracting environment. The sample consists of large and small firıns. They use 398 US 
firıns in 1982, 425 firms in 1983, and 427 firıns in 1984. They measure ownership 
variables by the percentage of common equity holding by ali top-level managers and the 
average percentage of equity ownership per top-level managers. They indicate fırın 
characteristics using (1) fırın size by logarithm of sales and squared size, (2) capital-to-
sales ratio and its squared which are measure importance of hard capital in the firın ' s 
technology, (3) the ratio of R&D spending to sal es, ( 4) the ratio of advertising spending to 
sales, (5) free cash flow by operating income to sales, (6) standard deviation of stock 
retum, (7) time and industry dummies, and (8) capital expenditures to capital stock. They 
use Tobin's Q ratio and ROA as measure of fırın perforınance. Tobin's Q relies on market 
value of stock plus estimated market value of preferred stock plus book value of total 
liabilities to book balue of total assets. They use OLS regressions. They fınd that a positive 
relation between insider ownership and the capital-to-sales ratio, R&D spending to sales, 
but a negative relation betwen insider ownership and advertising to sales and operating 
income to sales ratios. They show that ownership structure and fırın perforınance are 
endogenously determined by some partly observed exogenous variables. These exogenous 
variables are fırın characteristics and fırın fıxed effects. After controlling for fırın 
characteristics and fırın fixed effects, they fınd no relation between managerial ownership 
and fırın perforınance for large and small fırıns. (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 1996) 
Core et al. (1999) examine the relation between the level of CEO compensation and the 
quality of fırıns' corporate govemance. The sample consists of 205 publicly traded US 
fırıns over the period 1982-1984. They employ four measures for the ownership structure 
of the fırın. (1) CEO percentage stock ownership. They measure CEO ownership as the 
percentage of outstanding shares owned by the corporate CEO and his immediate family. 
(2) Non-CEO insider own 5%, (3) percentage stock ownership per outside director, and (4) 
outside blockholder own 5%. They use the second and the fourth measures as indicator 
variables. They employ eight measures for the board structure. (1) CEO is board chair, (2) 
board size, (3) inside directors, (4) outside directors appointed by CEO, (5) gray outside 
directors, (6) interlocked-outside directors, (7) outside directors over age 69, and (8) busy 
outside directors. Inside directors are defıned as the percentage of the total directors who 
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are managers, retired managers. CEO compensation ıs based on three measures of 
compensation. (1) Total compensation is the sum of salary, annual bonus, phantom stock, 
restricted stock, (2) Cash compensation is the sum of salary and annual bonus, and (3) 
Salary measures the component of compensation that is fıxed at the beginning of the year. 
They employ three measures of CEO compensation as dependent variables. Firın 
perforınance is measured using accounting return on assets. They include measures of fırın 
risk as control variables for the level of compensation. They use sales, investment 
opportunities fo economic deterıninants. Their descriptive statistics indicate that the CEO 
is board chair in about 76% of the companies. The average board consists of 13 directors, 
of which 32,89% are insiders, 6,89% are gray and 3,27% are interlocked. They examine 
the level of CEO compensation, fırın risk, prior fırın perforınance, the board and ownership 
structure using a cross-sectional multiple regression. The regression results exhibit that 
larger fırıns and fırıns with higher investment opportunities pay higher CEO compensation. 
The coefficient on the stock return indicates a negative and signifıcant connection with 
compensation, but the coefficient on return on assests is not signifıcant. The standard 
deviation of return on assets is negative and statistically significant, the standard deviation 
of stock retum is negative. About ownership structure, they fınd that the CEO 
compensation is a decreasing function of the CEO's ownership stake. When there is a non-
CEO intemal board member or an extemal blockholder who owns at least 5% of the 
shares, CEO compensation is lower. They do not find that the percentage ownership per 
outside director is connected with CEO compensation. Their results suggets that when 
firıns have weaker govemance structure, firıns have greater agency problems and when 
govemance structure are less effective, CEOs eam greater compensation. Finally, these 
fırıns perforın worse. 
Short and Keasey (1999) examine the relation between managerial ownership and fırın 
perforınance . The sample consists of 225 UK fırıns over the period 1988-1992. When they 
compare UK and US fırıns with Morck et. al. (1988) and McConnell & Servaes (1990), 
they find that managerial ownership in UK fırıns is more dispersed than in US fırıns. They 
use ownership variables by the percentage of shares held by directors, the percentage of 
shares owned by institutions owning 5% or more, and the percentage of shares held by 
other extemal ownership interest. Their control variables are the logarithm of the fırın's 
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sales, the average annual growth in sales, the total debt divided by book value of total 
assets, and R&D expenditure divided by total assets. They build OLS regression using two 
perforınance variables. The first variable is retum on shareholder's equity (ROE) that is 
calculated profits attributable to shareholders, divided by shareholders' equity and 
reserves. ROE is an accounting based measure of the perforınance. The second variable is 
valuation ratio (VL) that is calculated the market value of equity at the accounting year 
end. VL is a market measure of the perforınance. They define managerial ownership as the 
percentage of equity shares owned by directors' and their immediate families, like 
Morck .. et.al.(1988). They find that, in ROE regression, a positive relation between 
managerial ownership and fırın perforınance in [0-15,58%] range, then a negative relation 
between them in [15,58-41,48%] range, and finally a positive relation between them when 
managers' ownership exceeds 41,84%. These results suggest that fırın perforınance is 
positively connected with managerial ownership at high levels of ownership. They find 
that fırın perforınance and managerial ownership have the non-linear relationship for both 
accounting and market measures of perforınance. (McConnell and Servaes, 1990; 
Holdemess et al.,1998; Morck et al. , 1988; Severin, 2000) 
Claessens and Djankov (1999) investigate the relationship between ownership 
concentration and corporate perforınance in the Czech Republic. The sample consists of 
706 Czech firıns o ver the peri od 1992-1997. They test whether firıns with more 
concentrated ownership have experienced larger positive changes in profitability and labor 
productivity. They utilize the share of equity held by the top 5 investors and a logistic 
transforınation of this share as the indicators for ownership concentration. They measure 
fırın perforınance using profitability and labor productivity. They use OLS regression and 
random-effects estimation. They find that a positive non-monotic relation between 
ownership concentration and both profitability and labor productivity. Firıns with 
ownership concentration above 50% in 1994 display a 30% higher labor productivity on 
average in 1996, compared to firıns with less ownership concentration. They use a durnmy 
for the first phase of privatization and also dummies for year and sector as control 
variables. The regression results indicate that ownership concentration is positively related 
to fırın perforınance, although the concentration variable is not significant in the 
profitability regression. The quadratic terın on ownership concentration is negative but 
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insignifıcant in both regressions. They fınd that the more concentrated ownership, the 
higher fırın profitability and labor productivity. They use the distribution of ownership by 
different types. These are bank-sponsored investment funds, nonbank-sponsored 
investment funds, local strategic investors, foreign strategic investors and the state. The 
fındings indicate that local strategic investors do not have a signifıcant influence on labor 
productivity, although their ownership is connected with higher profitability. Ownership by 
foreign strategic investors is connected with higher profitability and labor productivity in 
both regressions and ownership by nonbank-sponsored is connected with higher 
profitability and labor productivity in the random-effects estimation. As a last point, they 
fınd ownership concentrated (and its square) insignifıcant fora fırın's profitability. 
Severin (2000) examınes the relationship between ownership structure and fırın 
perforınance. The sample consists of 199 French fırıns listed on the Paris Bourse in 1996. 
These fırıns consists of 138 fırıns in industrial sector and 61 fırıns in service sector. Data of 
ownership structure is collected for 1995. Managerial ownership is defıned as ownership 
by members of boards of directors. He uses the percentage of capital owned by the boards 
of directors which are 33,50% and 66%. Firın perforınance is measures by return on 
investment (ROI), ROE, Tobin's Q, and Marris Ratio. ROI equals to net result plus interest 
in book value divided by equity plus total debt. it values the total perforınance of the fırın. 
ROE equals to net profit divided by equity in book value. Tobin's Q equals to market value 
of assets divided by replacement value of assets and Marris Ratio equals to market value of 
equity divided by book value of equity. Tobin's Q and Marris Ratio are calculated in 
market value, whereas ROI and ROE are calculated in book value. ROi and Tobin's Q are 
indicators of economic profitability and ROE and Marris Ratio are indicators of fınancial 
profitability. He uses security turnover rate and leverage as two extemal discipline 
variables. He measures leverage by; 
• By the ratio of book value of fınancial debt divided by the total of equity in book 
value, 
• By the ratio of book ratio of fınancial debt divided by the total of equity in market 
value, 
• By the ratio of book value of fınancial debt divided by the total of assets in book 
value. 
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Organisational variable is the percentage of outside director and control variable is size by 
the logarithm of the total assets. His objective is to deterınine several groups of 
homogeneous individuals. He uses non-parametric test and Kolmogorov test. Kohonen 
map indicates that at fırst, perforınance increases and then decreases when the shares are 
concentrated in the hands of managers and between 0% and 66% the convergence in 
interest hypothesis is verifıed, then when the percentage held the administrators is above 
66%, there are conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders. At nonparametric 
test, he uses ownership variables as family, managerial and controlled fırıns. He constructs 
a piecewise linear regression to show the role of the extemal and organisational variables 
on the corporate perforınance. All results indicate that size has a positive effect on the 
perforınance (at the 5% threshold when using the Marris), but leverage has a negative 
effect on the perforınance. Size explains differences between corporate govemance. The 
impact of security tumover rate is positive and signifıcant. The organisational variables 
have effect on fırın perforınance , but insignifıcantly . This study indicates that the non-
linear relationship between ownership structure and fırın perforınance. (Morck et al., 1988; 
McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Holdemess et al.,1998; Short and Keasey, 1999; Davies et 
al., 2002). 
Mendez and Anson (2000) analyse stock ownership structure and fırın perforınance on 
Spain. The sample consists of 92 non-fınancial fırıns, including both large and small fırıns, 
over 1990-1997. They use dependent variables by ( 1) the ratio market to book value of 
comrnon equity, (2) ROA is relies on the ratio of operating income to total assets, (3) 
industry-adjusted market to book value of comrnon equity, (4) adjusted operating income 
to total assets. They do not use Tobin's Q, because this ratio is problemative using Spanish 
data. They use ownership variables as; 
1) The percentage of shares held by the fırın' s top executives and their families. This 
is defıned as managerial ownership. 
2) The percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder. They divitle large 
shareholders into three categories; 
a) The percentage of shares held by banks, 
b) The percentage of shares held by institutional investors, 
c) The percentage of shares held by non-fınancial companies. 
3) Durnmy variables that take value one if banks, institutional investors, or non-
fınancial companies held more than 5% of the fırın's shares. 
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They use control variables as the logarithm of the fırın's total assets, the ratio of long-terın 
debt to total assets, and the annual percentage of increase in total assets. Their statistical 
analysis indicates that institutional investors own as a mean 0,29% of the fırın shares. 
Banks own only 7.16% ofthe fırın shares but, non-fınancial companies own 41,63% ofthe 
fırın share on average. Non-fınancial companies own 38,98% of the fırın shares in median, 
but banks and institutional investors do not hold important shareholding in median. Finally, 
institutional investors do not describe an important shareholdings group. They examine the 
relationship between managerial ownership and fırın related variables, and the relationship 
between fırın value and ownership structure using OLS and panel data estimates. They use 
2SLS panel data estimates to investigate the potential endogencity of ownership structure. 
The results show that fırın perforınance is deterınined by unobservable characteristics. 
Firın market perforınance depends on fırm's ownership structure and other fırm's 
characteristics. Size of the fırın affect the relationship between ownership structure and 
fırın value. There is a positive connection between managerial ownership and fırın market 
value for large fırıns, but a negative connection between them for small firms. The 
relationship between managerial stock ownership and fırın value depends on the fırın's 
size. They fınd that non-fınancial companies have an important in:fluence on fırın market 
value, not on fırın accounting perforınance. They do not fınd the relationship between 
ownership structure and fırın value. 
Repei (2000) investigates the impact of different owner types, concentration and 
privatization on corporate perforınance. The sample consists of 318 companies in Ukranie 
from 1977 to 1998 for cross-sectional analysis which covers fıfteen sectors. Corporate 
ownership is measured by insider (managers and employees), home outside, foreign 
outside, individuals and state ownership. The insider ownership refers primarily to 
managerial control. According to Ukrainian legislation: 
• (O, 25%] of equities provides only possive voting rights, 
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• (25, 50%] of equities provides the right to block global decision voted at a 
shareholder meeting, 
• (50, 75%] of equities refers to controlling stake, 
• (7 5, 100%] of equities provide complete control o ver the fırın . 
State-controlled fırıns have the highest average concentration of ownership which is 
60,37%, and then insider-controlled fırıns have 50,17%. The lowest average concentration 
of ownership is 1,99% for individual-controlled fırıns. The average concentration of 
ownership is high 47,19% for entire sample. He measures fırın perforınance using "annual 
wage" which is the ratio of total annual wage expenses to number of employees, "sal es per 
employee" which is the ratio of total annual sales per employee, and "sales change 1997-
1998" which is the change of total sales year to year in nominal terıns. Annual wage 
measures the average productivity of labor and sales per employee shows the relative 
efficiency of enterprises in production. He uses OLS regression. Sales per employee data 
shows that employees of foreign-controlled fırıns are the rnost productive, but employees 
of individual-controlled fırms are the least productive. The concentration has a negative 
effect on wages since controlling shareholder appropriate ernployees. He fınds that in 
Ukraine, high concentration is comrnon so linear approxirnation of the concentration-
performance relation provides good results. Private ownership lead to higher performance 
than state ownership. Outside owners provide much better governance of assets, but private 
individuals are very ineffective owners because of "free-riding" problem. Home outsiders 
suitable for the purpose off rapid restructuring. Foreign outsiders suitable for the static 
econornic efficiency. The effect of insider ownership is ambigous. Finally, in Ukraine, 
concentrated ownership of private outsiders is the rnost effıcient system of corporate 
govemance. 
Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) test the irnpact of ownership structure on company 
performance. They conduct their research on a sample of 435 of the largest European 
companies. They use a data base containing inforınation on ownership structure of the 100 
largest nonfinancial companies in 1990 in each of 12 European nations: Austria, Belgium, 
Denrnark, Finland, France, Germany, The United Kingdorn, Italy, The Netherlands, 
Norway, Spain, and Sweeden. The data base includes six annual observations from 1990 to 
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1995. They support that the identity of large owners is important for corporate 
performance. They define ownership structure as the share arıd identity of the largest 
owner. Because, the share and identity of the largest owner is a good measure of ownership 
structure in European companies, as a result of a generally high level of ownership 
concentration. They categorize the companies according to banks, institutional investors, 
other nonfinancial companies, families, and government. The differences of ownership 
share are correlated with the identity of the owners. Their findings shows that on average 
the largest owner controls 39 percent of the votes. Nonfinancial companies which are 
families, nonfinancial companies, and government-ownership companies hold more higher 
shares than financial companies which are banks, and institutional investors-ownership 
companies on average (families holding %59, nonfinancial companies holding %48, 
government holding %72, banks holding %21, and institutional investors holding less than 
%10). They measure company performance with 3 different variables: (1) market-to-book 
value of equity, (2) return on assets, and (3) sales growth. Institutional investors-
ownership companies have more higher market-to-book values of equity (2,22) than banks-
ownership companies (1 ,99). Nonfinancial companies and families-ownership· companies 
have the same market-to-book value of equity (1 ,86). The market-to-book value is 
influenced positively and significantly by ownership share, and negatively and 
significantly by the share of ownership share. Institutional investors-ownership companies 
have high asset returns (6,74), whereas government-ownership companies have low asset 
returns (3 ,37). Nonfinancial companies and families-ownership companies have higher 
sales growth (nonfinancial companies 6,89 and families companies 6,86). These 
differences may associated with that ownership categories have different goals. For 
example, institutional investor-ownership companies prefer profit and have a strong 
preferences for shareholder value, whereas goverment-ownership companies prefer social 
goals to shareholder value. They find a positive effect of ownership concentration on 
market-to-book value of equity (shareholder value), and asset return (profitability), but no 
effect on sal es growth. They use control variables as industry effects ( 64 categories ), 
nation effects (12 categories), and debt-equity ratio. Nationality affect performance 
because of nation-specific institutional characteristics. 
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Nagor et al. (2000) examine the ownership structure and the fırın perforınance of closely-
held corporations. They use two independent datasets for their analysis. Datasets consists 
of the NSSBF and private property casualty insurers. Their ownership variables are; 
• The ownership share ofthe primary owner, 
• Whether a family owns more than 50% of the fırın, 
• The number of shareholders. 
They group the ownership stake of the largest owner in four categories. These are [0,50%), 
50%, (50, 75%), and [75, 100%]. The first category describes diluted ownership. The third 
category describes those fırıns where the largest shareholder has control, but a medium 
sized ownership stake. The fourth category represents those firıns where the controlling 
shareholder has a large ownership stake. They indicate the distribution of ownership stakes 
for NSSBF C- and S- corporation in 1992 for 2776 firıns. The results indicate that 
concentrated ownership is the strongest ownership structure. When they compare these 
results with number of owners, these results are driven by single-owner firıns . Two-owners 
fırıns are fifty-fıfty, more than 40% of the fırıns for three and more owners and 67,2% of 
the firıns for six or more owners have diluted ownership. When they look at the 
distribution of ownership stakes for 53 Private Property-Casualty Insurers in 1998, the 
results indicate that the largest shareholder is medium sized comprises 13%, the diluted 
ownership comprises 35,9% of the sample. They use "whether one family controls more 
than 50% of the fırın" to control the differences between the coalition's ownership stake 
with the primary individual owner's stake. They measure fırın perforınance using return on 
asset which is net income scaled by total assets. They construct ordinary least squares 
regression of retum on asset. The four distribution categories are described by the three 
dumrnies D[O, 50%), D[50%], and D[75, 100%]. They use the cross-sectional variation in 
ROA. The logarithm of sales is used to control for fırın size, SIC dumrnies are used to 
control for industry effects on retun on asset, "whether the manager is an owner" is used to 
control for manager-owner agency effect on perforınance, and "whether the fırın is an S- or 
a C- corporation" is used to control for impacts of different tax regimes. The results 
indicate that the largest shareholder is medium sized has the l9west ROA. The coeffıcient 
on all the ownership dumrnies are positive for perforınance measure. The coeffıcient on the 
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number of owners is negative and signifıcant for return on asset. This result is similar to 
their hypothesis. Most closely-held corporations have a few shareholders and fırın 
performance is decreasing in the number of shareholders. The coefficient on "whether the 
manager is an owner" is insignifıcant for return on asset, that is the traditional manager-
owner agency problem is weak in closely-held corporations. The coefficient on "whether 
the fırın is an S- or a C- corporation" is positive for return on asset and C-corporations 
have a lower return on asset than S-corporations. Because C-corporations are taxed at both 
the corporate and the personal level and C-corporations have a higher incentive to 
distribute cash to shareholders by means of salary and other fırın expenses instead of 
dividends. Finally, all fındings suggest that if the controlling shareholder owns a large 
ownership stake, the expropriation is low, in this way intemalizing most of the 
expropriation costs, or if no shareholder is large enough to unilaterally expropriate in the 
first place. They fınd that the relation between fırın performance and the ownership stake 
of the largest shareholder is U-shaped, with diluted own fırms signifıcantly outperforming 
fırms and concentrated ownership fırms marginally outperforming fırms where the largest 
shareholder is medium sized. 
Claessens et al. (2000) examine the separation between ownership and control for 2980 
corporations, including both fınancial and non-fınancial institutions, in nine East Asian 
countries. These countries are Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, The 
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. They analyze the cash flow and control 
rights of companies with holdings 5% of the votes by shareholders. Their defınition of 
ownership relies on cash flow rights. They explain corporate ownership structure with 
widely held and controlling owners. Owners are divided into four categories by families, 
the State, widely held fınancial instituitons, and widely held companies. Their defınition of 
control relies on voting rights. They measure voting rights using; 
• Own=20%. It takes on average 19,76%. Such deviations are small in the East Asian 
countries. 
• Pyramids with ultimate owners. Indonesia has the largest pyramid structure, on the 
contrary, Thailand has the smallest pyramid structure. 
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• Controlling owner alone. A large owner controls more than 50% of the votes. This 
state is the highest in lapan, Korea, Hong Kong and is the lowest in The Philippines 
and Singapore. 
• Cross-shareholding. It is the highest in Singapore, Malaysia and lapan, but is the 
lowest in Indonesia and Thailand. 
• Management. It is defined that the CEO, board chairman or vice-chairman are from 
the controliing family and this share is the highest in Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, 
and Taiwan, but is the lowest in lapan and The Philippines. 
They examine ali firms, the largest 20, the median 50, and the smallest 50 companies in 
each country sample to show separation of ownership and control using 2611 publicy 
traded companies. Controliing shareholders are defined at the 20% cutoff. The separation 
of ownership and control exists only in Malaysia, The Philippines and Singapore for state-
controlied firms, and Singapore has the most separation among ali firms. Hong Kong, 
lapan, The Philippines, Thailand have the largest separation in the smaliest firms among 
farnily-controlled firms . These results indicate that family-controlled firms and small firms 
have the most separation between ownership and control. They investigate ultimate control 
at 10% and 20% of voting rights using fi ve ownership categories. (widely held, family, 
state, widely held financial , widely held corporations.) The results exhibit that there are 
more important changes in Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and Malaysia. Family control drops 
from 67.9 to 48.4 in Korea, and drops from 65.6 to 48.2 in Taiwan. Family control 
increases from 50.8 to 61.6 in Thailand, and increases from 57.7 to 67.2 in Malaysia. lapan 
has the largest share of widely held firms at the both 10% and 20% cutoff, but Indonesia 
and Thailand have the smaliest share of widely held firms . Share of widely held increases 
at the 20% cutoff for ali countries. Share of widely-financial institutions and widely held 
corporations decrease at the 20% cutoff for ali countries. They exarnine the relationship 
between age of companies and concentration of control. The correlation coefficient are 
positive in ali countries without lapan. They also examine the firms which are controlied 
by a single family. Finaliy, their results indicate that many firms are controlied by a single 
shareholder. The separation of ownership and control is cornmon in family-controlied 
firms and smali firms. Except in lapan, ali countries has good shareholder protection. 
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Older fırms are usually family-controlled fırms and corpotare wealth is very concentrated 
in the hands of few families in East Asia. 
Johnson et al. (2000) investigate the depreciation of currencies and the decline of the stock 
markets through corporate govemance. Their sample consists of 25 countries during the 
Asian crisis of 1997-1998 (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, The Czech 
Republic, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Korea, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, Turkey, Taiwan, 
South Africa, and Venezuela). They use macroeconomic variables to measure prior 
economic conditions. Macroeconomic variables are govemment budget balance as a 
percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1996, current account asa percent of GDP in 
1996, total reserves in dollar terms at the end of 1996, import coverage, foreign debt as a 
percent of exports for 1996, short-term debt and amortization as a percent of reserves, 
interest payments as a percent of export and extemal debt-GDP ratio at the end of 1996. 
Their dependent variable is exchange rate purchasing power in January 1999. They form 
an ingenious relationship between investor protection and fınancial crises. They fınd that 
corporate govemance gives probably more as convincing an explanation for the extent of 
exchange rate depreciation and stock market decline as any or all of the usual 
macroeconomic arguments. They employ four measures of the ease of enforcing contracts 
between management and the providers of fırms' fınance . The fırst three measures are the 
effıciency of the judiciary, corruption and the rule of law and the fourth measure is a 
general assessment of corporate govemance. Govemance variables are powerful predictors 
of the extent of markets declines during the crisis . They suggest that if expropriation 
increase by managers when the expected rate of return on investment falls, then an adverse 
shock to investor confidence will lead to increased expropriation as well as lower capital 
inflow and greater attempted capital outflow for a country. They indicate that weak 
enforcement of shareholder rights has first-order value in determining the extent of 
exchange rate depreciation and stock market collapse in 1997-1998. 
Mueller and Spitz (2001) look at the impact of ownership structure on fırın performance 
using panel data to control for unobserved fırın heterogeneity. ~hey examine 1351 German 
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limited liability fırms in the servic sector. The sample consists of 2797 observations from 
1997 to 2000. They measure fırın performance using; 
number of increases' per sector per year - number of decreases' s per company per year 
number of companies in the sector 
Exogenous variables are ownership share of managers and quadratic term for the 
ownership share of managers. Ownership share of managers equals to the share of equity 
held by the management of the fırın divided by 100. Other variables of their study are the 
number of managers who hold own shares, the number of extemal equity holders a fırın 
has, the number of bank relationships a fırın holds, the standard deviation of the responses 
to the profitability question, the forecasting error for retums, the age of company in years, 
and the natural logarithm of number of employees. They explain that fırın performance is 
influenced by the ownership share of managers, a durnmy for ownership exclusively by 
managers, the number of managers who hold ownership stakes, the number of outside 
owners, the number of bank relationships, and the size of the company. They use the fıxed 
effect estimation in regression to control for endogeneity. They control for the effects of 
competitors on performance using market concentration and import competition in the 
regression. They fınd that the relationship between managerial ownership share and risk is 
non-linear. They indicate that companies that are totally owned by managers do especially 
well. Companies with many bank relationships do worse, but monitoring by banks has a 
positive effect. They fınd that ownership affects company performance. There is an 
inverted U-shaped relation between the managerial ownership and fırın performance 
(Morck et al. , 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990). The ownership share of managers has 
a positive effect on performance up to an ownership share of around 50% and a negative 
effect thereafter. These effects are statistically important. Mueller and Spitz (2001) use 
incentive alignment effects of managerial ownership and entrenchment effects to determine 
fırın performance. The fırst effect is because of betler incentives and the second effect is 
because of entrenchment. 
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Figure 2.3 The relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance by 
Mueller and Spitz (2001) 
The lagged specification verifies the inverted U-fonn. There are a positive effect of 
managerial ownership share up to 80%, the maximum point increases to around 80% 
managerial ownership share, then the effect becomes negative. 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) examine the relation between the ownership structure and 
the perfonnance of corporations if ownership is treated as an endogenous variable 
(Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Leach and Leahy, 1991). Their sample consists of a-223 firm 
random subsample of the sample in the original Demsetz and Lehn study (1985) over the 
period 1976-1980 in US. The sample includes both regulated and non-regulated firms . 
They use two aspects of ownership structure, the fraction of shares owned by the five 
largest shareholding interests and the fraction of shares owned by management. They 
measure perfonnance by Tobin's Q ratio. Their econometric model has two equations. The 
first has finn perfonnance and the second has fraction of shares owned by management as 
the dependent variables. The explanatory variables of the first equation are percentage of 
shares owned by management, percentage of shares owned by the fi ve largest shareholders, 
advertising and R&D expenditures, expenditures on fixed plant and equipment, the value 
of debt as a fraction of the book value of assets, utility, media indicator and financial firm 
indicator variables. The explanatory variables of the second equation are finn performance 
as measured by average Tobin's Q, market risk of stock, finn-specific risk, firm size as 
measured by book value of assets, the value of debt as a fraction of the book value of 
61 
assets, utility, media indicator and financial firm indicator variables. They construct both 
OLS and 2SLS regression methods and they compare OLS estimates to 2SLS estimates. 
The 186 firms sample contains non-regulated firms and the 223 sample contains both 
regulated and non-regulated firms. They find no statistically significant connection 
between ownership structure and firm performance. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) show 
that when controlling for endogeneity, managerial ownership is determined by corporate 
value, but not vice-versa. 
Davies et al. (2002) examine the relationship between corporate value and managerial 
ownership. They indicate that even when controlling for endogeneity, not only is corporate 
value a determinant of managerial ownership, but managerial ownership is also a 
determinant of corporate value (page: 29). The sample consists of 752 UK firms in 1995. 
They use ownership variables by 
• Insider Ownership: The total level of holdings held by company management that 
are greater than 5% ofa company's equity. 
• Blockholder Ownership: The total level of holdings held by outside blockholders 
that are greater than 3% ofa company' s equity. 
• Largest Stakeholder: The largest single outside blockholder that holds at least 3% 
of company' s outstanding equity. 
They show that the mean blockholder ownership is 37,34%, insider ownership is 13,02% 
and the largest stakeholder is 18,82%. They use capital expenditures, total assets 
employed, debt/assets employed, market value of equity, R&D costs, after tax profits as 
independent variables. They use control variables like Cho (1998). They measure firm 
performance by Tobin's Q ratio. It is equal to the ratio of the market value of equity and 
book value of debt and preferred equity to the book value of assets in the firm minus 
current liabilities. They build the two stage least squares method to estimate insider 
ownership, corporate value and investment. They find that the non-linear relationship 
between corporate value and managerial ownership. Tobin's Q ratio increases for 
managerial ownership levels up to 7% , and then declines to ownership levels of 26%. 
Market discipline has an impact on managerial objectives up to the 51 %. Tobin's Q ratio 
62 
then decreases until ownership levels reach 76% after which increases. They indicate that 
corporate value, fırın level investment and managerial ownership are independent on each 
other. 
Cui and Mak (2002) examine the relationship between managerial ownership and fırın 
perforınance. They use a sample of fırıns that are listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. 
Their study is based on high research & development fırıns, because of high inforınation 
asymmetry, high growth opportunities, different board structures, and different ownership 
structures. There are three measures for managerial ownership as aggregate ownership of 
all directors and offıciers, average individual ownership, and CEO ownership. Control 
variables are (1) size relies on natura! logarithm of annual sales, (2) debt ratio relies on 
total liabilities to total assets, (3) fıxed assets ratio relies on book value of PP&E divided 
by total assets, (4) research & development intensity relies on R&D expenditure to total 
assets, and (5) growth relies on percentage growth rate of total assets. Their perforınance 
variables are Tobin's Q and return on asset. They use Tobin's Q as the primary measure of 
fırın performance. Their correlation analysis shows that managerial ownership has a 
negative relationship with Tobin's Q, size, PP&E / total assets ; on the contrary it has a 
positive relationship with growth rate. Tobin's Q hasa negative relationship with return on 
asset, size but it has a positive relationship with R&D intensity and growth rate. Return on · 
asset hasa positive relationship with size, debt ratio, R&D intensity, and growth rate. Their 
results suggest that large fırıns have higher current profitability, but less potential for future 
growth in profitability. Their sample consists of 114 7 observations o ver the peri od 1994-
1998. They use OLS regression using Tobin's Q and return on asset. Retum on asset 
regression and Tobin's Q regression have different results. For the return on asset 
regression, the coefficient is positive and important for managerial ownership, but the 
coefficient is negative and unimportant for squared ownership. For the Tobin's Q 
regression, the coefficient is negative and important for managerial ownership, but the 
coefficient is positive and marginally important for squared ownership. They also use the 
piecewise regression to explain the relationship between managerial ownership and 
Tobin's Q. They defıned the relationship that is a W-shaped. Tobin's Q falls, then rises 
and falls, and rises again. Tobin's Q declines as managerial o~ership increases from 0% 
to 10%, increases between 10% and 30%, and declines again 30% and 50%. There is 
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another increase in above 50% ownership. There is a positive relationship between squared 
ownership and Tobin's Q. This study points out that industry has an impact on the 
relationship between managerial ownership and fırın perforınance. 
Berkowitz and Qiu (2002) examine the perforınance of the mutual funds managed by 
Canadian publicly-traded management companıes and Canadian private-owned 
management companies. Their sample consists of six largest publicly-traded management 
companies and six largest private-owned management companies over the period 1985-
1998. Their primary goal is to examine how the ownership of mutual fund management 
companies affects their fırın perforınance. They divide Canadian funds investing into three 
categories. These are Canadian equity funds, Canadian balanced funds, and Canadian 
funds invested in US equities. They choose two benchmarks to estimate the abnorınal 
perforınance . The first is CAPM approach, the second is three factor model which consists 
of (1) an excess market return factor, (2) size factor, and (3) a book-to-market factor. Size 
factor and book-to-market factor measure the risk prernium. The size and book-to-market 
factors are greater for Canadian market, on average, smaller value oriented fırıns in 
Canadian and large growth-oriented fırıns in the US. Using the three factor model, they 
fınd that the Canadian equity funds have a higher positive coefficient on the excess market 
return than Canadian balanced funds. Canadian equity funds have a positive coefficient on 
the size factor, and a negative coeffıcient on the book-to-market factor, but Canadian 
balanced funds have the opposite of this relation. They analyze the relationship between 
ownership and perforınance for management companies, using management fee, 
administrative fee, and expense fee with cross-sectional regression. The results indicate 
that funds have important economies of scope, not economies of scale. They explain both 
advantages and disadvantages of publicly-traded for management companies. The first 
advantage is improvement to company's access to capital. Publicly-traded spreads risk 
over a larger number of owners. This is the second advantages. üne of the most important 
disadvantages of publicly-traded is high operating costs. Their results indicate that 
publicly-traded management companies have higher agency costs than privately-owned 
management companies and they take on more risk, so they supply higher compensation to 
managers. Publicly-traded management companies tend to charge higher management fees 
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than the private management companies. When management fees high, the net return of 
the mutual funds decrease, so there is a negative impact on future investment. 
Gedajlovic and Shapiro (2002) examine the relation between ownership concentrated and 
fınancial performance. Their sample consists of 334 Japanese corporations over the period 
1986-1991. They use three variables as ownership measures; 
1) Ownership by fıve largest blockholders without regard to identity, 
2) The total ownership shares of Japanese fınancial institutions, 
3) The ownership shares of Japanese non-fınancial instituitons. 
They use retum on asset asa fırın perforınance measure in GLS random-effects, and OLS 
regressions. Retum on asset relies on the ratio of net income to total assets. They use 
control variables by; 
1) Firın size : as the logarithm of total assets, 
2) Firın growth : as year-over-year sales growth, 
3) Financial leverage : as the ratio of debt to capital employed. 
Their analysis is focused on a term as ownership concentrated. They explain that an 
important effect of ownership concentrated is to promote intercorporate goals of risk 
reduction in Japanese fırms . Their fındings indicate that the ownership by fıve largest 
blockholders is very highly correlated with the ownership by non-fınancial companies, it is 
negatively correlated with the ownership by fınancial companies. They fınd that a positive 
relation between ownership concentrated and fırın performance and this relation is 
connected with agency theory. Because, ownership concentrated promotes the pursuit of 
profit maximization according to agency theory. 
Douma et al., (2002) examine the impacts of ownership structure on the fırın performance 
in India. They utilize large-scale fırın level data of lndian listed corporations to take a 
closer look at the monitoring roles of foreign and domestic_ blockholders. The sample 
constains 1005 Indian fırms over the period 1999-2000. They use ownership variables as 
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explanotary variables. These are percentage of cornrnon shares owned by foreign 
institutional investors and foreign corporations, by foreign institutional investors, by 
foreign corporations, by domestic (Indian) financial institutions and domestic corporations, 
by domestic financial institutions, by domestic corporations and by all directors and 
relatives. They measure fırın perforınance using return on asset and Tobin's Q ratio. They 
define return on asset as the operating eamings before interest, depreciation and taxes over 
the book value of total assets, and Tobin's Q ratio as the sum of market value of equity and 
book value of debt dividend by the book value of assets. They use total sales and age as 
control variables. They construct OLS regression. The findings suggest that foreign 
ownership positively related affects fırın perforınance whether the perforınance measure is 
return on asset or Tobin's Q raito. Foreign fınancial institutional ownership is positively 
connected with stock market-based measures of fırın perforınance only. There is an 
important positive relationship when fırın perforınance is measured by Tobin's Q ratio. 
They indicate that ownership by owner managers and domestic corporate ownership 
positively affect fırın perforınance . Group affiliation negatively affects fırın perforınance. 
Finally, they suggest that the positive effect on fırın perforınance of foreign ownership is 
attributable to foreign corporations that have, on average, a larger shareholding and a 
higher degree cornrnitment and long-terın involvement, and the impact of domestic 
corporations, which are by far the largest blockholders with important monitoring 
potential. 
Singh and Davidson (2003) examıne the relationship between corporate ownership 
structure and agency costs. Their analysis is focused on only large US corporations having 
annual sales revenue of $ 100 millions or more. They use two measures for agency costs. 
The first measure of agency costs is the asset turnover ratio by the ratio of annual sales to 
total assets. That is, management's ability is measured to employ assets efficiently. While a 
high asset turnover ratio indicates a large amount of sales, a low asset tumover ratio 
indicates using assets in non-cash flow generating. The second measure of agency costs is 
SG&A expense. This ratio is measured as the ratio of SG&A expense to total sales 
revenue. They use this ratio because, they think that SG&A expenses reflect managerial 
discretion in spending company resources and it also reflect expenses on furnishings, 
office buildings, and other similar facilities. They use the proportion of inside ownership as 
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percentage of equity stock held by the management and members of the board of directors, 
and use outside block ownership as percentage of total stock held by non-managerial and 
non-board members having 5% or more equity in fırın. They use control variables by (1) 
size of the board of directors, (2) ratio of independent outsider on the board, (3) the ratio of 
insi der on the board, ( 4) leverage that is measured as each fırın' s debt to total assets, and 
(5) fırın size that is measured as the logarithm of annual sales revenue. They use multiple 
regression models. Their fındings show that the coeffıcient for fırın size positively related 
to the asset turnover ratio, and the coeffıcient for leverage negatively related to the asset 
turnover ratio. The coeffıcient for board size are negative and important. The coeffıcient 
for board composition are unimportant. These results indicate that large fırıns are more 
efficient in their asset utilization and board composition does not influence agency costs. 
They fınd that there is no relationship between inside ownership and the SG&A expenses 
ratio. Larger fırıns have relatively smaller SG&A expenses ratios. Finally, larger inside 
ownership aligns the interest of shareholders and management and seems to lower agency 
costs. When fırıns have larger inside ownership, they have lower agency conflicts and 
lower agency costs. Higher asset turnover express the lower agency costs. 
Wei and Varela (2003) examine the relationship between state equity ownership and fırın 
market performance. Their samples consist of China' s newly privatized fırms in 1994 (164 
fırıns), in 1995 (175 fırıns), and in 1996 (252 fırıns). They explain corporate governance 
in China. China fırıns have more fewer managerial equity ownership than US fırms. 
Common shares of China fırıns are divided into four categories. These are the state shares, 
legal person shares, foreign shares, and individual shares. They use Tobin's Q and monthly 
stock returns (MSR) as perforınance variables. Tobin's Q is calculated by the sum of the 
market value of equity, book value of long-terın debt and book value of short-terın is 
divided by the book value of assets. They build OLS regression. Their independent 
variables are; 
• The fraction of the common shares held by the state in the sample fırms and its 
squared, 
• The percentage of shares owned by domestic institutions or legal entities, 
• The natural logarithms of total assets and sales, 
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• The total debt divided by total assets, 
• Eamings per share, 
• The standard deviation of the monthly stock returns. 
They fınd that the relationship between state equity ownership and Tobin's Q is convex. 
Because fırın perforınance is high both at low and high state ownership. At low state 
ownership, Tobin's Q is high because of property rights theory. This theory examines the 
effects of govemment and private ownership on fırın perforınance. At high state 
perforınance , Tobin's Q is also high because of closely monitoring role of govemment. 
Their results show that Tobin's Q is negatively concemed with size, but stock returns are 
positively concemed with standard deviation and size. Firın size are the main deterıninants 
of the stake's equity ownership in China's newly privatized fırms. Domestic institutional 
ownership does not improve perforınance . They fınd that state ownership has a negative on 
fırın value, and state equity ownership harms to fırın perforınance. 
2.6. Ownership Structur~ and Firm Performance in Turkey 
Turkey is bound to become an important commercial and fınancial center in the region. 
üne of the major developments in the Turkish fınancial sector was the establishment of the 
lstanbul Stock Exchange (iSE). The iSE, which played a very important role in the 
development of the Turkish economy, started its activities on 3 January 1986. Among the 
factors influencing the rapid expansion of the iSE were the accelerated growth of the funds 
due to the eff ect of tax concessions and the liberalization of the entrance of the foreign 
investors into the capital markets. Currently, there are three markets operating on the iSE 
which are mainly the iSE Equity Market, Bonds and Bills Market and the lntemational 
Market. The iSE Equity Market has fıve submarkets where transactions are executed 
through a fully computerized system. These submarkets are the National Market, Regional 
Market, New Companies Market, Watchlist Companies and the Wholesale Market. Stock 
and bond markets are completely are open to foreing investors with no restriction on the 
repatriation of capital and profit. As a result, foreign investors' equity portfolio holdings 
have made up more than 50 percent of the free float in recent years. The privatization of 
State Economic Enterprises has been a major structural objective of the Turkish 
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government since the mid-1980's. Although a formidable task, numerous state companies 
have already been privatized. Over the last ten years, the state has completely withdrawn 
form a number of industry sectors, including food processing and cement production. 
Similarly, more than half of state shares in the tourism and textile sectors have been 
privatized. Almost 5,000 foreign companies actively participate in the Turkish economy. 
Companies within the privatization portfolio are privatized through the use of one or more 
of the methods mentioned below; 
• Sale: Transfer of the ownership of units of goods and services in the assets of 
companies in full or partially, or transfer of all or some of the shares of these 
companies through domestic or intemational public offerings, block sales to real 
and/or legal entities, block sales including deferred public offerings, sales to 
employees, sales on the stock exchanges by standard or special orders, sales to 
investment funds and/or securities investment partnerships by taking into 
consideration the prevailing conditions of the companies. 
• Lease: Grant of the right of use of all or some of the assets of the companies for a 
defıned peri od of time. 
• Grant of Operational Rights 
• Establishment of Property Rights other than Ownership 
• Profit Sharing Model and other Legal Dispositions Depending on the Nature 
of the Business. 
Yurtoğlu (2000) analyses 257 companies traded on the Istanbul Stock Exchange. The aim 
of this study indicates the main characteristics of ownership structure of these companies. 
Yurtoğlu gives information on the pyramidal and complex ownership structure. This study 
indicates that 179 (70%) ofthe companies are in the manufacturing sector, 39 (15%) are in 
the fınancial sector, 14 are holding companies and the remaining 25 companies are 
services, wholesale trade and construction. The average fırın is quiet large with 910 
employees. The average fırın is traded since about six years. Ownership concentration is 
measured as the percentage of a company's outstanding equity held by the largest 
shareholder (Cl), by the fıve largest shareholders (C5), and by the ten largest shareholders. 
Dispersed measures as the frequency distribution of the outstanding equity held by a large 
number of small investors. The means of Cl is 44,65%, C5 is 67,35% and ClO is 69,16%. 
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The means of dispersed is 29,94%. Ten different types of owners are used to show the 
identity of the largest direct owners. These are holding companies, non-financial, financial 
companies, individuals/families, foreign, state/state agencies, managers, foundations, labor 
unions/cooperative, and retirement plans. Holding companies have ownership stakes in 143 
companies, whereas labor unions/cooperatives have ownership stakes in only 6 companies. 
The means of holding companies is 36,14%, non-financial companies is 31,67%, labor 
unions/cooperatives is 34,76%, and foreign is 37,13%. Foreign companies have ownership 
stakes in 40 companies. Managers have ownership stakes in 1 1 companies, but with a 
mean value of 6,93%. This study's results exhibit that Turkish corporate govemance 
indicates strong similarities to the insider system, and concentrated and centralized 
ownership structure are high in Turkish traded companies. Families own 198 of the 257 
traded companies and 158 family companies have majority control, thus the dominant 
shareholders are families. 
Önder (2000) investigates the relationship between the ownership structure and the 
performance of companies whose stocks are traded in the Istanbul Stock Exchange. The 
sample consists of 1071 observations over the peri od 1992-1997. Önder (2000) measures 
ownership concentration by (1) the percentage shareholdings of the largest shareholder, (2) 
the percentage of shareholdings of the three largest shareholders, and (3) the percentage of 
the public stake. Firm performance is measured by market value indicators (market value 
and Tobin's Q), profitability ratios (productivity of total assets, productivity of equity 
capital and net profit margin), and growth rates (total assets and net sales). Regressions of 
performance variables are used in study. The results suggest that firms which have foreign 
ownership structure indicate that low the percentage of public stake and high the 
percentage shareholdings of the three largest shareholders. Firms which have state 
ownership structure indicate that high the percentage shareholdings of the largest 
shareholder and the three largest shareholders, but these firms have lower the percentage of 
public stake (28, 12% ), whereas firms that do not have state ownership structure show 
higher the percentage (33,00%) of public stake than state ownership firms. This study 
indicates that there is a positive relation between public' ownership stake and the growth 
rates on total assets and net sales. When ownership concentration increases, market value 
of equity increases, and when ownership concentration declines retum on asset increases. 
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Özer and Yamak (2001) investigate the connection between ownership concentration and 
fırın performance, and the effect of market control on the connection between them. The 
sample consists of 299 companies trading in the market as of the end of 1999 listed on the 
Istanbul Stock Exchange. They employ ownership concentration, market control ( dispersed 
ownership ), and owner identity as the independent variables. They measure ownership 
concentration as the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder. Owner identity is 
classifıed in fıve categories which are the percentage of shares held by individuals, 
holdings, financial institutions, non-fınancial companies, and other organizations. Other 
organizations contain foundations, cooperatives and state agencies. They measure fırın 
performance using retum on assets, return on equity, sales profitability, sales growth, asset 
turnover, and non-operating income. They fınd that 204 fırms have concentrated ownership 
structure, like a controlling owner. Their fındings indicate that in concentrated companies, 
the percentage ownership of the largest owner is 53 ,21 % , the share of the dispersed 
owners is 25,25% and in dispersed companies, the percentage ownership of the largest 
owner is 22,71 %, the share of the dispersed owners is 52,74%. Their results suggest that 
when the percentage share of the dispersed owners increases, it has an unsuitable impact 
on performance for retum on asset and retum on equity. Other organizations such as 
foundations, cooperatives, state agencies have a positive relationship with performance. 
Identity of the controlling shareholder appear to have a great effect on the performance for 
the concentrated companies. Debt pressure and perfomance have a positive and signifıcant 
relationship. This relation exhibits the disciplinary pressure of the debt holders. When the 
share of the dispersed owners increase, fırın performance becomes worse for the 
concentrated companies. They do not fınd the effect of ownership concentration on fırın 
performance. They indicate that the effect of market control is negative on performance. 
Finally, they suggest the presence of a highly concentrated ownership structure in the 
Turkish market. 
Saraç (2002) examines the ownership structure of Turkish manufacturing fırms and the 
impacts of financial crises on the ownership structure and fırın performance. Saraç looks at 
both pre-crisis and post-crisis information and compares the normal situation with 
abnormal situation. The sample consists of Istanbul Chamber of Industry-the 500 biggets 
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companies which traded in lstanbul Stock Exchange. All variables are defıned as the 
percentages of equity ownership. Saraç uses ownership variables as; 
1. Stockholding held by the 3 largest shareholders which measures the degree of 
concentration, 
2. Stockholding held by shareholders with 10% or more of total capital or voting 
rights, 
3. Stockholding held by public, 
4. Stockholding held by state, 
5. Stockholding held by board members and managers, 
6. Stockholding held by foreign individual and institutional investors, 
7. Stockholding held by dominating family members, 
8. Stockholding held by fırms, 
9. Stockholding held by non-profit institutions such as pension funds, 
1 O. Stockholding held by persons. 
Saraç uses iSE Approach. This approach divides the total shareholders equity into five 
components. These are the percentage of the equity held by shareholders with 10% or more 
of total capital or voitng rights; the percentage of the equity belonging to those 
shareholders who have responsibilities at the company's govemance; who work for the 
company as general manager ete.; who are first degree relatives of the shareholders in first 
three groups; who are holding less than 10% of total capital or voting rights, but are a part 
of the same holding group or conglomerate with the shareholders in stockholding held by 
the 3 largest; the percentage of the equity belonging to other shareholders plus public (free 
floating). Retum on asset is used as a measure of perforınance. Saraç fınds that the mean 
percentage of equity owned by the 3 largest shareholders is 63,26, and the mean percentage 
of equity owned by those shareholders who own 10% or more is 59,76. The mean 
percentage of equity held by the private sector is 88,05, foreign is 9,08, and state is 2,87. 
That is, the 3 largest shareholders own more than 50% of all equity in an average fırın and 
those major owners holding at least 10% of the equity own more than 50% of all equity in 
an average fırın. Correlation matrix indicates that Turkish manufacturing fırıns become 
more open to public. Stockholding held by public, state, and non-profit institutions have 
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negative correlation with stockholding held by dominating family members. The 
relationship between institutional ownership and concentration is positive and high. This 
result shows that in most of the closely held-firms the major shareholders are institutions. 
There is a positive relation between foreign ownership and concentrated ownership and a 
negative relation between foreign and dispersed ownership. The results indicate that 
foreign ownership incerases in Turkish manufacturing sector. Turkish manufacturing 
companies have more concentrated ownership structure rather than dispersed (Yurtoğlu, 
1998; Özer and Yamak, 2001 ). Firm are owned by small number of owners according to 
developed countries. Saraç finds an important relation between ownership structure and 
firm performance. Stockholding held by the 3 largest shareholders has a positive relation 
with profitability, but has a negative stockholding held by public. Concentrated ownership 
are more profitable than diffused ownership. Institutional ownership has a positive and 
important relation with profitability. In Turkish manufacturing sector, the profitable 
companies have institutional shareholders. Stockholding held by foreign and firms do not 
have an important relation with profit. 
CHAPTERIII 
EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
3.1. Methodology 
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In this section, we elaborate on the general trends of ownership structure in ISE companies, 
and hypotheses. Our empirical test and hypotheses are based on the ownership structure of 
Turkish companies and the relationship between ownership structure and fırın performance 
(profitability), a relationship emerging from the literature on the separation of ownership 
and control. Then, we present sample, variables ( ownership, performance, and control), 
and the method of analysis. 
3.1.1. General Trends of Ownership Structure in The iSE Companies 
These expectations have been tested by looking at statistical data, concerning each variable 
above over the analysis period. Given the stage of economic and financial development in 
Turkey, one would normally expect that; 
El : Turkish companies have concentrated ownership structure rather than dispersed 
ownership structure. 
E2 : The openness ratio has been increasing. 
E3 : The percentage of shares held by foreign owners and the number of companies 
in which foreign owners have stake are increasing. 
E4 : The percentage of shares held by the state and the number of companies in 
which the state have stake are decreasing. 
ES : The percentage of shares held by institutional owners and the number of 
companies in which institutional owners have stake are increasing. 
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E6 : The percentage of shares held by management and the number of companies in 
which management have stake are increasing. 
3.1.2. Hypotheses To Be Tested Relationship Between Ownership Structure And 
Firm Performance 
Hl : There is a relationship between ownership concentration and return on asset. 
H2 : There is a relationship between ownership concentration and return on equity. 
H3 : There is a relationship between ownership concentration and net operating profit 
margın. 
H4 : There is a relationship between ownership concentration and market-to-book 
value. 
HS : There is a relationship between ownership concentration and price-earnings ratio. 
H6 : There is a relationship between managerial ownership and return on asset. 
H7 : There is a relationship between managerial ownership and return on equity. 
H8 : There is a relationship between managerial ownership and net operating profit 
margin. 
H9: There is a relationship between managerial ownership and market-to-book value. 
HlO : There is a relationship between managerial ownership and price-earnings ratio. 
Hl 1 : There is a relationship between state ownership and return on asset. 
H12 : There is a relationship between state ownership and retum on equity. 
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H13 : There is a relationship between state ownership and net operating profit margin. 
H14 : There is a relationship between state ownership and market-to-book value. 
HlS : There is a relationship between state ownership and price-eamings ratio. 
H16: There is a relationship between foreign ownership and retum on asset 
Hl 7 : There is a relationship between foreign ownership and retum on equity. 
H18 : There is a relationship between foreign ownership and net operating profit 
margın. 
H19 : There is a relationship between foreign ownership and market-to-book value. 
H20 : There is a relationship between foreign ownership and price-earnings ratio. 
H21 : There is a relationship between public stake and retum on asset. 
H22 : There is a relationship between public stake and retum on equity. 
H23 : There is a relationship between public stake and net operating profit margin. 
H24 : There is a relationship between public stake and market-to-book value. 
H25 : There is a relationship between public stake and price-earnings ratio. 
H26 : There is a relationship between institutional ownership and retum on asset. 
H27 : There is a relationship between institutional ownership and retum on equity. 
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H28 : There is a relationship between institutional ownership and net operating profit 
margın. 
H29 : There is a relationship between institutional ownership and market-to-book 
value. 
H30 : There is a relationship between institutional ownership and price-earnings ratio. 
3.1.3. Sample 
The data-base used in this study consists of 141 industrial and merchandising companies 
listed in Istanbul Stock Exchange. Financial companies due to their differential aspects 
regarding govemance structure and leverage, and the companies for which the required 
<lata were unavailable, have been excluded from the analysis. 
Table 3.1 indicates that 130 companies are traded in national market, 5 companies are 
traded in regional market, and only 6 companies are traded in watch-list market. 
Table 3.1 Summary information about the sample 
MARKET NUMBER OF FİRMS 
National Market 130 
Regional Market 5 
Watch-List Market 6 
TOTALFİRMS 141 
A six-year cross-sectional <lata concerning the ownership structure, and financials of these 
companies between 1997 and 2002 were used in the analysis. This period captures both 
pre-crisis and post-crisis information. Short-term performance indices may be misleading 
since it would be difficult to assess the impact of variables over a longer period. Therefore, 
we used 6-vear averages for these measures. 
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üne of the best sources of financial information on traded companies in Turkey is the iSE. 
it publishes daily,weekly, monthly, quarterly, and yearly financial statements and a 
company yearbook. The Yearbook of Companies is published by the Exchange in two 
volumes by the Documentation Department. The first contains general information, 
including each company' s main business, address, phone number, ongoing projects, equity 
participation, shareholders, and the percentage of ownership. The second volume provides 
company financial statements (income statement and balance sheet), and key financial 
ratios. The iSE also provides fundamental and market information saved on diskettes. The 
diskettes, Yearbook of Companies, and monthly, quartely, and annual bulletins, are also 
available in English. in this thesis, ownership structure information has been obtained from 
The Yearbook of Companies (www.irnkb.gov.tr), financial statement information has been 
obtained from the diskettes. We have employed annual <lata. The sample consists of 2,397 
observations for each year. The total number of observations amounts to 14,382. 
Figure 3.1 shows the number of companies traded on the iSE over the period 1997-2002. 
A slight decrease in the number of companies after 2000 is observed. 
400 
number.of 200 
companıes 
o~~ıc.:;.ı·:ti!>.L..l::..J· ~= 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
mcompanies 258 277 285 315 310 288 
ye ar 
Figure 3.1 The number of companies traded on the iSE 
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3.1.4. Variables 
3.1.4.1. Ownership Variables: Ownership variables include ownership concentration 
and public stake as well as the ownership held by different types of owners. The largest 
shareholder and the three largest shareholders are among the most widely employed in the 
literature and are the most widely available. So, in this thesis, ownership concentration is 
measured by the percentage of shareholdings of the largest shareholder (BIGGESTl), 
consistent with Gedajlovic and Shapiro (1998); Cole and Mehran (1998); Yurtoğlu (2000); 
Önder (2000); Mendez and Anson (2000); Özer and Yamak (2001); the percentage of 
shareholdings of the three largest shareholders (BIGGEST3), consistent with Önder 
(2000), and Saraç (2002). The measure of ownership dispersion is public stake (PUBLIC). 
Ownership structure of Turkish companies is different from ownership structure of 
developed countries. in Turkey, at first many companies are established as family 
companies, later on these companies are sold to public. The proportion of public offering 
depends on growth. Therefore, large companies may have more public ownership than 
small companies. 
The ownership is divided into four main categories with respect to percentage of shares. 
These are; 
1) MANAGEMENT (MGT) : The total ownership by directors and management 
(McConnell and Serveas, 1990) or total ownership by directors and their families 
(Morck et al., 1988) or the ownership by the CEO (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996) 
are used the most widely proxy for managerial ownership. in this thesis, MGT 
consists of the board members, top executives, and benefical owners owning ten 
percent or more of the company stock. 
2) ST ATE OWNERSHIP (ST ATE) : The percentage of shares held by the state. 
3) FOREIGN OWNERS (FOREIGN) : The percentage of shares held by foreign 
owners. 
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4) INSTITUTIONAL OWNERS (INST) : In the sample, cross ownership of the 
group companies is very cornmon, thus although ownership of a company is 
distributed among different corporations, the ultimate control lies in the hands of 
the group through cross ownership. So, we examined institutional ownership under 
two sub-categories: the percentage of shares held by holdings or another 
companies, and the percentage of shares held by institutional investors, including 
banks. 
3.1.4.2 Performance Variables: Financial performance is measured using return-on-
assest (ROA), return-on-equity (ROE), net operating profit margin (NOPM), market-to-
book value (MV /BV), and price-earnings ratio (P/E). Performance variables are the 
dependent variables in all equations. In most studies, Tobin's Q ratio is used as an average 
performance measure. (Morck et al.,1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990, 1995; Agrawal 
and Knoeber,1996; Xu and Wong,1997; Cho,1998; Holdemess et al., 1999; Hirnmelberg et 
al., 1999; Severin,2000; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Davies et al.,2002; Cui and Mak, 
2002; Douma etc.,2002; Wei and Varela,2003). However, in this thesis Tobin's Q has 
been excluded from the analysis due to difficulties in measuring market value of debt and 
the cost of replecament of total assets for Turkish companies. We use ratio analysis to 
understand the financial affairs of companies. 
The ratios used in this study are follows: 
a) Profitability Ratios: 
ı. Return-on-Equity =Net Profit / Book Value ofEquity 
ıı. Return-on Assets = Eamings Before Interest and Tax / Book Value 
of Total Assets 
ııı. Net Operating Profit Margin = Earnings Before Interest and Tax / 
Net Sales 
b) Leverage Ratios: 
ı. Debt-to-Equity = Book Value of Total _Debt / Book Value of Total 
Equity 
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c) Market-Value Ratios: 
ı. Market-to-Book Ratio = Stock Price / Book Value per Share 
11 . Price-Earnings Ratio = Stock Price / Earnings per Share 
Data were collected on five measures of financial perforınance and financial perforınance 
ratios are calculated for each year over the six year period between 1997-2002. Return-on-
Assets (ROA) is an accounting measure of the efficiency with which corporate assets are 
managed; Return-on-Equity (ROE) is a measure of effıciency with which corporate 
shareholders' investments are managed; Price-Eamings Ratio (P/E) indicates the growth 
potential and risk ofa company; Market-to-Book Ratio (MV/BV) is an indicator of how 
other investors regard the company. 
3.1.4.3. Control Variables: A number of additional variables are included in the 
fınancial perforınance regression models to control for other potential influences on the 
perforınance of fırms . The variables includes debt-equity ratio (D/E), fırın size (SIZE), 
and systematic risk of company's stock (BETA). Financial leverage, is measured by (D/E), 
is used asa control variable, consistent with Cho (1998), Chhibber and Majumdar (1999), 
and Sing and Davidson (2003). Agency theory argues that debt serves to focus 
management' s attention toward achieving efficiencies while limiting the access of 
management to the excess cash flows resulting from those effıciencies . Leverage is an 
important variable in Turkey, because in Turkish companies use high debt. In theory, the 
greater level of the debt, the greater the amount of lender monitoring; therefore, fırıns' 
perforınance is expected to be better. SIZE is an organizational factor which can influence 
fırın perforınance. Large fırıns can be less efficient because of the loss of control by top 
managers. The potential impact of fırın size on the perforınance of fırms is allowed for by 
the inclusion of the logarithm of total assets (SIZE), consistent with Holdemess (1999), 
Weigand and Lehman (1999), Severin (2000), Mendez and Anson (2000), Gedajlovic and 
Shapiro (2002), Wei and Varela (2003). BETA is the measure ofthe systematic risk of the 
company's stock, consistent with Leech and Leahy (1991), Himmelberg (1999), Demsetz 
and Villalonga (2001). Stock return data have been collected monthly. Stock market rates 
of return as deterınined by 72 monthly stock market returns to measure instability of 
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companies environment during the 6-year period 1997-2002. The variables used in the 
study are listed in Table 3.2 
Table 3.2 Description of variables 
VARIABLES DESCRIPTION 
• Performance Variables Dependent Variables 
ROE (Return-on-Equity) Net Profit / Book Value of Equity 
ROA (Return-on-Assets) Earnings Before Interest and Tax / Book 
Value of Total Assets 
NOPM (Net Operating Profit Margin) Eamings Before Interest and Tax /Net 
Sal es 
MV/BV (Market-to-Book Value) Stock Price / Book Value per Share 
PIE (Price-Earnings Ratio) Stock Price / Eamings per Share 
• Ownership Variables lndependent Variables 
BIGGESTl The percentage of shares held by the largest 
shareholder 
BIGGEST3 The percentage of shares held by the three 
largest shareholders 
MGT (Management) The percentage of shares held by the board 
members, top executives, and benefical 
owners. 
STATE (State Ownership) The percentage of shares held by the state. 
FOREIGN (Foreign Owners) The percentage of shares held by foreign 
owners. 
INST (Institutional Owners) The percentage of shares held by holdings 
or another companies, and the percentage of 
shares held by institutional investors, 
including barıks. 
PUBLIC (Public Stake) The percentage of the public stake. 
• Control Variables lndependent Variables 
SIZE The logarithm of the firm's total assets 
DIE (Debt-to-Equity) Book Value of Total Debt / Book Value of 
Total Equity 
BETA Systematic Risk of Company's Stock 
3.1.5. Method of Analysis 
The basic method used in this thesis is multiple regression analysis. Because, multiple 
regression is the appropriate method of analysis when the research problem involves a 
single metric (quantitative, ratio <lata) dependent variable presumed to be related to two or 
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more metric independent variables. Cross-sectional data is used in multiple regression 
analysis. The variables being referred to are calculated as averages of 6 years of annual 
data, from 1997 to 2002. The reason for using average year, we can not be detected the 
effect of ownership variables at performance variables for each year. in all the regression 
equations calculated performance variables were used as the dependent variable. SPSS 
10.0 has been used for statistical analysis. The general form of the regression equation we 
estimate is; 
Performance = f ( ownership variables, control variables) 
We used analysis of variance (ANOVA) to determine the probability that differences in 
means across several groups are due solely to sampling error. The key statistic in ANOV A 
is the F-test of differences of group means. First, we determine the critical value for the F 
statistic (F-crit) by referring to the F distribution with (k-1) and (N-k) degrees of freedom 
for a specifical level ofa . lf the value of the calculated F statistic exceeds F-crit, we 
conclude that the means across all groups are not all equal. Like regression, ANOV A is a 
parametric procedure which assumes multivariate normality. 
We have aimed to investigate the relationship between the ownership structure of the fırın 
and its performance through backward stepwise elimination. Sequential search methods 
have a common the general approach of estimating the regression equation with a set of 
variables and then selectively adding or deleting variables until some overall criterion 
measure is achieved. The backward elimination procedure computes a regression equation 
with all the independent variables, and then deletes independent variables that do not 
contribute significantly. Stepwise estimation is perhaps the most popular sequential 
approach to variable selection. This approach allows us to examine the contribution of each 
independent variable to the regression model. lndependent variables are added as long as 
their partial correlation coefficient are statistically significant. However, there is no 
quarantee that the stepwise estimation is always a good model. Multicollinearity is always 
possibility in multiple regression. When two independent variables are highly correlated, 
they both convey essentially the same information. in such situations, it is not possible to 
separate the individual effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable. in 
our sample, there is a high correlation between BIGGEST 3 and PUBLIC variables (r = -
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0.842, p:S0.01 ). Since PUBLIC and BIGGEST 3 move together, it is impossible to 
disentangle the separate effects of these variables on the dependent variable. Furthermore, 
from a practical standpoint, once a regression equation has been established between 
dependent variable and BIGGEST 3, nothing is gained by adding PUBLIC to the equation. 
Then, a regression equation has been established between dependent variable and 
PUBLIC, nothing is gained by adding BIGGEST 3 to the equation. Finally, we employ two 
regression equations for each dependent variable to remove multicollinearity. The two 
regression equations are the following: 
Regression Eguation 1 
ROA = Po + Pı*(BIGGESTJ) + Pı*(BIGGEST3) + p3*(MGT) + p4*(FOREIGN) + 
Ps*(STATE) + P6*(INST) + P1*(DIE) + Ps*(SIZE) + p9*(BETA) + ei ... .......................... .. ... ..... .. (3.1) 
ROE = po + Pı*(BIGGESTJ) + pı*(BIGGEST3) + p3*(MGT) + p4*(FOREIGN) + 
Ps*(STATE) + P6*(INST) + P1*(DIE) + Ps*(SIZE) + p9*(BETA) + ei ... ..... ... ...... ... ............... ...... (3 .2) 
NOPM = ~o + Pı *(BIGGESTJ) + Pı *(BIGGEST3) + p3*(MGT) + p4*(FOREIGN) + 
Ps*(STATE) + P6*(INST) + P1*(DIE) + Ps*(SIZE) + p9*(BETA) + ei .......... ....... ........ ... ............ (3 .3) 
MV/BV = Po + Pı *(B/GGESTJ) + Pı*(BIGGEST3) + p3*(MGT) + p4*(FOREIGN) + 
Ps*(STATE) + P6*(INST) + P1*(DIE) + Ps*(SIZE) + p9*(BETA) + ei .... ...... ... ..... ... .............. ... ... (3.4) 
P/E = Po + pı*(BIGGESTJ) + pı*(B/GGEST3) + p3*(MGT) + p4*(FOREIGN) + 
Ps*(STATE) + P6* (INST) + P1*(DIE) + Ps*(SIZE) + p9*(BETA) + ei .. ... .............. ....... ... ... ........ . (3.5) 
Regression Eguation il 
ROA = Po + Pı*(PUBLIC) + Pı*(MGT) + p3*(FOREIGN) + p4*(STATE) + Ps*(INST) + 
P6*(D/E) + P1*(SIZE) + Ps*(BETA) + ei.. .. .. ......... .... .... ........ ..... .............. .... ... ........ .. ....... ..... ............ ...... ........... . (3 .6) 
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ROE = Po + Pı*(PUBLIC) + P2*(MGT) + p3*(FOREIGN) + p4*(STATE) + Ps*(INST) + 
P6*(D!E) + P1*(SIZE) + Ps*(BETA) + ei .... .. ... ..... .. ...... ....................................... .. ....... ... ....... ............ ... ... ......... ... (3.7) 
NOPM = 130 + Pı*(PUBLIC) + p2*(MGT) + p3*(FOREIGN) + p4*(STATE) + Ps*(INST) 
+ P6*(D/E) + P1*(SIZE) + Ps*(BETA) + ei ..... .......................... .. .. ............................................. .. .. ... .... .. ............ (3 .8) 
MV/BV = 130 + Pı*(PUBL/C) + p2*(MGT) + p3*(FOREIGN) + p4*(STATE) + Ps*(INST) 
+ P6*(D/E) + P1*(SIZE) + Ps*(BETA) + ei. ........ .. ........... .... .................. ................ .. .................................. ........ (3.9) 
P/E = po + Pı*(PUBLIC) + Pı*(MGT) + p3*(FOREIGN) + p4*(STATE) + Ps*(INST) + 
P6*(D!E) + P1*(SIZE) + Ps*(BETA) + ei .......... ........... .... ..... ........ .. ......................... ............ ................... ....... ... (3.10) 
3.2. Findings 
We present our empirical results. We first examine the ownership structure of Turkish 
companies. Then we investigate the relationship between ownership structure and fırın 
performance. 
3.2.1. The Ownership Structure of Turkish Companies 
Table 3.3 presents 6-year averages of ownership statistics. Table 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, 
3.1 O show the figures of ownership structures in Turkish companies based on the six-year-
data from 1997 to 2002. 
Table 3.3 Summary statistics of ownership variables for six-year average 
Variable 
BIGGEST 1 
BIGGEST3 
PUBLIC 31.22 
MGT 8.71 
STATE 2.02 
FOREIGN 7.26 
INST 50.87 
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Table 3 .3 shows the distribution of measures of ownership. The mean percentage of shares 
of the largest shareholder (BIGGEST 1) is 44.86, and the mean percentage of shares held 
by the three largest shareholders (BIGGEST 3) is 61.61. The mean proportion of shares 
owned by public through the Istanbul Stock Exchange is 31 .22. The mean percentage of 
shares held by management (MGT) is 8.71, held by the state (STATE) is 2.02, held by the 
foreign owners (FOREIGN) is 7.26, and held by the institutional owners (INST) is 50.87. 
In this study, the presence of controlling shareholders is assessed by the maJor 
shareholder' s position relative to the dispersed owners (Özer and Yamak, 2001). In cases, 
where the largest shareholder (BIGGEST 1) percentage exceeds the dispersed shareholder 
percentage, and where the largest shareholder is not comprised by dispersed owners, the 
company is defined as having a controlling shareholder. Out of the total sample of 141 
companies, 107 hasa controlling owner in 1997, 109 in 1998, 104 in 1999, 107 in 2000, 
104 in 2001 , and 100 in 2002. These results verify El. We look at other owner identities 
we can say that the important portion of Turkish companies is managed by institutional 
owners. 
Ownership data indicates that Turkish companies have heavily concentrated ownership 
structures. This finding is not different from those of the previous studies on the 
ownership concentration of Turkish companies (Yurtoğlu, 2000; Önder, 2000; Özer and 
Yamak, 2001 ; Saraç, 2002). Companies in both the US and UK are often described as 
having widely dispersed shareholdings. So, Turkish companies ownership structure is 
different from developed countries. 
Table 3.4 Summary statistics of the percentage of shares held by the largest 
shareholder over the period 1997-2002 
BIGGEST 1 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Mean 43.79 44.70 44.52 44.41 45.92 45.81 
Median 41.62 43.43 43.77 43.77 44.22 44.38 
Minimum 0.52 0.30 1.01 1.98 7.22 1.80 
Maximum 96.41 96.40 96.41 95.86 97.48 96.39 
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The percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder (BIGGEST 1) ranges from 0.52 to 
96.41 around a mean (median) of 43.79 (41.62) in 1997, ranges from 0.30 to 96.40 around 
a mean (median) of 44.70 (43.43) in 1998, ranges from 1.01 to 96.41 around to mean 
. (median) of 44.52 (43 .77) in 1999, ranges from 1.98 to 95.86 around a mean (median) of 
44.41 (43 .77) in 2000, ranges from 7.22 to 97.48 around to a mean (median) of 45.92 
(44.22) in 2001, and ranges from 1.80 to 96.39 around to a mean (median) of 45.81 (44.38) 
in 2002. When we look at the percentage of shareholdings of the largest shareholder, most 
of the firm are owned by relatively small number of owners on the contrary developed 
countries. The findings indicate that the largest shareholder owns more than 40% of shares 
for each year. 
Table 3.5 Summary statistics of the percentage of shares held by the three largest 
shareholders over the period 1997-2002 
BIGGEST 3 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Mean 61.40 62.04 61.28 61 .26 62.33 61.25 
Median 63.02 61.28 63.62 62.44 64.10 63.67 
Minimum 0.82 4.2 1 4.21 3.84 9.17 3.91 
Maximum 96.41 97.44 97.44 97.46 97.95 99.09 
The percentage of shares held by the three largest shareholders (BIGGEST 3) ranges from 
0.82 to 96.41 around a mean (median) of 61.40 (63.02) in 1997, ranges from 4.21to97.44 
around a mean (median) of 62.04 (61.28) in 1998, ranges from 4.21 to 97.44 around to 
mean (median) of 61.28 (63.62) in 1999, ranges from 3.84 to 97.46 around a mean 
(median) of 61.26 (62.44) in 2000, ranges from 9. 17 to 97.95 around to a mean (median) of 
62.33 (64.10) in 2001 , and ranges from 3.91 to 99.09 around to a mean (median) of 61.25 
(63.67) in 2002. The fındings indicate that the three largest shareholders own more than 
60% of shares for each year. The results of Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 indicate that El is 
true. 
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Table 3.6 Summary statistics of the percentage of public stake over the period 1997-
2002 
PUBLIC 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Mean 31.07 30.61 31.14 31.42 31.62 31.57 
Median 27.47 27.41 28.78 30.00 30.36 30.88 
Minimum 3.59 0.17 2.56 2.54 2.05 0.91 
Maximum 98.00 96.36 90.35 81.97 88.66 88.42 
The mean percentage of public stake (PUBLIC) ranges from 3.59 to 98.00 around a mean 
(median) of 31.07 (27.47) in 1997, ranges from O. 17 to 96.36 around a mean (median) of 
30.61 (27.41) in 1998, ranges from 2.56 to 90.35 around to mean (median) of31.14 (28 .78) 
in 1999, ranges from 2.54 to 81.97 around a mean (median) of 31.42 (30.00) in 2000, 
ranges from 2.05 to 88.66 around to a mean (median) of 31.62 (30.36) in 2001 , and ranges 
from 0.91 to 88.42 around to a mean (median) of 31.57 (30.88) in 2002. The findings 
indicate that the percentage ofpublic stake is over 30%. However, the percentage of public 
stake does not show an important change. Therefore, This result indicates that E2 is not 
true. 
Table 3. 7 Summary statistics of the percentage of shares held by management over 
the period 1997-2002 
MGT 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Mean 9.59 9.00 8.76 8.96 8.13 7.85 
Median 0.07 0.24 0.12 0.41 0.07 O.Ol 
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Maximum 68.48 81.69 83 .60 62.17 93 .73 93 .73 
The percentage of shares held by management (MGT) ranges from 0.00 to 68.48 around a 
mean (median) of 9.59 (0.07) in 1997, ranges from 0.00 to 81.69 around a mean (median) 
of 9.00 (0.24) in 1998, ranges from 0.00 to 83.60 around to mean (median) of 8.76 (0.12) 
in 1999, ranges from 0.00 to 62.17 around a mean (median) of 8.96 (0.41) in 2000, ranges 
from 0.00 to 93.73 around to a mean (median) of8.13 (0.07) in 2001, and ranges from 0.00 
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to 93.73 around to a mean (median) of 7.85 (O.Ol) in 2002. Table 3.11 indicates manager-
owners have ownership stake in 75 companies in 1997, 84 companies in 1998, 78 
companies in 1999, 72 companies in 2000, 76 companies in 2001 and 71 companies in 
2002. The number of companies in which manager-owners have stake and the percentage 
of shares held by management are decreasing. This resu/t does not verify E6. 
Table 3.8 Summary statistics of the percentage of shares held by the state o ver the 
period 1997-2002 
STATE 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Mean 2.54 2.41 2.52 1.81 1.74 1.1 o 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Maximum 96.41 96.41 96.14 95.86 88.60 88.60 
The percentage of shares held by the state (ST ATE) ranges from 0.00 to 96.41 around a 
mean (median) of 2.54 (0.00) in 1997, ranges from 0.00 to 96.41 around a mean (median) 
of 2.4 l (0 .00) in 1998, ranges from 0.00 to 96.14 around to mean (median) of 2.52 (0.00) 
in 1999, ranges from 0.00 to 95 .86 around a mean (median) of 1.81 (0 .00) in 2000, ranges 
from 0.00 to 88 .60 around to a mean (median) of 1. 74 (0.00) in 200 l , and ranges from 0.00 
to 88 .60 around to a mean (median) of 1.1 O (0 .00) in 2002 . These statistical data has been 
calculated by SPSS l O.O. Median for each year is zero and we ha veto say that zero median 
is insignificant . The state variable measures privatization level in country. The major 
targets of the privatization program are primarily (l) minimize state involvement in the 
industrial and commercial activities of the economy, (2) provide a legal and structural 
environrnent in which free enterprise can operate, (3) decrease the financial burden of State 
Economic Enterprises on the national budget, ( 4) transfer privatization revenues to major 
infrastructural projects, (5) expand and deepen the existing capital market by promoting 
wider share ownership, (6) provide efficient allocation of resources . A privatization 
program was started in 1983. In Turkey, many companies and banks have been established 
in the custody of the state. The state has undertook management of these companies and 
banks, and it has played an important role in development of them. The state has 
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encouraged loca! families to establish manufacturing firms in order ro create a 
manufacturing industry (Özer and Yamak, 2001 ). With privatization, these institutions 
have been turned over private sector and public. Because, privatization will clearly define 
ownership rights and it will create the institution of private investment. While the mean 
percentage of state was 2,54 in 1997, the mean percentage of state declined to 1, 1 O in 
2002. The period 1997-2002 indicates that the percentage shares held by state has a 
decreasing trend. The state has ownership stake in 11 companies in 1997, 1998, 1999, 8 
companies in 2000, 1 O companies in 2001 , and 9 companies in 2002 ( see Table 3 .11 ). 
Turkish companies have low level of state ownership structure; because too small number 
of state enterprises is traded in Istanbul Stock Exchange. These results lead to acceptance 
of E4. 
Table 3.9 Summary statistics of the percentage of shares held by foreign owners over 
the period 1997-2002 
FOREIGN 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Mean 5.08 6.53 7.15 7.25 8.54 9.00 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Maximum 72 .78 76.51 76.51 84.05 93 .00 96 .39 
The percentage of shares held by foreign owners (FOREIGN) ranges from 0.00 to 72.78 
around a mean (median) of 5.08 (0.00) in 1997, ranges from 0.00 to 76.51 around a mean 
(median) of 6.53 (0.00) in 1998, ranges from 0.00 to 76.51 around to mean (median) of 
7.15 (0.00) in 1999, ranges from 0.00 to 84.05 around a mean (median) of 7.25 (0.00) in 
2000, ranges from 0.00 to 93.00 around to a mean (median) of 8.54 (0.00) in 2001, and 
ranges from 0.00 to 96.39 around to a mean (median) of 9.00 (0.00) in 2002 . While the 
mean percentage of foreign owners was 5. 08 in 1997, the mean percentage of state 
declined to 9.00 in 2002. Foreign owners have ownership stake in 23 companies in 1997, 
28 companies in 1998, 30 companies in 1999, 28 companies in 2000, 32 companies both in 
2001and2002 (see Table 3.11).(The numberofcompanies in which foreign owners have) 
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Table 3.10 Summary statistics of the percentage of shares held by institutional 
owners over the period 1997-2002 
INST 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Mean 51 .79 51.26 50.51 50.85 49.80 51.03 
Median 55.38 55.74 53.22 55.50 54.87 57.36 
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Maximum 91 .79 89.66 91.48 90.70 97.95 94.86 
The percentage of shares held by institutional owners (INST) ranges from 0.00 to 91.79 
around a mean (median) of 51.79 (55.38) in 1997, ranges from 0.00 to 89.66 around a 
mean (median) of 51.26 (55.74) in 1998, ranges from 0.00 to 91.48 around to mean 
(median) of 50.51 (53.22) in 1999, ranges from 0.00 to 90.70 around a mean (median) of 
50.85 (55.50) in 2000, ranges from 0.00 to 97.95 around to a mean (median) of 49.80 
(54.87) in 2001, and ranges from 0.00 to 94.86 around to a mean (median) of 51.03 (57.36) 
in 2002. Institutional owners have ownership stake in 13 7 companies in 1997, 136 
companies in 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, and 135 companies in 2002 (see Table 3.11). The 
number of companies in which institutional owners have stake and the percentage of 
shares held by institutional owners do not show important changes. Thus, results do not 
verifies ES. 
Table 3.11 The number of companies in which düferent owners have stake 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
MGT 75 84 78 72 76 71 
STATE 11 11 11 8 10 9 
FOREING 23 28 30 28 32 32 
INST 137 136 136 136 136 135 
Table 3.10 indicates manager-owners have ownership stake in 75 companies in 1997, 84 
companies in 1998, 78 companies in 1999, 72 companies in 2000, 76 companies in 2001 
and 71 companies in 2002. The state has ownership stake in 11 companies in 1997, 1998, 
1999, 8 companies in 2000, 10 companies in 2001, and 9 companies in 2002. Foreign 
owners have ownership stake in 23 companies in 1997, 28 companies in 1998, 2000, 30 
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companies in 1999, 32 companies in 2001, 2002. Institutional owners have ownership 
stake in 137 companies in 1997, 136 companies in 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, and 135 
companies in 2002. 
Table 3.12 Correlations between the types of shareholders for six-year average 
BIGGEST1 BIGGEST3 PUBUC MGT STATE FOREIGN INST. 
BIGGEST1 1.00 
BIGGEST3 0.755** 1.00 
PUBUC -0.458** -0.842** 1.00 
MGT -0.401 ** -0.190* 0.198* 1.00 
STATE 0.278** 0.196* -0.138 -0.103 1.00 
FOREIGN 0.234** 0.305** -0.228** -0.194* -0.048 1.00 
INST 0.287* 0.402** -0.398** -0.374** -0.320** -0.406** 1.00 
**Correlation is signifıcant at the level O.Ol level (2-tailed) 
*Correlation is signifıcant at the !eve! 0.05 !eve! (2-tailed) 
The correlation between BIGGESTl, BIGGEST3 and PUBLIC is negative and high 
(important). This correlation shows the relationship of open (diffused) versus concentrated 
ownership. As companies become more open to public, ownership concentration 
decreases. Public stake (PUBLIC) has a negative correlation with institutional ownership. 
Institutional ownership is negatively related with ST ATE. Because, in state owned or 
participated companies usually there is no family domination. The correlations between 
institutional ownership, foreign ownership, state ownership and BIGGEST 1, BIGGEST 3 
( ownership concentration) are positive and significant. This implies that, in most of the 
closely held firms, the major shareholders are institutional owners, foreign owners or state 
owner. Correlation matrix for all variables has been showed in Appendix C. 
Finally, we show main results of ownership structure of Turkish companies in Table 3.13. 
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Table 3.13 Main results of ownership structure of Turkish companies 
RESULT EXPLANATION 
Turkish companies have 
Expectation 1 ACCEPT concentrated ownership structure 
rather than dispersed ownership 
structure 
Expectation 2 REJECT 
The openess ratio does not 
indicate important change. It 
shows a consistent trend. 
The percentage of shares held by 
Expectation 3 ACCEPT foreign owners and the number of 
companies in which foreign have 
stake are increasing. 
The percentage of shares held by 
Expectation 4 ACCEPT the state and the number of 
companies in which state have 
stake are decreasing. 
The percentage of shares held by 
institutional owners and the 
Expectation 5 REJECT number of companies in which 
institutional owners have stake do 
not show important change. 
The percentage of shares held by 
Expectation 6 REJECT management and the number of 
companies in which management 
have stake are decreasing. 
3.2.2. Descriptive Statistics of Performance and Control Variables 
Table 3.14 presents descriptive statistics of performance and control variables for six-year 
average. All financial ratios have been shown from 1997 to 2002 in Appendix B. 
Table 3.14 Summary statistics of performance and control variables for six-year 
average 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
ROE 0.16 0.11 2.83 -17.80 22.85 
ROA 0.17 0.19 0.12 -0.44 0.50 
NOPM 0.07 0.16 0.95 -9.45 1.39 
MV/BV 1.03 0.94 5.61 -32.75 37.46 
P/E 16.73 5.07 58.57 -183.06 433.37 
D/E 1.23 1.27 13.65 -84.07 84.23 
SiZE 7.43 7.42 0.50 6.22 9.03 
BETA 0.77 0.81 0.27 0.02 1.28 
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The mean return on asset (ROA) is 0.1 7, which is similar to comparable previous studies, 
but slightly higher than Yurtoğlu (2000) who reports mean return on asset 0.12. Return on 
equity (ROE) ranges from -17.80 to 22.85 around a mean of 0.16. Retum on asset (ROA) 
ranges from -0.44 to 0.50 around a mean of 0.17. Net operating profit margin (NOPM) 
ranges from -9.45 to 1.39 around a mean of 0.07. Market-to-book value (MV /BV) ranges 
from -32.75 to 37.46 around a mean of 1.03 . Price-earnings ratio (P/E) ranges from -
183.06 to 433.37 around a mean of 16.73 . Debt-to-equity ratio ranges from -84.07 to 84.23 
around a mean of 1.23 . The logarithm of total asset (SIZE) ranges from 6.22 to 9.03 around 
a mean of 7.43 . The systematic risk of the company (BETA) ranges from 0.02 to 1.28 
around a mean of 0.77. 
3.2.3. The Relationship Between Ownership Structure and Firm Performance 
We analyze the possible effects of ownership structure on fırın performance using stepwise 
regression method. Statistics included in the presentation of regression results are as 
follow: "R" statistic shows the correlation between observed and predicted values of the 
dependent variable and reflects only the degree of association. "R2" specifies the 
percentage of the variation in dependent variable explained by independent variables. The 
higher the value of R2, the greater the explanatory power of the regression equation. This 
coefficient is a measure of how well the regression equation fits the <lata. "Adjusted R2" 
takes into account the number of independent variables included in the regression equation 
and the sample size. "F" value measures the statistical significance of the equation. "W' 
coefficient determines the relative effect of each independent variable on the dependent 
variable. "t" value indicates the relative importance of each variable in the proposed 
regression model and attached significant level. 
3.2.3.1. Return on Asset 
All regression models are significant for retum on asset used as dependent variable. The 
explanatory power of these regressions is medium, all of the adjusted R2's are higher than 
0.150 (0.161 in Equation I, and 0.150 in Equation II). In spite of low adjusted R square, F-
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ratios are significant and high for each model (7. 709 in Equation I, and 5. 107 in Equation 
11). 
Table 3.15 Regression analysis results for return on asset (ROA) 
Variables Equation 1 Variables Equation il 
~ t ~ t 
Constant 6.559*** Constant 5.424*** 
D/E 0.155 1.865* PUBLIC -0.155 -1.856* 
D/E 0.166 1.997** 
Excluded V. Excluded V. 
BIGGEST 1 0.063 0.763 STATE -0.032 -0.376 
BIGGEST 3 0.084 1.014 MGT -0.042 -0.502 
STATE -0.017 -0.203 FOREIGN 0.026 0.305 
MGT -0.026 -0.318 INST 0.019 0.208 
FOREIGN 0.050 0.592 SIZE 0.105 1.259 
INST 0.067 0.804 BETA 0.027 0.323 
SIZE 0.121 1.454 
BETA 0.030 0.365 
R 0.430 R 0.431 
R Square 0.185 R Square 0.186 
Adjusted R Square 0.161 Adjusted R Square 0.150 
** *p:S0.01 , **p:S0.05, *p:SO.l O 
Analysis results for return on asset and independent variables points out that the regression 
model is significant for Equation I (R2 = 0.185 , F = 7.709, p:S0.01) (see Table 3.16). 
Return on asset and the percentage of the largest shareholder (BIGGEST 1) and the three 
largest shareholders (BIGGEST 3) have a positive relationship, but insignificant. 
Statistically significant and positive relationships have been detected between debt-to-
equity (D/E) and return on asset (p = 0.155, p:SO. 1 O). Regression model are significant for 
return on asset used as dependent variable in Equation 11 (R2 = 0.186, F = 5.107, p:S0.01) 
(see Table 3. 17). The effect of public ownership can be detected at return on asset (~ = -
O. 155, p:SO. 10). The relationship between public stake (PUBLIC) and return on asset has 
been detected as expected. There is a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between debt-to-equity ratio (D/E) and return on asset at the 5% threshold (p = 0.166). 
Table 3.16 ANOVA results for ROA and D/E Variables (Equation 1) 
Model 
Regression 
Residual 
Total 
Sum of Squares 
0.492 
2.171 
2.663 
df 
1 
139 
140 
Mean Square F Sig. 
0.123 7.709*** 0.000 
0.016 
Table 3.17 ANOVA Results for ROA and PUBLIC, D/E Variables (Equation il) 
Model 
Regression 
Residual 
Total 
Sum of Squares 
0.496 
2.167 
2.663 
df 
2 
138 
140 
Mean Square F Sig. 
0.083 5.107*** 0.000 
0.016 
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in Table 3.16, absolute F value (F-cal) is found as 7.709 and the signifinance value is 
0.000. Comparison of F-cal and critical F value (F-crit = 6.81), which is found from F-
distribution table for 1 and 139 degrees of freedom with a =O.Ol, 7.709 > 6.81. We can 
conclude that all group means are not equal. In Table 3.17, absolute F value (F-cal) is 
found as 5 .107 and the signifinance value is 0.000. Comparison of F-cal and critical F 
value (F-crit = 4.75), which is found from F-distribution table for 2 and 138 degrees of 
freedom with a =O.Ol , 5.107 > 4.75. We can conclude that all group means are not equal. 
Finally, the results of regressions model for return on asset are significant for each 
equation. The effect of public ownership can be detected at return on asset (~ = -0. 155, 
pSO. 1 O) in Equation II. Therefore, we can indicate that H21 finds statistical support to be 
accepted. In Equation I, we find that there is a positive relationship between ownership 
concentration and return on asset, but insignificant, so Hl is not confirmed. When welook 
at the effects of independent variables on return on asset for each equation, debt-to-equity 
(D/E) and return on asset (~ = 0.155, p~0.10) in Equation I, and W = 0.166, pS0.05) in 
Equaiton II. We conclude to assert that regarding all regression models, there is no 
relationship between return on asset and the percentage of shares held by different owner 
identity. Thus, H6, Hll, H16, H26 are not confirmed. 
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3.2.3.2. Return on Equity 
The Adjusted R square 's show that the explanatory power of the retum on equity 
regressions is generally high. All regression equations are significant for retum on equity 
used as dependent variable. The explanatory power of these regressions is high, all of the 
adjusted R2 's are higher than 0.800 (0.855 in Equation I, and 0.864 in Equation II). Also, 
all of the F-ratios for the regressions are significant (207.520 in Equation I, and 127.736 in 
Equation II) . 
Table 3.18 Regression analysis results for return on equity (ROE) 
Variables Equation 1 Variables Equation il 
~ t ~ t 
Constant 1.815* Constant 4.295*** 
BIGGEST 3 0.079 2.231 ** PUBLIC -0.818 -3.836*** 
INST -0.063 -1.795* STATE -0.547 -3.560*** 
D/E -0.910 -28.135*** MGT -0.751 -3.803*** 
BETA -0.070 -2.157** FOREIGN 0.739 3.435*** 
INST -1.123 -3.820*** 
SiZE -0.101 -2.735*** 
D/E -0.915 - 28.400*** 
Excluded V. B t Excluded V. ~ t 
BIGG EST 1 0.021 0.418 BETA -0.054 -1.557 
STATE -0 .040 -l. l l 8 
MGT -0.03 1 -0.875 
FOREIGN 0.024 0.544 
SIZE -0.040 -1.100 
R 0.927 R 0.933 
.. 'R Square 0.859 R Square 0.871 
Adjusted R Square 0.855 Adjusted R Square 0.864 
***pS>.01, **p:'.il.05 , *p :'.il .10 
Analysis results for retum on equity and independent variables points out that the 
regression model is significant for Equation I (R2 = 0.859, F = 207.520 pS>.01) (see Table 
3. 19). A positive and significant effect of ownership concentration (BIGGEST 3) has been 
found at return on equity (~ = 0.079, p :'.il.05). This result verifies H2. Institutional 
ownership (INST) and retum on equity have a significant and negative relationship (~ = -
0.063 , p S>. l O). Debt-to-equity ratio (D/E) and return on equity ha ve a negative and 
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statisticall y significant relationship at the 1 % threshold (p = -0.91 O). The coeffıcient on the 
variables systematic risk (BETA) and retum on equity is negative and signifıcant at the 
5% threshold (~ = -0.070) . 
Regression model are significant for retum on asset used as dependent variable in Equation 
il (R2 = 0.871 , F = 127.736, pSJ.01) (see Table 3.20). The coefficient on the variables 
public stake (PUBLIC) and retum on equity is negative and statistically signifıcant (p = -
0.818 , pSl.01) in Equation il. Thus, the result shows that H22 is true. State ownership 
(ST ATE) and retum on equity also ha ve a negative and statistically signifıcant relationship 
(p = -0.547, p Sl.01). We can indicate that H12 finds statistical support to be accepted. 
Managerial ownership (MGT) and retum on equity have a statistically significant and 
negative relationship (~ = -0.751 , pSJ.01) in Equation il. Thus, H7 is true. Also 
institutional ownership (INST) and retum on equity have a signifıcant and negative 
re lationship (~ = - 1.123, pSl.01) in Equation il. Institutional ownership (INST) and retum 
on equity ha ve a s ignifıcant and negati ve relationship (~ = -0.063 , p Sl. 1 O) in Equation I. 
Thus, H2 7 is confirmed. Foreign ownership has a positive effect on retum on equity in 
Equation I, but stati stically not significant. However, the coeffıcient on the variables 
foreign ownership (FOREIGN) and retun on equity is positive and statistically signifıcant 
at the 1 % threshold (p = O. 739) in Equation II. Hl 7 find statistical supported to be 
accepted. Debt-to-equity ratio (D/E) and return on equity have a negative and stati stically 
s ign ifı cant relationship at the l % threshold (~ = -0.9 15). The coeffıcient on the variables 
the logarithrn of total asset (S IZE) and retum on equity is negative and significant (p = -
0.1Ol , pS).01 ) in Equation il. 
Table 3.19 ANOVA results for ROE and BIGGEST3, INST, D/E, BETA variables 
(Equation 1) 
Model 
Regression 
Residual 
Total 
Sum of Squares 
965.950 
158.261 
1124.211 
df 
4 
136 
140 
Mean Square F Sig. 
241.488 207.520*** 0.000 
1.164 
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Table 3.20 ANOV A results for ROE and PUBLIC, STATE, MANAGE, FOREIGN, 
INST, SiZE, D/E variables (Equation il) 
Model 
Regression 
Residual 
Total 
Sum of Squares 
978.644 
145.567 
11 24.211 
df 
7 
133 
140 
Mean Square F Sig. 
139.806 127.736*** 0.000 
1.094 
in Table 3.19, absolute F value (F-cal) is found as 207.520 and the signifinance value is 
0.000. Comparison of F-cal and critical F value (F-crit = 3.44), which is found from F-
distribution table for 6 and 134 degrees of freedom with a =O.Ol, 207.520 > 3.44. We can 
conclude that all group means are not equal. in Table 3.20, absolute F value (F-cal) is 
found as 127.736 and the signifinance value is 0.000. Comparison of F-cal and critical F 
value (F-crit = 2.76), which is found from F-distribution table for 7 and 133 degrees of 
freedom with a = O.Ol , 127.736 > 2.76. We can conclude that all group means are not 
equal. 
3.2.3.3. Net Operating Profit Margin 
The explanatory power of these regressions is low, the adjusted R2 's are 0.034 for each 
model. Also, F-ratios fo r the regression models are not significant. The coefficient on the 
variables systematic risk of the company (BETA) and net operating profit margin is 
positive and statistically significant at the 5% threshold W = 0.203) in two regression 
equations. Analysis results for net operating profit margin and independent variables are 
the same Equation 1 and Equation il. 
Table 3.21 Regression analysis results for net operating profit margin (NOPM) 
Variables Equation 1 Variables Equation il 
~ t ~ t 
Constant -2.013** Constant -2.013** 
BETA 0.203 2.449** BETA 0.203 2.449** 
Excluded V. ~ t Excluded V. ~ t 
BIGGEST 1 0.018 0.215 PUBLIC -0.051 -0.611 
BIGGEST 3 0.027 0.323 STATE -O.Ol 7 -0.206 
STATE -O.Ol 7 -0.206 MANAGE 0.063 0.746 
MANAGE 0.063 0.746 FOREIGN 0.060 0.714 
FOREIGN 0.060 0.714 INST -0.038 -0.453 
INST -0.038 -0.453 SiZE O. 111 1.214 
SiZE O. 111 1.214 DIE 0.018 0.215 
DIE 0.018 0.215 
R 0.203 R 0.203 
R Square 0.041 R Square 0.041 
Adjusted R Square 0.034 Adjusted R Square 0.034 
***p:S0.01, **p:S0.05, *p:S0.10 
Table 3.22 ANOV A results for NOPM and BETA variables (Equation 1) 
Model 
Regression 
Residual 
Total 
Sum of Squares 
5.256 
121.838 
127.095 
df 
1 
139 
140 
Mean Square F Sig. 
5.256 5.996*** 0.010 
0.877 
Table 3.23 ANOVA results for NOPM and BETA variables (Equation il) 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 5.256 1 5.256 5.996*** 0.010 
Residual 121.838 139 0.877 
Total 127.095 140 
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in Table 3.22 and Table 3.23, absolute F value (F-cal) is found as 5.996 and the 
signifınance value is O.O 1 O. Comparison of F-cal and critical F value (F-crit = 6.81 ), 
which is found from F-distribution table for 1 and 139 degrees of freedom with a =O.Ol, 
5.996< 6.81. it means that we fail to conclude that all group means are not equal. 
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Analysis resu s for net operating profit margin and independent variables are the sarne 
Equation 1 anci Equation il. The effect of ownership structure variables can not be detected 
at net operating profit margin. Thus, we can show that H3, H8, Hl3, Hl8, H23, and H28 
do notfind statistical supported to be accepted. 
3.2.3.4. Market-to-Book Value 
We show the Table 3.24, 3.25, and 3.26 for market-to-book value; the explanatory power 
of the regressions is quite high. Analysis results for market-to-book value and independent 
variables are the same Equation 1 and Equation il. That is, we have not found the effect of 
ownership concentration and public stake on market-to-book value. The adjusted R2 's, in 
all regressions are very near to 0.600. All F ratios are statistically significant. The effect of 
owner identity variables can not be detected at market-to-book value. 
Table 3.24 Regression analysis results for market-to-book value (MV/BV) 
Variables Equation 1 Variables Equation il 
p t p t 
Constant 2.076** Constant 2.076** 
DIE 0.746 13.207*** DIE 0.746 13.207*** 
Excluded V. p t Excluded V. p t 
BIGGEST 1 0.005 0.080 PUBLIC 0.003 0.053 
BIGGEST 3 -0.002 -0.043 STATE 0.035 0.620 
STATE 0.035 0.620 MANAGE -0.027 -0.483 
MANAGE -0.027 -0.483 FOREIGN -0.012 -0.209 
FOREIGN -0.012 -0.209 INST 0.006 0.113 
INST 0.006 0.113 SiZE 0.009 0.159 
SiZE 0.009 0.159 BETA -0.009 -0.156 
BETA -0.009 -0. 156 
R 0.746 R 0.746 
R Square 0.557 R Square 0.557 
Adjusted R Square 0.553 Adjusted R Square 0.553 
* **p:SO.O 1, * *p:S0.05 , *p:S0.1 O 
Table 3.25 ANOVA results for MV/BV and D/E variable (Equation 1) 
Model 
Regression 
Residual 
Total 
Sum of Squares 
2457.840 
1958.624 
4416.464 
df 
1 
139 
140 
Mean Square F Sig. 
2457.840 174.428*** 0.000 
14.091 
Table 3.26 ANOVA results for MV/BV and D/E variable (Equation il) 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 2457.840 1 2457.840 174.428*** 0.000 
Residual 1958.624 139 14.091 
Total 4416.464 140 
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In Table 3.25 and Table 3.26, absolute F value (F-cal) is found as 174.428 and the 
signifinance value is 0.000. Comparison of F-cal and critical F value (F-crit = 6.81), 
which is found from F-distribution table for l and 139 degrees of freedom with a = O.Ol , 
174.428 > 6.81 We can conclude that all group means are not equal. 
Debt-to-equity ratio (D/E) and market-to-book value have a statistically significant and 
positive relationship W = 0.746, p ~ .Ol) in each regression equation. The regression 
models are signifıcant for market-to-book value. There is no relationship between 
ownership variables and market-to-book value (MV/BV), similar to net operating profit 
margin. Tlıis result does not verijj; H4, H9, H14, H19, H24, and H29. 
3.2.3.5. Price-Earnings Ratio 
.· -' . 
We show the Table 3.27, 3.28 , and 3.29 for price eamings regressions; the explanatory 
power of the regressions is very low. The adjusted R2 's, in all regressions , are very near to 
0.017. Ali F ratios are not statistically significant. Finally, we conclude to assert that 
regarding price-eamings variable, there is no significant relationship between price-
eamings variable and independent variables. 
Table 3.27 Regression Analysis Results for price-earnings ratio (P/E) 
Variables Equation 1 Variables Equation il 
p t p t 
Constant 3.111 ** Constant -3.731 ** 
STATE 0.156 1.757* FOREIGN -0.149 -1.743* 
Excluded V. p t Excluded V. p t 
BIGGEST 1 0.028 0.292 PUBLIC -0.021 -0.243 
BIGGEST 3 0.030 0.345 STATE 0.108 1.280 
MANAGE -0.070 -0.821 MANAGE -0.11 o -1.280 
FOREIGN -0.123 -1.460 INST 0.036 0.391 
INST 0.132 1.489 SIZE -0.039 -0.464 
SIZE -0.118 -1.275 D/E -0.034 -0.398 
DIE -0.007 -0.079 BETA -0.021 -0.251 
BETA -0.025 -0.296 
R 0.113 R 0.128 
R Square 0.013 R Square 0.016 
Adjusted R Square 0.006 Adjusted R Square 0.009 
***pS0.01, **pS0.05, *p:'.S0.10 
Table 3.28 ANOVA results for P/E and STATE variable (Equation 1) 
Model 
Regression 
Residual 
Total 
Sum of Squares 
61 77.482 
477233.9 
480411.3 
df 
1 
139 
140 
Mean Square F Sig. 
6177.482 1.811 0.181 
3411.754 
Table 3.29 ANOV A Results for P/E and FOREIGN variable (Equation il) 
Model 
Regression 
Residual 
Total 
Sum of Squares 
7850.245 
472561.1 
48041 l .3 
df 
1 
139 
140 
Mean Square F Sig. 
7850.245 2.309 0.131 
3399.720 
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In Table 3 .28, absolute F value (F-cal) is found as 1.811 and the signifinance value is 
0.181. Comparison of F-cal and critical F value (F-crit = 3.91), which is found from F-
distribution table for 1and139 degrees offreedom with a = 0.05, 1.811< 3.91. We fail to 
conclude that aı.11 group means are not equal. In Table 3.29, absolute F value (F-cal) is 
found as 2.309 and the signifinance value is 0.131. Comparison of F-cal and critical F 
value (F-crit = 3.91), which is found from F-distribution table for 1 and 139 degrees of 
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freedom with a = 0.05, 2.309< 3.91. We fail to conclude that all group means are not 
equal. 
The regression model is not significant for Equation I (R2 = 0.013 , F = 1.811 ). There is a 
positive relationship between the percentage of shares held by the state (STATE) and 
price-earnings ratio (P/E) W = 0.156, p :1)_ l O), but the explanatory power of this regression 
is very low. The adjusted R2 are lower than 0.020, and the F statistic is insignificant. The 
regression model is not significant for Equation II (R2 = O.O 16, F = 2.309 ). The effect of 
foreign owners on price-earnings is negative W = -0 . 149, p :1) .1 O). 
Two regressıon equations are not significant for price-eamings ratio. The explanatory 
power of the regression is very low; in all regression equations, the adjusted R2 's are lower 
than 0.02 and all F ratios are insignificant. We conclude to assert that regarding price-
earnings ratio, there is no significant relationship between price-earnings variable and 
independent variable. Therefore, HS, HJO, Hl 5, H20, H25, and H30 are not confirnıed. 
3.2.3.6. The Results of Regression Analysis 
Finally, we have found that for Equation I, return on asset and debt-to-equity have a 
positive and statistical ly signifıcant relationship at the 10% threshold (~ = 0.155); return on 
equity and the percentage of shares held by the three largest shareholders have a positive 
and statistically significant relationship at the 5% threshold (~ = 0.079); return on equity 
and the percentage of shares held by institutional owners ha ve a negative relationship at the 
10% threshold (~ = -0.063); market-to-book value and debt-to-equity have a positive and 
statistically significant relationship at the 1 % threshold . We have found that for Equation 
II , return on asset and the percentage of public stake have a negative and statistically 
significant relationship at the 10% threshold (~ = -0. 155); return on asset and debt-to-
equity have a positive and statistically significant relationship at the 5% threshold (~ = 
0.166); return on equity and the percentage of public stake ha ve a negative and statistically 
significant relationship at the 1 % threshold (~ = -0.818); return on equity and the 
percentage of shares held by management have a negative and statistically significant 
relationship at the 1 % threshold (~ = -0. 75 1 ); return on equity and the percentage of shares 
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held by the state have a negative and statistically significant relationship at the 1 % 
threshold (~ = -0.547); retum on equity and the percentage of shares held by institutional 
owners have a negative and statistically significant relationship at the 1 % threshold W = -
!. 123 ); return on equity and the percentage of shares held by foreign owners ha ve a 
positive and statistically significant relationship at the 1 % threshold W = 0.739); retunı on 
equity and the logarithrn of total asset have a negative and statistically significant 
relationship at the 1 % threshold (~ = -0.1O1 ); return on equity and debt-to-equity have a 
negative and statistically significant relationship at the 1 % threshold (~ = -0.915); market-
to-book value and debt-to-equity have a positive and statistically significant relationship at 
the 1 % threshold (~ = 0.746). We show for price eanıings regressions and net operating 
profit margin regressions, the explanatory power of the regressions is very low and ali F 
ratios are not statistically significant. Table 3.30 presents results ofregression analysis. 
Hypotheses 
Hl 
Hl 
HJ 
H4 
HS 
H6 
B7 
H8 
H9 
010 
Hll 
012 
HlJ 
H14 
HlS 
H16 
H17 
H1 8 
H19 
H20 
Hll 
022 
H23 
H24 
H25 
H26 
H27 
B28 
H29 
H30 
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Table 3.30 Main results : summary table 
CHAPTERIV 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
4. 1. Summary and Conclusions 
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The theoretical literature on corporate govemance is expanding while the empirical 
research still needs to establish very fundamental issues; e.g. the relationship between a 
fırın 's performance and its ownership structure. Most of the business activity was 
conducted by proprietorship, partnerships, and closed corporations for many years. Over 
the recent century, a new form of business organization flourished as non-concentrated-
ownership corporations emerged. The modern diverse-ownership corporations has broken 
the link between the ownership and active management of the firm. Modem corporations 
are run by professional managers who typically own only a very small fraction of the 
shares. ln addition, ownership is disperse, that is the corporation is owned by and its profits 
are distributed among many stockholders (Lauterbach and Vaninsky, 1999). We argue that 
the effects of ownership structure on profitability. Our objective, in this thesis, was to 
better understand the effect of ownership structure on firm performance. We use a cross-
sectional set of annual observations on Turkish companies during the six-year period 1997-
2002. We show the relationship between ownership structure and fırın performance in the 
multiple regression using backward stepwise estimation and analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). The effect of ownership structure is ambigous. We find some effects of 
ownership structure on performance. 
To summarize, our major findings are; 
• Turkish companıes have concentrated ownership structure rather than dispersed 
ownership structure as indicated by earlier research (Yurtoğlu , 1998; Önder, 2000; 
Özer and Yamak, 2001; and Saraç, 2002). The largest shareholder owns more than 
40% of ali equity as indicated by Yurtoğlu (1998) who found 44.65%, Önder 
(2000) who found 42.65%. The three largest shareholder own more than 60% of all 
equity consistent with Saraç (2002) who found 63.26%, Önder (2000) who found 
62.04% . When we look at the percentage of shareholdings of the largest 
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shareholder, most of the firm are owned by relatively small number of owners on 
the contrary developed countries. Companies in both the US and UK are often 
described as having widely di spersed shareholdings. So, Turkish companies 
ownership structure is different from developed countries. 
• The findings show that openess ratio is over 30% in our study is similar to that 
reported by Önder (2000), and Saraç (2002). The openess ratio has not showed an 
important change during the period 1997-2002. 
• The important portion of Turkish companies is managed by institutional owners. 
Turkish companies have pyramidal or complex ownership structure. Because, we 
measured institutional ownership under two sub-categories: the percentage of 
shares held by holdings or another companies, and the percentage of shares held by 
institutional investors, including banks. For Turkish companies, previous studies 
indicate that many companies are managed by holdings and families . The board of 
Turkish holdings is often composed of farnily rnernbers and relatives. (Yurtoğlu , 
1998; Önder, 2000 ; Özer and Yamak, 2001 ; Saraç 2002). This result is similar to 
previous studies. Because, in our study, institutional ownership variable includes 
holdings and group business. 
• The percentage of shares held by foreign owners and the nurnber of cornpanies in 
which foreign owners have stake are increasing. Because, stock and bond rnarkets 
are completely open to foreing investors with no restriction on the repatriation of 
capital and profit. 
• The percentage of shares held by state owner and the number of companies in 
which state owner ha ve stake are decreasing, because of privatization program. The 
state has undertook management of these cornpanies , and it has played an important 
role in development of thern . The state has encouraged loca! families to establish 
manufac turing fimıs in order to create a manufacturing industry (Özer and Yamak, 
2001 ). With privatization, these institutions ha ve been tumed over private sector 
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and public. Because, privatization will clearly define ownership rights and it will 
create the institution of private investment. 
• The percentage of shares held by institutional owners and the number of companies 
in which institutional owners have stake do not show an important change. They 
have a consistent trend over the period 1997-2002. 
• The percentage of shares held by management and the number of companies in 
which management are decreasing. Managerial ownership is measured by the 
percentage of shares held by the board members, top executives, and benefical 
owners owning ten percent or more of the company stock. However, in many 
Turkish companies, the board members and top executives consists of family 
members so, many companies have family-control, instead of management-
control. 
• Institutional ownership is negatively related with state ownership. Because, in state 
owned or participated companies usually there is no family domination. In most of 
the closely held firms, the major shareholders are institutional owners, foreign 
owners or state owner. Firms which have foreign ownership structure indicate that 
low the percentage of public stake and high the percentage shareholdings of the 
three largest shareholders (Önder, 2000). 
• As ownership concentration, measured by the percentage of shares held by the 
three largest shareholders, increases; return on equity incerases in our study is 
similar to that reported by some earlier studies. For example, Xu and Wong 
(1997), Cole and Mehran (1998), Claessens and Djankov (1999) fınd that better 
performance is associated with greater ownership concentrated. Gedajlovic and 
Shapiro (2002) find that this positive relationship is connected with agency theory. 
Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) find a positive effect of ownership concentration on 
shareholder value. Because, concentration gives the incentive and the power to 
monitor and control the management. Ownership concentration promotes the 
pursuit of maximum profit according to agency theory. Ownership concentration 
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has been identified as an important tool to curtail managers' propensity to pursue 
inefficient strategies. it provides large owners with incentives to take an active 
interest in the firm and to monitor its managers and ownership concentration has 
been identified as an important tool to curtail managers' propensity to pursue 
inefficient strategies. (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). 
• Public stake affects return on asset and return on equity significantly negative. 
Because, the dispersed ownership has agency costs. The separation of ownership 
and control refers to the phenomenan associated with publicly held business 
corporations in which the shareholders (the residual claimants) possess little or no 
direct control over management decisions. This separation is generally attributed to 
collective action problems associated with dispersed share ownership. Major costs 
of the dispersed ownership are the transaction costs of monitoring managerial 
decisions that affect shareholders ' wealth and the costs of hiring and firing 
corporate managers. Transaction costs refer to the costs of negotiating the 
transaction. The dispersion of ownership reduces shareholders' desire and ability to 
control (Berle and Means, 1932). Therefore, the most important disadvantage of 
the open corporations is agency cost. Because managers whose interests are not 
same interests of residual claimants. This agency problem is controlled by decision 
system that separate the management and control of important decisions at all 
levels of the organization (Fama and Jensen, 1983a). 
• We indicate that there is a positive connection between foreign ownership and 
return on equity, consistent with Severin (2000), Douma et al., (2002). Foreign 
investors invest to profitable companies. Because, they usually do sophisticated 
analysis prior to investment. Most of the profitable companies have foreign 
investors. 
• The effect of managerial ownership is negative on return on equity. We can explain 
a negative relationship between managerial ownership and profitability with 
entrenchment argument. More equity ownership by the manager may decrease 
financial performance, because managers with large ownership stakes may be so 
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powerful that they do not have to consider other stakeholders interest. They may 
also be so wealthy that they no longer intend to maximize profit but get more utility 
from maximizing market share or technological leadership ete (Morck et al.,1988). 
This result is opposed to previous studies (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Ang et al., 2000; Singh and Davidson, 2003). According to Berle 
and Means (1932) when shareholders are too diffuse to monitor managers, 
corporate assets can be used for the benefit of managers rather than for maximizing 
shareholder wealth. It is well known that a solution to this problem is to give 
managers an equity stake in the fırın. Doing so helps to resolve the moral hazard 
problem by aligning managerial interests with shareholders' interests. Therefore, 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that managers with small levels of ownership 
fail to maximize shareholder wealth because they have an incentive to consume 
perquisites. Managerial ownership helps align the interest of shareholders and 
managers, and as the proportion of managerial equity ownership increases, so does 
corporate perforınance (Singh and Davidson, 2003). Agency costs are higher 
among fırms that are not 100 percent owned by their managers and these costs 
increase as the equity shares of the manager-owner declines (Ang et al., 2000). 
• The effect of state ownership is negative on retum on equity, like Thomsen and 
Pedersen (2000), Repei (2000), Wei and Varela (2003). The coefficient for the state 
is negative and highly signifıcant, suggesting that higher state shares in Turkish 
companies lead to lower fırın perforınance. State ownership is detrimental to fırın 
perforınance. Ownership in a corporation comes with rights and obligations and 
monetary, profit-driven incentives to monitor the managers' decision making. But, 
because state ownership is so loosely defıned, no individual representing the state 
ownership has real incentives to make sure that fırın value is maximized. The 
source of the negative effect of state ownership on fırın perforınance may come 
from the divergence of the political interests of the govemment combined with the 
profı motivation inherent a typical corporation. 
• The effect of institutional ownership is negative on ~etum on equity, similar to 
Dounıa et al., (2002) who reported group affiliation negatively affects fırın 
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performance. Turkish companıes have pyramidal or complex ownership structure. 
Pyramidal ownership structure has some disadvantages. 
1. it may increase centralized interference of holding managers over the managers of 
subsidiary companies, thus reducing incentives on the latter group. Moreover, a 
pyramidal structure may end up with higher degree of bureaucracy which has 
negative impact on efficiency. 
2. Institutional investors / holding managers may be more risk averse than subsidiary 
managers. This causes to miss some profitable projects available to the subsidiary 
company. 
3. Transfer pncıng policy imposed by the holding managers on the subsidiary 
companies for intercompany transfers of goods and services may be another factor 
reducing the profitability of some subsidiary companies. 
4. Possible confücts between institutional investors / holding shareholders and the 
minority shareholders of subsidiary companies may cause some agency costs 
which may reduce subsidiary profits. 
Although above cornments constitute some plausible explanations for the negative 
relationship between institutional ownership and company performance, we suggest 
that those cornments must be read by caution as it is obvious that further research is 
necessary to have beter insights in this matter. 
• Our results highlight that size has a negative influence on the firm performance 
as indicated by Li and Simerly (1998), Weigand and Lehman (1999), Wei and 
V arela (2003). These results suggest that large firms have lower profitability. 
Berle and Means ( 1932) explain that as the firm size increases, shareholdings 
becomes diffused. Large firms tend to have more dispersed ownership and 
therefore less effective control. 
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• The debt-to-equity variable, measunng leverage, is positive and significant in 
return on asset and market-to-book value regression models is similar to Cui and 
Mak (2002). This suggets that a potential disciplinary impact of stakeholders rather 
than shareholders or market (Özer and Yamak, 2001 ). 
• The debt-to-equity variable is negative and significant in return on equity, like 
Severin (2000). This is consistent with high debt interest. When debt interest is 
higher than retum on asset, the effect of debt is negative on return on equity. This 
state is normal because of a substantial amount of inflation, political and economic 
uncertanity in the Turkish economy. 
• Retum on equity and systematic risk of company' s stock has a negative and 
significant relationship, consistent with risk-averse diversification by investors 
(Demsetz and Villalonga, 20_01 ). High systematic risk of company's stock is a 
result of high debt financing. 
This study has its limitations. Turkish companies have pyramidal and complex ownership 
structure. Many of the largest corporations are affiliated with each other within a business 
group. These business groups are organized around a holding company. Thus, it is difficult 
to establish a relationship between these companies in a complex structure. Few Turkish 
companies are traded when compared with those listed in the American and British 
exchange. Furthermore, many of the family companies are not listed in the ISE. We have 
measured managerial ownership as the percentage of shares held by the board members, 
top executives, and benefical owners owning ten percent or more of the company stock. 
However, in many Turkish companies, the board members and top executives consists of 
family members so, many companies have family-control, instead of management-control. 
This study contributions to open debate about the link between ownership structure and 
fırın performance. Finally in light of our findings, we propose for further research that this 
study may lead to a more comprehensive analysis of the relationship between ownership 
structure and firm performance. 
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Demzets&Lehn SAMPLE 511 large US firms over the period 1976-1980. 
(1 985) 
OWNERSHIP ( 1) Logarithm of an Herfindahl Index, ( calculated 
The relation VARIABLES by summing the squared percentage of shares 
between controlled by each shareholder) (2) Logarithm of 
ownership combined holding by 5 largest shareholders, (3) 
concentration Logarithm of holding by 20 largest shareholders, 
andfirm (4) Holdings by 5 largest families and individuals, 
performance. (5)Holdings by 5 largest institutional investors. 
PERFORMANCE Return on equity, standard error of market model 
VARIABLES regressing firm return on market retum. 
OTHER Industry dummies for utilities, financials, and 
VARIABLES media; firm size by market value of equity; capital 
expenditure / total sales; advertising /total sales; 
R&D / total sales; standard deviation of 
accounting ROE; standard deviation of stock 
return. 
METHODS& OLS regression. 
RESULTS They find that stock concentration and firm 
performance is unrelated, and non-linear relation 
between accounting rates of return and the 
concentration of ownership. There is no 
significant relationship between the presence of 
large shareholdings and firm ' s value. 
Demsetz SAMPLE 56 large US firms in 1980. 
(1986) 28 firms exhibiting the highets degree of ownership 
concentration and 28 firms exhibiting such low 
insi der- concentration of ownership that no one shareholder 
investment owned more than 0.02 percent of the shares 
argument. OWNERSHIP Insider ownership by directors and officiers. 
VARIABLES 
PERFORMANCE Insider trading involvement as insider trading volume 
VARIABLES to insider ownership 
OT HER 
VARIABLES 
METHODS& Descriptive statistic. 
RESULTS He indicates that insider trading involvement is 7 times 
higher for firms with high insider ownership. 
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Morck et al. SAMPLE 3 71 largest US firms 
(1988) 
OWNERSHIP Shareholding by all members of the board in the 
The relation VARIABLES ranges [0-5%], [5-25%], and [25-100%], combined 
between shareholding by top two officiers, and dummy for 
ownership presence of founder on board. 
structure and PERFORMANCE Tobin's Q ratio and profit rate firm 
performance. 
VARIABLES 
OTHER Size by replacement cost of assets, R&D costs to 
VARIABLES size, advertising to size, long-term debt to size, and 
industry by 3-digit SIC ( Standard Industry 
Classification) 
METHODS& OLS and Qiecewise linear regression. 
RESULTS They indicate that inside ownership is an important 
control mechanism, and it is positively connected 
with firm value, they find a non-linear relationship 
between ownership structure and firm value. 
McConnell SAMPLE 1173 US firms in 197 6, and 1093 US firms in 1986 
& Servaes 
(1990) OWNERSHIP (1) Insider ownership by managers and directors,(2) 
VARIABLES institutional ownership, (3) largest single 
The blockholder,( 4) combined ownership by non-insiders 
relation who have more than 5% ownership, (5) dummy for 
between presence of blockholders, insider ownership in the 
insider and ranges [0-5%], [5-25%], and [25-100%] . 
blockholder 
ownership PERFORMANCE Tobin's Q ratio and ROA 
and VARIABLES 
corporate 
value. 
OT HER Size by replacement cost of assets, R&D cost to size, 
VARIABLES advertising to size, long-term debt to size. 
METHODS& OLS and Qiecewise linear regression. 
RESULTS They explain the connection between ownership and 
fırın value with non-linear relationship.They find an 
inverted U-shaped function. Finally, they find a 
concave relation between managerial ownership and 
Tobin 's Q.shareholdings and firm's value. 
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Oswald & SAMPLE 645 US . firms over the period 1983-1987. 
Jahera 
(1991) OWNERSHIP Stockholdings of both officiers and directors. 
VARIABLES 
The relation 
ownership PERFORMANCE Rate of return on assets, rate of return on equity, 
structure VARIABLES excess rates of return. 
and 
financial 
perf ormance OT HER 
in the VARIABLES 
context of 
the agency 
theory. 
METHODS& The analysis is a five by fi ve matrix of QOrtfolios of 
RESULTS firms is formed based on the five way ranking by 
Qercentage of stock held by insiders and the fi ve way 
ranking of size. 
They find a significant relationship between 
ownership and performance even after controlling for 
size diff erences. 
Chaganti & SAMPLE 40 pairs of manufacturing fırms in US over the 
Damanpour peri od 1983- 1985. 
(1991) OWNERSHIP (1 )Stockholdings by outside institutions,(2) 
VARIABLES stockholdings by corporate executives, (3) 
The role of stockholdings by family owners, and (4) 
institutional stockholdings by insider institutions. 
owners and PERFORMANCE Return on assets, return on equity, price-earnings 
relation VARIABLES (PE) ratio,total stock return 
between OTHER Moderator variable, the size of outside institutional 
outside VARIABLES stockholding, and the interaction between them. 
institutional 
and METHODS& Seri es of hierarchical multiQle regressions. 
perfonnance. RESULTS Stock hold by outside institutional investors has a 
positive effect on the financial performance of the 
fırın. 
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Leech & SAMPLE Five ownership concentration indices; Herfindal 
Leahy (1991) index,Largest holding,Combined holding of largest 
5, 10, 20 shareholders. Six control type indices for 
Ownership manager control and ownership control. 
structure in ( Control-types are based on the concentration of 
terms of voting power.) Largest shareholding exceeds 5%, 
concentrated 10%, and 20%, Degree of control of largest holding 
and control exceeds 90, 95 and 99%. 
types OWNERSHIP Retum on sales, retum on equity , historical market 
classifications. VARIABLES value divided by ordinary share capital 
PERFORMANCE Return on sales, retum on equity , historical market 
VARIABLES value divided by ordinary share capital 
OT HER The standard deviation of the rate of retum, beta , 
VARIABLES size, product diversification, age of fırın , export 
intensity of sales which measures of exposure to 
competition in world markets, capital intensity of 
technology which is the ratio of capital to labor, 
and industry. 
METHODS& Multivariate regression. 
RESULTS Ownership-controlled firms have more higher profit 
rates and growth rates than manager-controlled 
firms with regard to retum on equity, retum on 
sales, growth of sales. They find that corporate 
performance is an increasing function of 
managerial ownership. 
McConnell SAMPLE 990 US firms in 1976, 876 US firms in 1986, and US 
& Servaes 780 firms in 1988. 
(1995) OWNERSHIP (1) insider stock ownership by managers and directors, 
VARIABLES (2) institutional ownership, (3) blockholders as 
The combined ownership by non-insiders who have more 
relation than 5% ownership. 
between PERFORMANCE Tobin's Q ratio. 
insider and VARIABLES 
blockholder OT HER Control variables are the same as McConnell & 
ownership VARIABLES Servaes (1990). 
and 
corporate METHODS& OLS regression 
value. RESULTS The results are the same as their preceding study (1990). Only difference is that Tobin's Q is 
significantly increasing with blockholder ownership 
now. 
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Agrawal & SAMPLE 383 large US fırıns in 1987. 
Knoeber 
(1996) OWNERSHIP (1) Percentage of insider ownership by directors and 
VARIABLES officiers, (2) dummy for presence of founding CEO, 
The relation and (3) percentage of shares held by above 5% 
between blockholders. 
ownership 
structure PERFORMANCE Tobin's Q ratio. 
and VARIABLES 
perforınance OT HER Y ears of CEO tenure, number of institutional 
to control VARIABLES shareholders, number of officiers and directors, 
agency research and development expenditures / total assets, 
problems advertising expenditures / total assets, dummy for 
NYSE listing, fırın diversifıcation, cash flow return, 
dummy for regulated fırın, size by assets, and control 
activity by % of acquired fırıns in each two-digit SIC. 
METHODS& OLS and 2SLS regression. 
RESULTS Blockholder ownership and institutional ownership 
increase by corporate control. Institutional ownership 
decreases with blockholder ownership. There is a 
positive relationship between greater insider 
ownership and fırın perforınance, and a negative 
relationship between more outsiders on the board, 
more debt fınancing, greater corporate control activity 
and fırın perforınance . Finally, they report a positive 
effect of shareholdings of insiders on fırın 
performance measured by Tobin' s Q. 
Xu& Wong SAMPLE 500 companies in China at the end of 1996. 
(1997) 
OWNERSHIP The percentage of shares controlled by top 1 O 
The impact VARIABLES shareholders and the sum of squared percentage of 
of ownership shares controlled by the each top 1 O shareholders 
structure on (Herfındahl Index). 
the 
perforınance. PERFORMANCE Tobin's Q ratio, the Market-to-Book Value Ratio, 
VARIABLES ROEandROA. 
OTHER Industry dummies for manufacturing, trade, utility, 
VARIABLES real estate industries; the debt / asset ratio, sale by the 
size effect of fırms, growth of net income 
METHODS& Firm perforınance increases with ownership 
RESULTS concentration. Because concentration gives the 
incentive and the power to monitor and control the 
management 
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SAMPLE 100 largest non-fınancial companies in European 
Pedersen countries in 1992. 
& OWNERSHIP (1) Dispersed ownership relies on holdings less than 
Thomsen VARIABLES 20% of company shares, (2) dominant ownership relies 
(1 997) on holdings between 20% and 50% of the company 
shares, (3) family-owned which is majority ownership, 
The (4) foreign-owned which is majority ownership, (5) 
relation government-owned which is majority ownership, (6) 
between cooperative. 
corporate 
ownership, PERFORMANCE 
fırın size, VARIABLES 
industry OTHER Stock market size, banking concentration, frequently of 
and VARIABLES dual class shares, openness of the economy. 
nation. 
METHODS& Multiominal Logistic Regressions. 
RESULTS National and industrial differences are as important for 
corporate ownership. 
Nickell et SAMPLE 580 UK manufacturing fırıns over the period 1985-
al.,(1997) 1994. 
OWNERSHIP SCl is a fınancial fırın such as insurance company, 
The role of VARIABLES bank. SC2 is a person, a family, a group of linked 
product individuals, a company pension fund or charity. SC3 
market is a non-fınancial company. 
competition, Dummies SCl, SC2, and SC3 equal to 1, iflargest 
fınancial shareholder has 90% or 95% change of winning a 
market majotiry vote. 
pressure and PERFORMANCE Productivity growth as change in logarithm of real 
shareholder VARIABLES sal es 
control in OTHER 1) Lagged productivity growth, 2) Change in log of 
generating VARIABLES employment, 3) Change in log of capital stock, 4) 
improved Change in index of industry overtime hours, 5) 
productivity Monopoly power by change of market share, or 
perforınance industry concentration, or industry import penetration 
ın or rent / value added, 6) Size by log of employment, 
companıes. 7) Financial pressure by interest payments / cash 
flow, 8) Industry & time durnmies. 
METHODS& Regression technigue by Arellano and Bond for 
RESULTS dynamic :ganel <lata methods. 
They find that the dominant extemal shareholders 
have in general no positive effect on company 
perforınance. But, if the dominant shareholder is a 
financial institution, then a positive effect of 
monitoring is found. 
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Denis and SAMPLE 1394 US firms over the period 1985-1988. 
Denis & 
Sarin (1997) OWNERSHIP ( 1) Ownership of the firms by officiers and directors, 
VARIABLES (2) by institutions, (3) by outside blockholders, ( 4) 
The impact the fraction of firms with outside blockholders, (5) 
of with founder as chief executive officer, (6) the 
ownership fraction of insiders on board, (7) the fraction of grey 
structure on directors on board and (8) the fraction of independent 
internal outsiders on board of directors. 
monitoring PERFORMANCE 
efforts by VARIABLES 
documenting OT HER 
the rate of VARIABLES 
nonroutine 
METHODS& Ownership structure has an important impact on top 
executive RESULTS internal monitoring effects. After controlling for firm 
turno ver. performance, there is an important negative relation between managerial ownership and the likelihood of 
turno ver. 
Gedajlovic & SAMPLE 1030 medium to large-sized publicly traded, private 
Shapiro sector firms over the period 1986-1991 in Canada, 
(1998) France, Germany, the US and the UK. 
OWNERSHIP The percentage of shares outstanding held by the 
The relation VARJABLES largest shareholder and the square of ownership 
between concentration 
ownership PERFORMANCE ROA. 
concentration VARIABLES 
and OTHER ( 1) diversification, (2) the growth rate of firm, (3) 
performance. VARIABLES firm size by the logarithm of total assets, (4) 
georaphic scope, (5) industry effects and (6) 
temporal effects (a firm's year-to-year performance 
will be affected by general economic and business 
cycle conditions). 
METHODS& DescriQtive statistics and ROA regression. 
RESULTS Ownership concentration varies greatly across 
countries, with the US and the UK least concentrated 
and Germany the most. They find direct nonlinear 
relation between ownership concentrated and 
profitability in the US, and fınd no nonlinear relation 
between ownership concentration and profitability in 
the UK. Their results do suggest that country effects 
exist in the ownership concentration-profitability 
relationship. 
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Li & Simerly SAMPLE 90 US companies over the period 1990-1993 
(1998) 
OWNERSHIP The stock owned by the CEO divided by total 
The eff ects of VARIABLES common shares outstanding in 1992. 
environmental PERFORMANCE ROA, ROE,ROI and operating return on asset 
dynamism on VARIABLES (OROA 
the insider 
OTHER CEO stock value, CEO duality, capital structure, 
ownership 
and VARIABLES institutional holding, firm size, firm age, and 
performance. diversification. 
METHODS& Multiple regression 
RESULTS There is a positive relationship between ownership 
and performance and environmental dynamism. 
Han & Suk SAMPLE 301 manufacturing firms o ver 1988-1992. 
(1998) 
OWNERSHIP Officiers, directors, benefical owners and principal 
The relation VARIABLES stockholders owning 10% or more of the company 
between stock. 
ownership PERFORMANCE Stock returns 
structure VARIABLES 
and firm OTHER The natura! logarithm of the average market value of 
performance VARIABLES equity, and the average earnings-price ratio. 
and the 
METHODS& When insider ownership increases, stock returns 
effects of 
insi der RESULTS increases.Corporate performance is an increasing 
ownership function of managerial ownership. There is a negative 
and relationship between excessive insider ownership and 
institutional its' effects on corporate performance. Stock return are 
ownership. positively connected with institutional ownership and institutional owners are active in monitoring 
management. 
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Cole& SAMPLE 94 thrift institutions, over the period 1983-1987 in USD. 
Mehran 
(1998) OWNERSHIP ( 1) The largest percentage ownership by a single officer 
VARIABLES and director, (2) the largest percentage ownership by a 
single institutions blockholder, (3) the largest percentage 
ownership by a single non-institutions blockholder, (4) 
the largest percentage ownership by the fırın's employee 
stock ownership plans. 
PERFORMANCE Industry-adjusted excess return. 
VARIABLES 
OT HER 
VARIABLES 
METHODS& Firın perforınance is an increasing function of changes in 
RESULTS insider ownership, and it is a decreasing function of 
changes in employee stock ownership plans. They fınd 
that fırıns perforın much better after the restriction expire, 
better perforınance is associated with greater ownership 
concentrated 
Klein (1998) SAMPLE 485 US fırıns for 1992 and 486 US for 1993. 
The relation OWNERSHIP Insiders,outsiders,and 
between the VARIABLES affiliates directors. 
composition PERFORMANCE ROA, Jensen Productivity and market returns 
ofthe board VARIABLES 
of directors OTHER %Insiders , %0utsiders, %Director Shareholding , 
and fırın 
perforınance . VARIABLES %5 Outside Director 
METHODS& OLS regression. 
RESULTS No systematic association between board committee 
structure and fırın perforınance. 
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Cho (1998) SAMPLE 320 of 500 large US fırms in 1991. 
The relation OWNERSHIP Ownership by officiers and directors of the 
between ownership VARIABLES board, and insider ownership is in the ranges : 
structure,investment [0%, 7%], [7%, 38], and [28%, 100%]. 
and corporate value 
focusing on the PERFORMANCE Tobin' s Q ratio. 
possible role of VARIABLES 
ownership. OT HER Firm size, financial leverage, liquidity, 
VARIABLES volatility, and industry dummy. 
METHODS& OLS and 2SLS regression. 
RESULTS Managerial ownership is an increasing 
function of corporate perforınance.Ownership 
structure affects investment and corporate 
value by using OLS regression, whereas 
investment affects corporate value which in 
turn ownership structure, but not vice versa by 
using 2SLS regression. 
Claessens & SAMPLE 706 Czech firms over the peri od 1992-1997. 
Djankov 
(1999) OWNERSHIP The share of equity held by the top 5 investors and a 
VARIABLES logistic transforınation of this share as the indicators 
The relation for ownership 
between concentration. 
ownership PERFORMANCE Profitability and labor productivity. 
concentration VARIABLES 
and OTHER A dummy for the first phase of privatization and also 
corporate VARIABLES dummies for year and sector as control variables 
perforınance 
METHODS& OLS regression and random-effects estimation. 
RESULTS They find that a positive non-monotic relation 
between ownership concentration and both 
profitability and labor productivity.Ownership 
concentration is positively related to fırın 
perforınance, although the concentration variable is 
not signifıcant in the profitability regression. The 
quadratic terın on ownership concentration is 
negative but insignificant in both regressions. They 
find that the more concentrated ownership, the 
higher fırın profitability and labor productivity. 
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Chhibber & SAMPLE 1000 Indian fırıns, up to- 1991 and after-1991. 
Majumdar 
(1999) OWNERSHIP Foreign owner, private owner and state owner. 
VARIABLES 
The impact PERFORMANCE ROA and return on sales 
offoreign VARIABLES 
ownership OT HER The ratio of exports to total sales, the ratio of imports 
on the fırın 
perforınance. VARIABLES to total operating expenses, size,age, diversity, group, 
the ratio of advertising, marketing and distribution 
expenses to total operating expenses, quick ratio, net 
fixed assets, debt-equity ratio, the ratio of excise 
duties paid to total sales, inventory and sales growth. 
METHODS& Multiple Regression 
RESULTS They show that the foreign high variable has a great 
impact on perforınance.They fınd that foreign-owned 
fırıns are better managers of fıxed capital stock. 
Foreign ownership of 51 % or more display superior 
perforınance when compared to the other fırıns. 
Denis & SAMPLE 583 US publicly traded-finns for the peirod 1983-
Sarin (1999) 1992 
OWNERSHIP (1) by CEO ownership, (2) ownership of officiers and 
The relation VARJABLES directors, (3) number of directors, (4) fraction of 
between independent outsiders,(5) fraction of inside directors, 
equity ( 6)fraction of affiliated outsiders, and (7) fraction 
ownership with outside-dominated boards 
structure and PERFORMANCE 
board VARIABLES 
composition. OTHER R&D /total asssets, fırın size, market value of equity, 
VARIABLES the ratio of total debt to total assets, tenure of CEO, 
and the standard deviation of daily stock returns. 
METHODS& Cross-sectional regressions. 
RESULTS Ownership structure and board composition changes 
are most signifıcantly associated with top executive 
changes, prior stock price perforınance, and corporate 
control threats, but these changes are weakly 
associated with changes in stock return variance, 
leverage, fırın age, and growth opportunities. 
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La Porta SAMPLE 20 largest publicy traded-firms in each of the 27 richest 
et al. economies at the end of 1995. 
(1999) OWNERSHIP Family oran individual; the State; a widely held-
VARIABLES financial institutions; a widely held corporations; and 
The miscellaneous (Ultimate owners) 
ownership Widely held. 
structure PERFORMANCE 
relies on VARIABLES 
voting OTHER The criterion for control, they use the cutoff of 1 O 
rights. VARIABLES percent and 20 percent. 
METHODS& Family-controlled firms are common and important. 
RESULTS Countries with poor shareholder protection exhibit more 
concentrated control of firms than do countries with 
good shareholder protection. 
Holderness SAMPLE Full sample consists of 1419 US firms in 193 5 and 
et al (1999) 4202 US firms in 1995. Limited sample consists of 
120 largest US firms in 1935 and in 1995. 
The relation OWNERSHIP The percentage and $ ownership by the fırıns 
between VARIABLES officiers and directors both directly and indirectly, 
managerial the percentage and $ ownership by CEO, combined 
ownership shareholding by officers and directors in the ranges 
and firm [0-5%], [5-25%], and [25-100%]. 
performance. PERFORMANCE Tobin's Q ratio 
VARIABLES 
OTHER Size by total assets, leverage by debt to assets, 
VARIABLES industry by one digit SIC codes. 
METHODS& OLS regression and Qiecewise linear regression to 
RESULTS test roof-sha11ed relation. 
Firm performance increases in the [0-5%] range of 
managerial shareholdings and decreases in the [5-
25%] range of managerial shareholdings.The relation 
between managerial ownership and firm performance 
is non-linear in their analysis. 
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Weigand & SAMPLE 361 Gerınan fırıns for the period 1991-1996. 
Lehman 
(1999) OWNERSHIP Sum of squared individual shares of outstanding 
VARIABLES shares ( Herfindahl Index), the largest shareholders' 
The impact blockholding. 
of corporate PERFORMANCE ROAandROE. 
govemance VARIABLES 
on the fırın OTHER Firın size by natural logarithm of total assets, fırın 
perforınance. VARIABLES growth by annual change in the natural logarithm of 
real sales, capital structure by shareholders' equity 
plus reserves divided by total capital, market 
concentration by Herfindahl Index of supplier 
concentration at the two-digit industry level. 
METHODS& OLS regression. 
RESULTS They fınd that corporate govemance systematic 
influences on fırın performance. Identity of owners 
indicates that the connection between ownership 
concentration and fırın perforınance depends on who 
owns the fırın .. Ownership concentration is the 
highest for the managed fırms. Family-controlled 
fırms have the highest ROE, foreign-controlled fırıns 
have the highest ROA. 
Himmelberg SAMPLE 398 US firms in 1982, 425 US firms in 1983, and 
et al. (1999) 427 US firıns in 1984. 
OWNERSHIP The percentage of common equity holding by all top-
The relation VARIABLES level managers and the average percentage of equity 
between ownership per top-level managers. 
managerial PERFORMANCE Tobin' s Q ratio and ROA. 
ownership VARIABLES 
and fırın OTHER Firm size by logarithm of sales and squared size, 
perforınance. VARIABLES capital-to-sales ratio and its squared, the ratio of 
R&D spending to sales, the ratio of advertising 
spending to sales, free cash flow by operating income 
to sales, standard deviation of stock retum, time and 
industry dummies, capital expenditures to capital 
stock. 
METHODS& OLS and iV regressions. 
RESULTS After controlling for fırın characteristics and fım1 
fixed effects, they fınd no relation between 
managerial ownership and fırın perforınance for 
large and small firms. 
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Core et al. SAMPLE 205 publicly traded US fırıns over the period 
(1 999) 1982-1984. 
The relation OWNERSHIP CEO percentage stock ownership, non-CEO insider 
between the VARIABLES own 5%, percentage stock ownership per outside 
level ofCEO director, outside blockholder own 5%. 
compensation 
andthe PERFORMANCE Accounting return on assets. 
quality of VARIABLES 
fırıns' OT HER Total compensation, cash compensation and salary 
corporate VARIABLES are dependent variables. 
govemance. 
METHODS& Cross-sectional multi.Qle regression. 
RESULTS When fırıns have weaker govemance structure, 
fırıns have greater agency problems and when 
govemance structure are less effective, CEOs eam 
greater compensation. Finally, these fırıns perforın 
worse. 
SAMPLE 225 UK fırms over the period 1988-1992. 
Short & 
Keasey OWNERSHIP ( 1) The percentage of shares held by directors, (2) 
(1999) VARJABLES the percentage of shares owned by institutions 
owning 5% or more, and (3) the percentage of shares 
The relation held by other extemal ownership interest. 
between 
managerial PERFORMANCE Return on shareholder 's equity (RSE), valuation ratio 
ownership VARIABLES 
and fırın OTHER The logarithm of the fırın' s sal es, the average annual 
perforınance . VARIABLES growth in sales, the total debt divided by book value 
of total assets, and R&D expenditure divided by total 
assets 
METHODS& OLS regression. 
RESULTS Firın perforınance and managerial ownership have 
the non-linear relationship for both accounting and 
market measures of perforınance . 
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Yurtoğlu SAMPLE 257 companies traded on the ISE as of July 1999 
(2000) over the peri od 1987-1997. 
OWNERSHIP ( 1) The percentage ofa company' s outstanding 
The main VARIABLES equity held by the largest shareholder , (2) by the 
characteristics five largest shareholders, (3) by the ten largest 
of ownership shareholders. The frequency distribution of the 
structure of outstanding equity held by a large number of small 
Turkish investors. 
companies. 
PERFORMANCE 
VARIABLES 
OTHER Ten different types of owners are; holding 
VARIABLES companies, non-fınancial, financial companies, 
individuals/families, foreign, state/state agencies, 
managers, foundations, labor unions/cooperative, 
and retirement plans. 
METHODS& Concentrated and centralized ownership structure 
RESULTS are high in Turkish traded companies. 
The dominant shareholders are families. 
Repei SAMPLE 318 companies in Ukranie over the period 1977-
(2000) 1998. 
OWNERSHIP By insider, home outside, foreign outside, 
The impact VARIABLES individuals and state ownership. 
of diff erent 
types, 
concentration PERFORMANCE Annual wage,sales per employee, and sales change 
and VARIABLES 1997-1998 
privatization OTHER 
on corporate VARIABLES 
performance. 
METHODS& OLS regression. 
RESULTS Private ownership lead to higher performance than 
state ownership. Outside owners provide much better 
govemance of assets, but private individuals are very 
ineffective owners because of "free-riding" problem. 
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Önder SAMPLE 1071 observations over the period 1992-1997 in the 
(2000) Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE). 
OWNERSHIP (1) The percentage shareholdings of the largest 
The relation VARIABLES shareholder, (2) the percentage of shareholdings of 
between the the three largest shareholders, and (3) the percentage 
ownership of the public stake. 
concentration PERFORMANCE market value indicators (market value and Tobin's 
and the VARIABLES Q), profitability ratios (productivity of total assets, 
performance. productivity of equity capital and net profit margin), 
and growth rates (total assets and net sales). 
OTHER 
VARIABLES 
METHODS& Multiple Regression 
RESULTS There is a positive relation between public' 
ownership stake and the growth rates on total assets 
and net sales. When ownership concentration 
increases, market value of equity increases, and 
when ownership concentration declines ROA 
ıncreases. 
Thomsen & SAMPLE 100 largest nonfınancial companies in 1990 in each 
Pedersen of 12 European nations 
(2000) OWNERSHIP The share and identity of the largest owner. 
VARIABLES 
The impact PERFORMANCE Market-to-book value of equity, return on assets, 
of ownership VARIABLES sales growth. 
structure on 
OTHER Industry effects ( 64 categories ), nation effects (12 company 
performance. VARIABLES categories), and debt-equity ratio. 
METHODS& Correlation with ownership shares and by owner 
RESULTS identity, regressıon models with different 
performance measures. 
They find a positive effect of ownership 
concentration on shareholder value,and profitability, 
but no effect on sales growth. Nationality affect 
performance because of nation-specific institutional 
characteristics. The effect of ownership 
concentration depends on owner identity. 
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Sever in SAMPLE 199 French fırıns listed on the Paris Bourse in 1996 
(2000) 
OWNERSHIP Ownership by members of boards of directors. He 
The relation VARIABLES uses the percentage of capital owned by the boards of 
between directors which are 33,50% and 66%. 
ownership PERFORMANCE ROi, ROE, Tobin's Q, and Marris Ratio. 
and fırın VARIABLES 
perforınance . OTHER Organisational variable is the percentage of outside 
VARIABLES director and control variable is size by the logarithm 
of the total assets. 
METHODS& A Qiecewise linear regression. 
RESULTS The non-linear relationship between ownership 
structure and fırın perforınance. 
Mendez& SAMPLE 92 non-fınancial fırıns, over the period 1990-1997 in 
Anson Spain. 
(2000) OWNERSHIP 1) The percentage of shares held by the fırın' s top 
The impact VARIABLES executives and their families, (2) held by the largest 
of stock shareholder, (3) dumrny variables that take value one 
ownership if banks, institutional investors, or non-fınancial 
structure on companies held more than 5% of the fırın's shares. 
fırın PERFORMANCE The ratio market to book value of common equity, 
perforınance VARIABLES ROA, industry-adjusted market to book value of 
common equity, adjusted operating income to total 
assets. 
OTHER The logarithm of the fırın' s total assets, the ratio of 
VARIABLES long-terın debt to total assets, and the annual 
percentage of increase in total assets 
METHODS& OLS and 12anel data estimates. 
RESULTS They do not fınd the relationship between ownership 
structure and fırın value. 
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Mueller& SAMPLE 13 51 Gerınan limited liability fırıns o ver the 
Spitz (2001) periodl 997-2000. 
OWNERSHIP The share of equity held by the management of the 
The impact VARIABLES fırın divided by 100. 
of ownership PERFORMANCE # of increases' per sector per year - # of decreases' s 
structure on VARIABLES per company per year divided by # of companies in 
fırın sector. 
perfarınance. OTHER The number of managers who hold own shares, the 
VARIABLES number of extemal equity holders a fırın has, the 
number of bank relationships a fırın holds, the 
standard deviation of the responses to the 
profitability question, the farecasting error far 
retums, the age of company in years, and the natura! 
logarithm of number of employees. 
METHODS& The fıxed effect estimation in regression to control 
RESULTS far endogeneity. 
There is an inverted U-shaped relation between the 
managerial ownership and fırın perforınance . The 
ownership share of managers has a positive effect on 
perfarınance up to an ownership share of around 
50% and a negative effect thereafter. 
Özer& SAMPLE 299 Turkish companies trading in the market as of 
Yamak the end of 1999 listed on the iSE 
(2001) OWNERSHIP The percentage of shares held by the largest 
VARIABLES shareholder. The percentage of shares held by 
The relation individuals, holdings, fınancial institutions, non-
between fınancial companies, and other organizations 
ownership PERFORMANCE ROA,ROE, sales profitability, sales growth, asset 
concentrated VARIABLES tumover, and non-operating income. 
and fırın OTHER 
perforınance. VARIABLES 
METHODS& Multiple Regression 
RESULTS The presence ofa highly concentrated ownership 
structure in the Turkish market. 
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Demsetz SAMPLE 223 US firms for 1976-1980. 
& 
Villalonga OWNERSHIP The fraction of shares owned by the fi ve largest 
(2001) VARIABLES shareholding interests and the fraction of shares owned 
by management 
PERFORMANCE Tobin's Q ratio. 
VARIABLES 
OTHER Advertising and R&D expenditures, expenditures on 
VARIABLES fixed plant and equipment, the fraction of the book 
value of assets, utility, media indicator and financial 
fırın indicator variables, market risk of stock, firm-
specific risk, fırın size. 
METHODS& OLS and 2SLS regressions. 
RESULTS When controlling for endogeneity, managerial 
ownership is determined by corporate value, but not 
vıce-versa. 
Saraç (2002) SAMPLE The 500 Turkish companies in ISE over the period 
1997-2001 
The OWNERSHIP (1) Stockholding held by the 3 largest shareholders, 
ownership VARIABLES (2) by shareholders with 10% or more of total 
structure of capital or voting rights, (3) by public,( 4) by state,( 5) 
Turkish by managers, ( 6) by foreign individual,(7)by 
manufacturing dominating family members,(8) by firms,(9) by 
firms and the person, (1 O) by non-profit institutions. 
impacts of PERFORMANCE ROA. 
finacial crises VARIABLES 
on the OTHER ISE Approach. 
ownership VARIABLES 
structure and 
firm METHODS& Correlations between the tvoes of shareholdings. 
performance. RESULTS Foreign ownership incerases in Turkish 
manufacturing sector. Turkish manufacturing 
companies have more concentrated ownership 
structure rather than dispersed.An important 
relation between ownership structure and firm 
performance. 
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Davies et SAMPLE 752 UK fırms in 1995. 
al. (2002) 
OWNERSHIP Insider ownership, 
The VARIABLES blockholder ownership, 
relation largest stakeholder. 
between PERFORMANCE Tobin' s Q ratio. 
corporate VARIABLES 
value and OTHER Capital expenditures, total assets employed, debt/assets 
managerial VARIABLES employed, market value of equity, R&D costs, after tax 
ownership. profits as independent variables. They use control 
variables like Cho (1998). 
METHODS& Two stage least sguares method. 
RESULTS The non-linear relationship between corporate value 
and managerial ownership. Tobin' s Q ratio increases 
for managerial ownership levels up to 7% and then 
declines to ownership levels of 26%. Market discipline 
has an impact on managerial objectives up to the 51 %. 
Tobin' s Q ratio then decreases until ownership levels 
reach 76% after which increases. They indicate that 
corporate value, fırın level investment and managerial 
ownership are independent on each other. 
Cui&Mak SAMPLE 1 14 7 observations over the period 1994-1998 in 
(2002) Singapore. 
OWNERSHIP As aggregate ownership of all directors and officiers, 
The relation VARIABLES average individual ownership, and CEO ownership. 
between 
managerial 
ownership PERFORMANCE Tobin's Q ratio and ROA. 
and fırın VARIABLES 
performance. OT HER Size relies on natura! logarithm of annual sales, debt 
VARIABLES ratio relies on total liabilities to total assets, fıxed 
assets ratio relies on book value of PP&E divided by 
total assets, R&D intensity relies on R&D 
expenditure to total assets, growth relies on 
percentage growth rate of total assets. 
METHODS& OLS regression. 
RESULTS The relationship between managerial ownership and 
Tobin' s Q is a W-shaped. Tobin's Q declines as 
managerial ownership increases from 0% to 10%, 
increases between 10% and 30%, and declines again 
30% and 50%. There is another increase in above 
50% ownership. There is a positive relationship 
between squared ownership and Tobin's Q. Industry 
has an impact on the relationship between managerial 
ownership and fırın perforınance. 
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Gedajlovic SAMPLE 334 Japanese corporations over the period 1986-
& Shapiro 1991. 
(2002) 
The relation OWNERSHIP (1) Ownership by fıve largest blockholders without 
between VARIABLES regard to identity,(2) the total ownership shares of 
ownership Japanese fınancial institutions,(3) the ownership 
concentrated shares of Japanese non-fınancial instituitons 
and fınancial PERFORMANCE ROA. 
perforınance. VARIABLES 
OTHER The logarithm of total assets,year-over-year sales 
VARIABLES growth,the ratio of debt to capital employed. 
METHODS& GLS random-effects and OLS regression. 
RESULTS A positive relation between ownership concentrated 
and fırın perforınance and this relation is connected 
with agency theory. Because, ownership 
concentrated promotes the pursuit of profit 
maximization according to agency theory. 
Do uma SAMPLE 1005 Indian fırıns over the period 1999-2000 
ete., (2002) 
The impacts OWNERSHIP ( 1) The percentage of common shares owned by 
of VARIABLES foreign institutional investors and foreign 
ownership corporations, (2) by foreign institutional investors, (3) 
structure on by foreign corporations, ( 4) by domestic (Indian) 
the fırın fınancial institutions and domestic corporations, (5) 
perforınance by domestic fınancial institutions, (6) by domestic 
corporations and (7) by all directors and relatives. 
PERFORMANCE ROA and Tobin's Q ratio 
VARIABLES 
OTHER Total sales and age. 
VARIABLES 
METHODS& OLS regression. 
RESULTS Foreign ownership positively related affects fırın 
perforınance whether the perforınance measure is 
ROA or Tobin's Q raito. Foreign fınancial 
institutional ownership is positively connected with 
stock market-based measures of fırın performance 
only. There is an important positive relationship when 
fırın performance is measured by Tobin's Q ratio. 
They indicate that ownership by owner managers and 
domestic corporate ownership positively affect fırın 
perforınance 
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Singh & SAMPLE Large US corporations having annual sales revenue of$ 
Davidson 100 millions or more for 1992 and for 1994. 
(2003) OWNERSHIP The percentage of equity stock held by the management 
VARIABLES and members of the board of directors, and the 
The percentage of total stock held by non-managerial and 
relation non-board members having 5% or more equity in fırın. 
between PERFORMANCE Asset turnover ratio and SG&A expense to measure 
corporate VARIABLES agency costs. 
ownership OTHER Size of the board of directors, ratio of independent 
structure VARIABLES outsider on the board, the ratio of insider on the board, 
and leverage that is measured as each fırm ' s debt to total 
agency assets, fırın size that is measured as the logarithm of 
costs. annual sales revenue. 
METHODS& Multiple regression models. 
RESULTS Larger inside ownership aligns the interest of 
shareholders and management and seems to lower 
agency costs. When fırms have larger inside ownership, 
they have lower agency conflicts and lower agency 
costs. 
Wei& SAMPLE China's newly privatized fırms in 1994 (164 fırms), 
Varela in 1995 (175 fırıns) , and in 1996 (252 firıns). 
(2003) OWNERSHIP The state shares, legal person shares, foreign shares, 
VARIABLES and individual shares. 
The relation 
between PERFORMANCE Tobin' s Q and monthly stock returns (MSR). 
state equity VARIABLES 
ownership OTHER The fraction of the common shares held by the state 
and fırın VARIABLES and its squared, the percentage of shares owned by 
market domestic institutions or legal entities,the natural 
performance. logarithms of total assets and sales,the total debt 
divided by total assets,EPS,the standard deviation of 
the monthly stock returns. 
METHODS& OLS regression. 
RESULTS The relationship between state equity ownership and 
Tobin's Q is convex. State ownership hasa negative 
on fırın value, and state equity ownership harrns to 
fırın performance. Domestic institutional ownership 
does not improve perforınance. 
APPENDIXB 
FINANCIAL RATIOS OVER THE 
PERIOD 1997-2002 
144 
Stock BV COMPANY (1997) ROA ROE MV/BV NOPM P/E D/E Size Price per Share EPS 
ABANA 0,29 0,27 0,22 4,48 0,81 0,04 5,85 601 2.783 741 
ADANA 0,15 0,17 2,38 0,20 14,31 0,37 7,39 9.23'6 3.874 645 
ADEL 0,46 0,37 0,41 0,43 1,11 0,41 6,37 1.361 3.326 1.229 
AFYON 0,40 0,50 4,86 0,17 9,74 1,14 6,12 24.975 5.142 2.565 
AK-AL 0,15 0,19 0,36 0,12 1,86 1,18 7,22 1.750 4.839 939 
AKCANSA 0,25 0,19 0,32 0,28 1,70 0,50 7,58 2.103 6.595 1.236 
AKIN TEKSTiL 0,20 0,21 0,05 0,19 0,22 1,17 7,02 313 6.890 1.436 
AKSA AKRILIK 0,47 0,48 0,69 0,30 1,45 0,47 7,58 3.167 4.569 2.180 
AKSU İPLİK 0,18 0,12 0,26 0,13 2,19 0,57 6,93 1.102 4.197 502 
ALTINYILDIZ 0,30 0,18 0,54 0,24 2,92 1,56 7,11 4.494 8.340 1.541 
ANADOLU CAM 0,06 0,01 0,27 0,12 51,80 3,44 7,23 335 1.240 6 
ANADOLU 0,28 0,36 0,12 0,16 0,33 1,21 7,02 819 6.970 2.505 
ANADOLU ısuzu 0,49 0,52 1,20 0,32 2,32 0,49 7,17 4.213 3.512 1.820 
ARAT TEKSTiL 0,10 0,16 0,05 0,18 0,32 2,44 6,86 561 10.639 1.752 
ARCELIK 0,34 0,39 0,30 0,20 0,76 1,08 7,99 1.378 4.666 1.817 
ASELSAN 0,21 0,18 0,12 0,31 0,68 1,97 7,57 721 5.810 1.056 
AYGAZ 0,26 0,32 0,19 0,11 0,61 0,69 7,39 1.120 5.837 1.840 
BAGFAS 0,36 0,40 0,14 0,23 0,34 1,13 7,15 4.545 33.282 13.471 
BANVIT 0,35 0,43 0,31 0,14 0,72 1,95 6,75 1.077 3.445 1.489 
BATICİM BATI 0,39 0,45 0,20 0,42 0,45 0,64 7,32 1.430 7.097 3.193 
BEKO 0,23 0,38 0,20 0,14 0,53 2,24 7,54 684 3.403 1.282 
BERDAN 0,17 0,09 0,07 0,23 0,72 0,81 7,12 915 13.890 1.275 
BİSAS 0,07 -0,24 0,13 0,09 -0,56 1,72 6,55 844 6.335 -1.503 
BOLU CIMENTO 0,28 0,24 0,10 0,30 0,40 0,27 7,10 217 2.282 538 
BORU SAN 0,35 0,23 0,08 0,16 0,33 2,30 7,11 330 4.293 997 
BOYASAN 0,12 0,09 0,03 0,15 0,33 1,00 6,83 383 13.430 1.148 
BOSSA 0,25 0,12 0,41 0,22 3,44 1,14 7,52 698 1.703 203 
BRİSA 0,44 0,40 1,81 0,41 4,50 0,48 7,64 7.204 3.973 1.600 
BURCELIK BURSA 0,38 0,46 0,35 0,28 0,75 1,07 6,14 1.434 4.129 1.912 
BURSA CIMENTO 0,44 0,40 0,12 0,36 0,30 0,38 6,95 1.048 8.791 3.534 
1997 Financial Ratios 
COMPANY (1997) ROA ROE MV/BV NOPM P/E D/E Size Stock BV EPS Price per Share 
CEYLAN GIYIM 0,29 0,11 0,15 0,30 1,34 1,40 6,44 925 6.134 691 
CEYTAS CEYHAN 0,11 0,12 0,05 0,09 0,43 0,92 6,68 223 4.167 518 
CARSI 0,24 0,67 0,18 0,13 0,27 5,06 7,04 1.073 6.013 4.026 
CBS BOYA 0,42 0,03 0,06 0,31 1,78 3,29 7,03 283 4.846 159 
CBS PRINTAS 0,33 0,31 0,07 0,17 0,24 3,27 6,20 289 3.925 1.201 
CELEBi HAVA 0,47 0,61 0,37 0,13 0,60 0,81 6,56 2.957 8.089 4.939 
ÇELiK HALAT 0,28 0,23 0,50 0,25 2,15 0,85 6,65 1.200 2.401 559 
CEMTAS CELIK 0,23 0,25 0,68 0,23 2,67 0,52 6,88 1.465 2.168 549 
CİMENTAS İZMİR 0,20 -0,07 0,31 0,27 -4,27 1,44 7,28 1.364 4.448 -319 
CİM SA 0,31 0,24 0,25 0,34 1,03 0,48 7,31 832 3.302 806 
DARDANEL 0,18 0,11 0,66 0,37 5,76 3,15 7,28 1.011 1.543 176 
DEMISAS 0,23 0,27 0,60 0,21 2,20 0,47 6,61 2.789 4.642 1.270 
DENiZLi CAM 0,25 0,04 0,15 0,20 3,36 1,79 6,43 368 2.438 110 
DERIMOD 0,34 0,10 0,23 0,26 2,40 5,16 6,55 1.078 4.658 449 
DITAS DOGAN 0,20 0,40 0,68 0,20 1,71 1,66 6,34 3.179 4.707 1.864 
DOGUSAN BORU -0,03 -0,24 0,86 -0,04 -3,53 1,98 6,13 1.745 2.040 -494 
DÖKTAS 0,14 0,11 0,33 0,12 3,05 1,66 7,14 702 2.155 231 
DURAN OFSET 0,05 0,13 0,54 0,03 4,10 2,33 6,27 744 1.380 181 
ECZACIBASIILAC 0,27 0,14 0,55 0,28 3,88 1,34 7,42 2.040 3.719 526 
ECZACIBASI YAPI 0,18 0,06 1,00 0,20 16,22 1,19 7,29 4.400 4.413 271 
EDiP İPLİK 0,10 0,04 0,04 0,12 1,18 2,39 6,86 378 8.406 320 
EGE ENDÜSTRİ 0,56 0,55 0,19 0,29 0,35 0,91 6,59 1.106 5.799 3.202 
EGE GÜBRE 0,19 0,15 0,28 0,12 1,84 2,12 6,53 710 2.517 385 
EGE PROFİL 0,42 0,51 0,13 0,33 0,26 2,28 6,59 575 4.391 2.254 
EGE SERAMiK 0,23 0,17 0,31 0,25 1,83 1,97 7,18 882 2.806 482 
EGE PLAST 0,30 0,37 0,35 0,21 0,96 3,28 6,85 972 2.747 1.011 
EMINIS AMBALAJ 0,23 -0,24 0,08 0,20 -0,32 4,01 6,33 412 5.203 -1.269 
ERBOSAN 0,18 0,33 0,24 0,11 0,74 1,46 6,48 523 2.143 709 
EREGLİ DEMiR 0,25 0,00 0,30 0,36 66,20 1,49 8,38 4.558 15.071 69 
ESEM SPOR 0,41 0,34 0,43 0,24 1,28 1,59 6,88 1.065 2.456 835 
1997 Financial Ratios 
-Stock BV 
COMPANY (1997) ROA ROE MV/BV NOPM P/E D/E Size Price per Share EPS 
FEN IS 0,69 0,33 0,40 0,50 1,21 5,94 6,68 1.834 4.624 1.516 
FRiGO-PAK 0,13 0,18 0,28 0,16 1,58 2,90 6,54 1.035 3.713 654 
GENTAS 0,42 0,40 0,05 0,63 0,12 0,29 6,54 284 6.046 2.430 
GIMA -0,09 -1,13 1,30 -0,05 -1,15 7,21 6,79 493 380 -429 
GIMSAN 0,11 0,05 0,02 0,11 0,30 0,31 6,52 478 29.545 1.570 
GOL TAS 0,41 0,36 0,12 0,48 0,33 0,32 7,05 1.662 14.072 5.041 
GOODYEAR 0,38 0,54 0,17 0,21 0,32 1,68 7,42 3.134 18.232 9.880 
GORBON ISIL 0,28 0,28 0,52 0,17 1,81 4,41 5,74 2.937 5.702 1.621 
GUBRE 0,37 0,17 0,56 0,13 3,30 1,89 6,96 3.057 5.433 928 
HAZNEDAR 0,34 0,37 0,89 0,23 2,40 0,63 6,29 2.123 2.376 884 
HEKTAS 0,19 0,24 0,16 0,19 0,66 0,97 6,82 330 2.122 500 
iHLAS EV 0,16 0,48 0,52 0,14 1,09 6,03 6,79 1.710 3.285 1.568 
INTEMA 0,22 0,07 0,84 0,07 12,13 2,03 6,77 3.333 3.981 275 
IZMIR DEMiR 0,12 0,03 0,15 0,12 4,98 0,47 7,51 383 2.631 77 
IZOCAM 0,28 0,21 0,15 0,28 0,69 1,22 6,83 500 3.401 721 
KAPLAMIN 0,04 0,03 0,26 0,02 8,71 0,28 6,33 1.449 5.564 166 
KARSU 0,07 0,12 0,16 0,07 1,36 1,00 6,84 466 2.944 342 
KARTONSAN 0,38 0,32 1,38 0,52 4,36 0,29 7,21 8.627 6.240 1.977 
KELEBEK 0,24 0,33 0,29 0,15 0,89 1,93 6,53 856 2.920 957 
KENT GIDA 0,35 0,44 0,16 0,33 0,36 2,03 7,29 944 5.940 2.613 
KEREVITAS 0,09 0,23 0,38 0,16 1,63 5,08 7,16 1.935 5.087 1.188 
KIPA 0,14 0,18 0,30 0,08 1,72 0,60 6,70 839 2.784 487 
KLIMASAN 0,30 0,28 0,17 0,34 0,61 0,45 6,49 1.476 8.589 2.404 
KONFRUT 0,11 0,14 1,08 0,13 7,65 1,30 6,52 2.573 2.373 336 
KONITEKS 0,37 0,31 0,03 0,31 0,09 7,50 6,19 552 20.259 6.322 
KONYA CIMENTO 0,21 0,22 0,85 0,18 3,85 0,36 6,77 1.519 1.790 394 
KORDSA 0,40 0,39 0,17 0,52 0,44 1,78 7,52 960 5.600 2.206 
KRiSTAL KOLA 0,14 0,13 3,08 0,19 24,15 0,61 6,73 4.290 1.392 178 
KUTAHYA 0,21 0,14 0,44 0,15 3,17 0,83 6,81 1.814 4.114 572 
LUKS KADİFE 0,34 0,50 0,57 0,27 1,14 0,95 6,19 1.816 3.192 1.596 
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COMPANY (1997) 
MAKINA TAKIM 
MARDiN CIMENTO 
MARET 
MARSHALL 
MERKO 
MEGES 
MEN SA 
MET AS 
MIGROS 
MILPA 
MUTLU AKU 
NET TURiZM 
NETAS 
OKAN TEKSTiL 
OLMUKSA 
OTOKAR 
OYSA NIGDE 
PARK TEKSTiL 
PARSAN 
PETKİM 
PETROL OFiSi 
PIMAS 
PINAR SU 
PINAR SÜT 
RAKS ELEKTRiKLi 
RAKS ELEKTRONiK 
SARKUYSAN 
SASA SUN'I 
SOKTAS PAMUK 
SONMEZ FILAMENT 
-
ROA ROE MV/BV 
0,23 0,15 0,82 
0,39 0,36 0,06 
0,12 0,09 0,11 
0,39 0,28 0,56 
0,10 0,07 0,24 
0,30 0,21 0,13 
0,12 0,24 0,54 
0,27 -0,50 2,51 
0,13 0,52 1,43 
0,22 0,24 0,10 
0,18 0,00 0,74 
0,46 0,32 0,26 
0,40 0,38 0,71 
0,05 0,00 0,09 
0,18 0,14 0,51 
0,13 0,14 0,36 
0,44 0,37 0,50 
0,14 0,17 0,35 
0,37 0,39 0,48 
0,32 0,21 0,02 
0,55 0,59 0,71 
0,28 0,41 0,39 
0,07 0,80 0,43 
0,28 0,24 0,09 
0,28 0,10 1,32 
0,10 0,20 0,06 
0,40 0,40 0,25 
0,39 0,45 0,80 
0,13 0,03 0,34 
0,36 0,47 0,20 
NOPM P/E D/E Size Stock 
BV per EPS Price Share 
0,30 5,46 1,09 6,86 1.054 1.287 193 
0,46 0,17 0,36 6,70 196 3.315 1.186 
0,05 1,20 0,59 6,62 1.374 12.584 1.143 
0,21 1,98 0,67 7,09 5.677 10.227 2.865 
0,14 3,62 1,03 7,00 719 3.027 198 
0,21 0,61 0,77 6,18 451 3.447 739 
0,.16 2,19 1,85 7,21 1.779 3.322 811 
0,.19 -4,97 0,87 6,66 8.688 3.467 -1.750 
0,05 2,76 3,78 7,61 12.949 9.063 4.691 
0,38 0,42 1,14 7,11 295 2.893 697 
0,11 463,83 1,62 6,83 2.130 2.872 5 
0,32 0,79 2,19 7,21 1.187 4.649 1.503 
0,28 1,85 0,73 7,45 9.394 13.201 5.075 
0,09 28,62 0,22 6,69 284 3.328 10 
0,12 3,78 0,42 6,80 1.809 3.529 478 
0,07 2,56 2,09 6,79 1.032 2.863 403 
0,30 1,34 0,55 6,44 1.247 2.517 930 
0,19 2,06 1,28 7,14 1.754 5.040 852 
0,28 1,24 0,63 6,56 1.502 3.104 1.216 
0,47 0,09 0,24 8,30 988 53.220 11.309 
0,07 1,22 1,07 7,88 3.779 5.289 3.106 
0,18 0,95 2,32 6,97 1.218 3.114 1.281 
0,06 0,53 8,14 6,42 351 823 659 
0,15 0,36 2,09 7,12 375 4.324 1.054 
0,35 13,43 4,34 6,89 6.340 4.808 472 
-0,12 0,28 1,96 7,41 1.885 33.851 6.641 
0,15 0,62 0,70 7,09 1.575 6.385 2.537 
0,35 1,80 0,78 7,71 3.256 4.049 1.808 
0,13 10,98 1,57 6,98 2.615 7.727 238 
0,31 0,42 0,94 7,05 1.180 6.013 2.836 
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-Stock BV COMPANY (1997) ROA ROE MV/BV NOPM P/E D/E Size Price per Share EPS 
SÖNMEZ PAMUKLU 0,17 0,10 0,04 0,24 0,40 0,37 6,96 378 9.197 951 
TÜ RK DEMİR 0,28 0,27 0,37 0,19 1,36 1,62 7,32 1.170 3.168 859 
ISİSE VE CAM 0,18 0,17 0,42 2,43 2,52 0,12 7,42 523 1.257 207 
TUBORG 0,25 0,04 0,38 0,37 9,86 1,32 7,03 586 1.531 59 
TANSAS 0,15 0,55 0,02 0,04 0,04 4,69 7,04 158 7.765 4.280 
TAT KONSERVE 0,24 0,17 0,74 0,26 4,44 0,94 7,06 1.968 2.657 443 
TiRE KUTSAN 0,19 0,11 0,37 0,16 3,47 0,31 6,76 761 2.053 219 
TOFAS OTO 0,21 0,32 0,26 0,16 0,83 1,03 7,93 885 3.357 1.066 
TRAKYA CAM 0,19 0,11 0,28 0,25 2,62 0,65 7,60 641 2.251 244 
TUKAS 0,26 0,13 0,21 0,25 1,59 1,74 6,65 320 1.525 201 
TUPRAS -0,09 -1,86 2,73 -0,04 -1,47 14,95 8,40 1.428 523 -973 
TURCAS 0,33 0,25 0,52 0,05 2,10 0,45 7,20 1.151 2.206 549 
UKI 0,47 0,39 0,58 0,21 1,48 0,39 6,43 3.103 5.330 2.092 
USAK 0,14 0,22 0,13 0,18 0,61 1,27 6,34 610 4.628 1.005 
UZEL MAKINA 0,65 0,75 0,44 0,30 0,59 0,82 7,38 2.523 5.744 4.304 
ÜNAL TARIM 0,26 0,27 0,06 0,22 0,21 1,53 6,34 296 5.244 1.434 
ÜNYE CİMENTO 0,42 0,43 0,05 0,33 0,12 0,33 6,74 140 2.741 1.176 
VESTEL 0,25 0,45 0,07 0,26 0,17 3,82 7,92 318 4.270 1.903 
VIKING 0,16 0,01 0,07 0,12 12,59 2,86 6,46 433 6.178 34 
YAT AS 0,34 0,42 0,42 0,28 1,00 0,95 6,97 1.956 4.676 1.955 
YÜN SA 0,36 0,07 0,55 0,38 7,54 -0,17 7,10 4.693 8.469 623 
1997 Financial Ratios 
-COMPANY (1998) ROA ROE MV/BV NOPM P/E D/E Size Stock Price BV per EPS share 
ABANA 0,21 0, 14 0,29 0,22 1,99 0,19 6,02 1.043 3.643 525 
ADANA 0,17 0,20 2,06 0,26 10,44 0,69 7,67 5.781 2.802 554 
ADEL 0,49 0,39 0,31 0,43 0,78 0,49 6,62 1.698 5.533 2.178 
AFYON 0,54 0,59 2,30 0,30 3,88 1,32 6,51 26.818 11 .681 6.904 
AK-AL 0, 13 0,07 0,23 0, 10 3,19 0,89 7,36 1.169 5.179 366 
AKCANSA 0,23 0, 16 0,92 0,27 5,60 0,35 7,89 2.819 3.055 504 
AKIN TEKSTiL 0,22 0,12 0,05 0,20 0,45 1, 18 7,29 218 4.214 488 
AKSA AKRILIK 0,27 0,22 0,76 0,19 3,44 0,36 7,70 2.781 3.662 807 
AKSU iPLiK 0,12 0,05 0,33 0, 11 6,29 0,51 7,20 857 2.614 136 
AL TINYILDIZ 0,27 0,21 1,28 0,25 5,97 1,70 7,42 5.117 4.008 857 
ANADOLU CAM 0,07 0,01 0,16 0,16 15,41 1, 12 7,55 434 2.730 28 
ANADOLU 0,25 0,19 0,28 0,13 1,46 0,65 7,19 948 3.429 650 
ANADOLU ısuzu 0,24 0,39 0,95 0,18 2,47 0,96 7,49 5.302 5.563 2.151 
ARAT TEKSTiL 0,04 -0,04 0,03 0,11 -0,70 3,41 7,15 435 15.935 -624 
ARCELIK 0,30 0,30 0,38 0,17 1,27 0,83 8,20 1.605 4.252 1.267 
ASELSAN 0, 16 0,16 0,12 0,23 0,75 1,95 7,83 820 6.965 1.098 
AYGAZ 0,24 0,31 0,22 0,12 0,70 0,56 7,67 1.310 6.025 1.884 
BAGFAŞ 0,27 0,27 3,63 0,17 13,44 0,71 7,26 19.351 5.325 1.440 
BANVIT 0,61 0,74 0,39 0,34 0,53 0,82 7,21 2.343 5.959 4.390 
BATICIM BATI 0,29 0,1 7 0,26 0,33 1,54 0,94 7,55 1.611 6.081 1.049 
BEKO 0,23 0,31 0,18 0,16 0,56 2,77 7,83 564 3.220 1.005 
BERDAN 0,15 0,06 0,26 0,23 4,27 1,22 7,46 1.282 5.014 300 
BISAŞ 0,03 -2,62 0,91 0,03 -0 ,35 7,41 6,71 1.389 1.527 -4.006 
BOLU CIMENTO 0,27 0,19 0,15 0,24 0,77 0,21 7,33 324 2.214 421 
BORUSAN 0,30 0,20 0,04 0,15 0,21 1,59 7,32 372 9.003 1.766 
BOYASAN -0,04 -0,96 0,09 -0,06 -0,09 2,46 6,93 293 3.241 -3.101 
BOSSA 0,21 0,12 0,24 0,25 2,01 1, 16 7,78 755 3.105 376 
BRISA 0,29 0,27 1,34 0,27 5,01 0,49 7,82 8.016 5.972 1.599 
BURCELIK BURSA 0,26 0,23 0,82 0,17 3,62 1,32 6,33 2.317 2.836 641 
BURSA CIMENTO 0,36 0,37 0,52 0,33 1,41 0,48 7,22 1.957 3.785 1.383 
CEYLAN GiYiM 0,09 -0,36 0,67 0,07 -1,85 2,44 6,56 985 1.465 -533 
1998 Financial Ratios 
-COMPANY (1998) ROA ROE MV/BV NOPM P/E D/E Size Stock Price BV per EPS 
share 
CEYT AS CEYHAN 0,06 -0 ,02 O, 11 0,08 -5,27 0,69 6,96 236 2.229 -45 
ICARŞI 0,13 0,23 1,55 0,08 6,61 7,71 7,39 2.615 1.690 396 
ICBS BOYA 0,23 -4 ,99 0,21 0,17 -0 ,04 15,95 7,25 421 2.033 -10.134 
ICBS PRINTAS 0,48 0,56 0,10 0,32 0,17 5,05 6,53 572 5.960 3.348 
!CELEBi HAVA 0,28 0,42 0,25 0,08 0,59 0,96 6,72 2.667 10.737 4.512 
ICELIK HALAT 0,26 O, 11 0,56 0,17 5,21 0,88 6,79 1.820 3.260 350 
ICEMTAS CELIK -0,01 -0, 14 0,85 -0 ,01 -5,94 0,65 6,95 2.013 2.377 -339 
ICIMENTAS IZMIR 0,16 0,13 0,52 0,20 3,95 1,04 7,48 2.199 4.254 556 
ICIMSA 0,31 0,24 0,17 0,36 0,69 0,30 7,56 1.097 6.540 1.598 
DARDAN EL 0,07 0,02 0,91 0,21 57,48 2,87 7,61 1.077 1.184 19 
DEMISAŞ 0,19 0,27 1, 16 0,23 4,32 0,92 7,00 3.049 2.627 706 
DENiZLi CAM 0,24 0,12 0,18 0,17 1,48 1,26 6,62 803 4.566 542 
DERIMOD 0,27 -0,09 0,42 0,34 -4,64 3,56 6,74 1.023 2.410 -221 
DITAS DOGAN 0,19 0,28 1,56 0,21 5,58 1,49 6,62 9.957 6.388 1.784 
DOGUSAN BORU 0,01 -0 ,30 0,96 0,01 -3,17 1,57 6,41 1.230 1.286 -388 
DÖKTAŞ 0,16 0,19 0,22 0,19 1, 15 1,63 7,46 1.016 4.588 881 
DURAN OFSET -0,01 -2,55 0,87 -0,01 -0,34 10,08 6,50 627 720 -1.836 
ECZACIBASI ILAC 0,20 0,05 0,30 0,24 5,58 1, 14 7,73 2.463 8.151 442 
ECZACIBASI YAPI O, 16 0,02 0,49 0,17 19,84 1, 14 7,51 3.710 7.502 187 
EDiP iPLiK 0,10 0,01 O, 11 0,14 10,96 1,83 7,14 341 3.204 31 
EGE ENDUSTRI 0,40 0,47 0,27 0,18 0,56 0,98 6,86 2.756 10.354 4.895 
EGE GUBRE 0,28 0,24 0,61 O, 11 2,56 1,27 6,67 1.915 3.161 747 
EGE PROFiL 0,27 0,13 0,10 0,30 0,80 2,91 6,81 631 6.107 793 
EGE SERAMiK 0,17 0,04 0,46 0,20 10,52 1,81 7,40 678 1.463 64 
EGE PLAST 0,27 0,15 0,38 0,25 2,55 7,21 7,10 981 2.582 385 
EMINIS AMBALAJ 0,18 -0,16 0,17 0,19 -1 ,05 1,61 6,59 715 4.233 -684 
ERBOSAN 0,30 0,37 0,15 0, 19 0,41 1,37 6,75 609 4.066 1.492 
EREGLI DEMiR 0,12 -0,20 0,21 0,19 -1,04 1,37 8,59 5.381 25.771 -5.157 
ESEM SPOR 0,35 0,31 0,35 0,20 1, 12 1,80 7,14 1.422 4.091 1.267 
FENIS 0,56 0,48 0,71 0,44 1,49 4,60 6,97 2.818 3.980 1.894 
FRiGO-PAK 0,10 0,03 0,22 0,14 6,96 2,72 6,73 1.301 5.991 187 
GENTAS 0,36 0,28 O, 11 0,42 0,39 0,20 6,75 369 3.289 934 
GIMA 0,01 -0 ,78 5,19 0,01 -6 ,61 7,07 7,30 1.295 249 -196 
1998 Financial Ratios 
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share 
GIMSAN 0,13 O, 11 0,01 0,1 5 O, 11 0,24 6,68 550 45.986 5.107 
GÖL TAS 0,30 0,24 0,66 0,32 2,71 0,22 7,21 2.432 3.701 896 
GOODYEAR 0,19 0,21 1,32 0,01 6,24 1,85 7,64 4.447 3.379 713 
GORBON ISIL 0,23 0,07 0,44 0,19 6,39 5,52 6,02 3.946 8.911 618 
GUBRE 0,30 0,20 0,78 0,15 3,92 2,09 7, 17 6.492 8.293 1.654 
HAZNEDAR 0,16 0,14 0,60 0,12 4,36 0,90 6,46 1.824 3.059 418 
HEKTAŞ 0,17 0,15 0,22 0,17 1,49 1,13 7,08 401 1.854 269 
iHLAS EV 0,16 0,36 0,96 0,14 2,64 4,04 6,99 2.292 2.382 868 
INTEMA 0,07 O, 11 0,90 0,01 8,38 2,29 6,77 3.333 3.714 398 
IZMIR DEMiR 0,08 0,02 0,20 O, 11 10,78 0,33 7,74 334 1.638 31 
IZOCAM 0,25 0,20 0,17 0,20 0,86 0,78 7,01 554 3.202 641 
KAPLAM iN -0,12 -0 ,09 0,22 -0 ,08 -2 ,40 0,40 6,45 1.461 6.789 -608 
KARSU 0,04 0,06 0,26 0,03 4,39 0,82 7,04 679 2.600 155 
KARTONSAN 0,34 0,24 1,27 0,50 5,34 0,17 7,36 12.327 9.740 2.308 
KELEBEK 0,24 0,13 0,38 0,1 3 3,07 1,89 6,73 888 2.313 289 
KENTGIDA 0,20 0,15 0,12 0,23 0,85 2,31 7,55 1.220 9.910 1.441 
KEREViT AS 0,14 0,01 1,30 0,24 163,45 0,96 7,39 4.369 3.352 27 
KIPA 0,27 0,40 0,33 0,19 0,82 1,09 7,05 1.594 4.840 1.945 
KLIMASAN 0,44 0,32 0,20 0,35 0,63 0,38 6,64 2.557 12.560 4.043 
KONFRUT 0,08 0,02 0,98 0,12 43,90 1,06 6,75 2.244 2.280 51 
KONITEKS 0,27 -0 ,99 2,20 0,22 -2,23 31,04 6,47 1.716 781 -770 
KONYA ÇiMENTO 0,22 0,25 0,61 0,18 2,43 0,32 7,01 1.964 3.210 807 
KORDSA 0,26 0,16 0,42 0,28 2,59 1,01 7,62 2.048 4.855 790 
KRiSTAL KOLA 0,21 O, 14 9,94 0,18 73,33 0,61 6,79 16.001 1.610 218 
KUTAHYA 0,15 0,09 0,39 0,12 4,48 0,87 7,03 2.561 6.648 571 
LÜKS KADiFE 0,12 0,04 0,97 0,14 26,42 0,98 6,35 1.825 1.877 69 
MAKINA TAKIM 0,20 0,10 0,73 0,35 7,64 0,77 7,25 872 1.190 114 
MARDiN CIMENTO 0,39 0,39 0,12 0,44 0,32 0,32 6,99 410 3.304 1.293 
MARET 0,16 0,06 0,15 0,06 2,42 0,55 6,84 1.607 10.589 665 
MARSHALL 0,23 0,11 1,92 0,14 18,21 0,76 7,26 9.116 4.756 501 
MERKO O, 11 O, 10 0,15 0,16 1,50 1, 18 7,27 780 5.208 520 
MEGES -0,02 -0 ,94 0,97 -0 ,01 -1 ,04 2,16 6,33 665 683 -641 
1998 Financial Ratios 
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MEN SA 0,14 0,01 0,43 0,17 37,43 3,74 7,49 1.625 3.797 43 
MET AS -0,03 -8,66 10,49 -0,04 -1,21 9,87 6,63 5.860 559 -4.840 
MIGROS 0,16 0,34 0,59 0,08 1,74 1,47 8,05 26.096 44.160 14.976 
MILPA -0, 11 0,18 0,19 -0 ,13 1,05 1,48 7,44 516 2.679 489 
MUTLUAKU 0,20 0,07 0,49 0,14 6,86 1,31 7,00 2.320 4.775 338 
NET TURiZM 0,42 O, 19 0,74 0,45 3,89 2,47 7,48 1.289 1.746 331 
NET AS 0,13 0,08 2,98 0,10 37,46 0,64 7,62 11. 711 3.933 313 
OKAN TEKSTiL -0 ,04 -0, 17 0,05 -0 ,08 -0,28 0,39 6,89 222 4.600 -783 
OLMUKSA 0,02 -0,19 0,54 0,00 -2,84 0,84 6,98 2.221 4.114 -782 
OTOKAR 0,18 0,30 0,36 0,13 1,19 3,23 7,29 2.328 6.548 1.963 
OYSA NIGDE 0,58 0,52 0,37 0,49 0,71 0,51 6,78 2.133 5.719 3.000 
PARK TEKSTiL -0 , 11 -0 ,98 0,52 -0,15 -0,53 3,02 7,24 930 1.801 -1.767 
PARSAN O, 19 0,23 0,51 0,21 2,18 0,86 6,90 1.520 2.970 698 
PETKIM 0,1 9 0,10 0,97 0,31 10,04 0,1 9 8,43 1.877 1.937 187 
PETROL OFiSi 0,53 0,59 0,88 0,07 1,50 0,89 8,01 6.790 7.689 4.530 
PIMAS 0,46 0,04 0,68 0,30 18,66 2,87 7,20 1.233 1.806 66 
PINAR SU 0,34 0,01 0,36 0,25 47,58 1,83 6,64 717 1.998 15 
PINAR SUT 0,29 0,21 0,06 0,13 0,27 1,36 7,32 511 9.061 1.860 
RAKS ELEKTRiKLi 0,20 -0 , 11 1,24 0,23 -11, 71 4,60 7,04 8.038 6.483 -687 
RAKS 0,24 0,01 1,48 0,32 164,32 1,91 7,59 3.635 2.457 22 
SARKUYSAN 0,36 0,29 0,1 3 0,16 0,47 0,54 7,32 1.610 12.093 3.450 
SASA SUN'I 0,19 0,20 0,70 0,22 3,55 1,60 7,96 3.434 4.874 967 
SÖKTAS PAMUK 0,05 -0,14 0,16 0,07 -1 , 16 2,15 7,26 1.904 11 .968 -1.645 
SONMEZ 0,16 -0,07 0,21 0,1 8 -3 ,16 1,03 7,14 1.506 7.065 -477 
SONMEZ 0,10 -0,02 0,04 0,19 -1 ,83 0,73 7,22 555 13.265 -303 
TURK DEMiR 0,21 0,05 0,43 0,16 9,26 2,50 7,61 1.010 2.328 109 
ISISE VE CAM 0,10 0,09 0,35 1,35 4, 11 0,10 7,68 662 1.870 161 
TUBORG 0,18 0,05 0,45 0,26 9,71 0,95 7,16 885 1.974 91 
TANSAS 0,13 0,35 0,10 0,03 0,28 4,98 7,30 420 4.406 1.524 
TAT KONSERVE 0,20 0,12 0,55 0,22 4,62 1,40 7,33 1.964 3.565 425 
TiRE KUTSAN 0,10 0,07 0,41 0,09 5,87 0,23 6,94 1.222 3.014 208 
TOFAS OTO -0,04 -0,51 0,42 -0,03 -0,82 2,38 8,12 926 2.228 -1 .132 
TRAKYA CAM 0,20 0,13 0,20 0,29 1,63 0,81 7,91 856 4.179 524 
1998 Financial Ratios 
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TUKAS 0,29 0,25 0,41 0,28 1,66 1,38 6,91 712 1.718 429 
TÜPRAŞ 0,24 0,49 1, 19 0,14 2,44 1,55 8,70 3.145 2.634 1.289 
TURCAS 0,34 0,33 0,58 0,05 1,76 0,39 7,39 2.034 3.513 1.155 
UKI 0,26 0,26 0,53 0,13 2,03 0,43 6,66 4.238 8.023 2.086 
UŞAK 0,14 0,15 0,14 0,16 0,89 1, 15 6,53 1.026 7.507 1.154 
UZEL MAKINA 0,52 0,72 0,32 0,23 0,45 0,81 7,58 2.968 9.134 6.551 
UNAL TARIM . 0,20 0,33 0,46 O, 16 1,42 1,40 6,63 813 1.762 573 
ÜNYE CIMENTO 0,35 0,34 0,1 2 0,34 0,35 0,19 7,09 243 2.065 702 
VESTEL 0,36 0,47 0,10 0,28 0,20 3,46 8,16 779 8.162 3.869 
VIKING 0,04 -0,39 0,36 0,07 -0,94 8,40 7,03 492 1.362 -525 
YATA$ 0,29 0,27 0,30 0,23 1, 11 1,09 7,18 2.183 7.213 1.971 
YUNSA 0,26 0,13 1,26 0,34 9,78 1,88 7,36 5.551 4.411 568 
1998 Financial Ratios 
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ABANA 0,50 0,46 0,29 0,43 0,63 0,48 6,41 2.119 7.252 3.349 
ADANA 0,23 0, 18 2,76 0,52 15,49 0,36 8,04 12.504 4.526 807 
ADEL 0,48 0,39 0,30 0,43 0,77 0,59 6,82 2.489 8.302 3.245 
AFYON 0,41 0,38 4,81 0,18 12,58 1,23 6,51 58.133 12.097 4.621 
AK-AL 0,10 0,03 0,20 0,10 6,92 1,22 7,58 1.453 7.268 210 
AKÇANSA 0,21 0,15 2,80 0,24 18,78 0,40 8,02 5.504 1.965 293 
AKIN TEKSTiL 0,20 0,03 0,06 0,18 2,05 1,36 7,47 343 5.996 168 
AKSA AKRILIK 0,28 0,29 0,72 0,27 2,45 0,76 8,02 4.329 6.023 1.767 
AKSU iPLiK 0, 11 0,00 0,31 0,10 420,14 0,72 7,34 889 2.915 2 
AL TINYILDIZ 0,21 0,05 1,32 0,21 24,04 2,60 7,63 6.508 4.923 271 
ANADOLU CAM 0,10 0,04 0,18 0,19 4,95 0,74 7,72 677 3.729 137 
ANADOLU 0,24 0,24 0,78 0,16 3,19 0,80 7,48 1.920 2.465 602 
ANADOLU ISUZU 0,17 -0,40 1,27 0,10 -3,15 2,75 7,60 4.711 3.720 -1.497 
ARAT TEKSTiL 0,03 -1 ,85 0,64 0,08 -0,35 9,98 7,35 522 813 -1 .501 
ARCELIK 0,29 0,30 0,71 0,21 2,37 0,99 8,61 3.600 5.050 1.516 
ASELSAN 0,19 0,17 0,33 0,28 1,87 2,37 8,09 2.412 7.398 1.289 
AYGAZ 0,29 0,28 0,69 0,13 2,47 0,69 7,92 3.443 4.980 1.392 
BAGFAS 0,27 0,17 1,84 0,22 10,52 1,16 7,51 13.674 7.442 1.300 
BANVIT 0,44 0,47 2,62 0,25 5,55 0,85 7,48 7.054 2.689 1.272 
BATICIM BATI 0,31 0,09 0,69 0,29 7,46 0,78 7,60 1.856 2.671 249 
BEKO 0,13 0,17 0,40 0,10 2,36 2,95 8,01 970 2.448 411 
BERDAN 0,14 -0,01 0,19 0,30 -16,68 2,17 7,78 1.395 7.287 -84 
BISAS -0,18 3,55 -0 ,75 -0,35 -0 ,21 -5,66 6,72 475 -633 -2 .247 
BOLU CIMENTO 0, 18 0,15 0,34 0,17 2,28 0,22 7,51 618 1.817 272 
BOR USAN 0,24 0,15 0,05 0,14 0,35 1,84 7,56 756 14.202 2.178 
BOYASAN -1,17 1,66 -0,01 -32,76 -0,01 -1,79 6,59 88 -6.587 -10.944 
BOSSA 0,24 0,16 0,57 0,36 3,47 1,36 7,95 1.202 2.120 346 
BRISA 0,28 0,20 1,25 0,29 6,12 0,50 7,99 10.810 8.660 1.765 
BURÇELIK BURSA -0,08 -0,35 1,98 -0 ,05 -5,70 2,14 6,39 2.384 1.202 -418 
BURSA ÇİMENTO 0,20 0,14 1,86 0,23 13,57 0,76 7,42 4.729 2.546 349 
CEYLAN GIYIM 0,30 0,16 0,56 0,22 3,48 1,71 6,66 1.317 2.333 378 
CEYT AS CEYHAN 0,10 0,02 0, 11 0,15 4,57 0,41 7,01 166 1.524 36 
1999 Financial Ratios 
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CARSI 0,16 -0,46 2,40 0,08 -5,23 19,68 7,60 2.778 1.159 -532 
CBS BOYA 0,27 -2,80 0,45 0,28 -0,16 61,56 7,35 308 684 -1 .914 
CBS PRINTAS 0,18 -0 ,27 0,03 0,29 -0,10 2,66 7,03 875 30.488 -8.346 
CELEBi HAVA 0,23 0, 17 0,14 0,09 0,84 0,91 6,96 2.767 19.166 3.297 
ÇELiK HALAT 0,21 0,07 0,41 0,14 5,59 1,48 7,02 1.753 4.262 314 
ÇEMTAS ÇELiK -0,16 -0,42 1,68 -0,14 -4 ,01 0,49 7,06 2.144 1.272 -534 
ÇIMENTAS IZMIR 0,16 0,00 0,53 0,20 972,12 0,73 7,64 3.871 7.279 4 
ICIMSA 0,26 0,25 0,88 0,39 3,52 0,70 7,86 2.255 2.561 640 
DARDAN EL 0,1 2 -0 ,87 1,17 0,43 -1,34 8,57 7,76 785 670 -585 
DEMİSAS 0,09 -0,04 1,08 0,13 -24,85 1,89 7,21 3.032 2.808 -122 
DENiZLi CAM 0,22 0,20 0,12 0,15 0,57 1,26 6,82 832 7.228 1.469 
DERIMOD 0,21 0,1 0 0,26 0,22 2,58 2,16 6,75 935 3.567 363 
DITAS DOGAN 0, 11 0,06 4,18 0, 15 74,74 1,53 6,76 24.143 5.773 323 
DOGUSAN BORU -0,22 -6,79 2,88 -0,53 -0,42 14,06 6,49 750 260 -1.769 
DÖKTAS 0,08 -0, 11 0,41 0,12 -3,56 2,65 7,72 1.238 3.029 -347 
DURAN OFSET -0,17 1,73 -0, 15 -0,12 -0,09 -4,28 6,59 451 -2.945 -5 .103 
ECZACIBASI ILAC 0,26 0,08 1,69 0,33 20,35 1,06 7,96 6.156 3.651 303 
ECZACIBASI YAPI 0,13 0,02 0,63 0,13 35,80 1,46 7,72 6.773 10.706 189 
EDiP iPLiK 0,09 -0,05 0,05 0,13 -0,99 1,75 7,37 289 5.520 -292 
EGE ENDUSTRI 0,26 0,05 0,21 0,22 3,81 1,79 7,02 2.206 10.718 579 
EGE GÜBRE 0,27 0,24 0,63 0,13 2,65 1,66 6,95 2.104 3.319 793 
EGE PROFiL 0,22 0,01 0,12 0,23 8,63 3,47 6,94 858 7.228 99 
EGE SERAMiK 0,13 -0,36 0,33 0,18 -0,92 3,82 7,61 461 1.389 -502 
EGE PLAST 0,23 -0,23 0,37 0,27 -1,63 18,57 7,39 777 2.106 -476 
EMINIS AMBALAJ 0,16 -0,04 0,27 0,24 -6,60 1, 15 6,87 750 2.793 -114 
ERBOSAN 0,29 0,42 0,31 0,22 0,75 1,40 7,05 1.280 4.074 1.702 
EREGLI DEMiR 0,17 -0,08 1,34 0,31 -15,84 1, 13 8,80 8.902 6.667 -562 
ESEM SPOR 0,30 0,05 0,25 0,21 4,52 1, 15 7,14 1.313 5.315 290 
FENIS 0,62 0,37 0,63 0,62 1,69 4,32 7,24 4.930 7.886 2.909 
FRiGO-PAK 0,13 0,03 1,55 0,15 60,26 2,43 6,85 2.679 1.726 44 
GENTAS 0,27 0,16 0, 11 0,29 0,65 0,17 6,93 580 5.415 890 
GIMA 0,09 0,01 2,83 0,05 484,56 2,04 7,62 2.590 915 5 
1999 Financial Ratios 
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GIMSAN 0,06 0,06 0,02 0,12 0,33 0,37 6,94 1.081 53.273 3.281 
GÖL TAS 0,21 0,20 0,53 0,28 2,67 0,31 7,38 2.681 5.060 1.004 
GOOD YEAR 0, 12 -0,29 2,05 0,09 -7,03 3,39 7,84 4.101 1.999 -584 
GORBON I SIL 0,12 -0,28 5,45 0,09 -19,72 4,15 6,21 5.989 1.098 -304 
GUBRE FABRIKALARI 0,28 0, 11 2,12 0,14 19,60 2,57 7,46 6.879 3.252 351 
HAZNE DAR 0,09 -0,04 0,98 0,80 -23,21 1,20 6,59 1.389 1.421 -60 
HEKTAS 0,06 -0,30 0,51 0,06 -1,73 0,91 7,13 514 1.006 -297 
İHLAS EV 0,13 0,20 0,81 0,10 4,03 3,95 7,20 3.219 3.993 799 
İNTEMA 0,03 0,04 0,35 0,01 8,88 1,45 7,17 4.290 12.327 483 
IZMIR DEMiR ÇELiK 0,05 0,02 0,23 0,08 12,09 0,54 7,96 557 2.395 46 
IZOCAM 0,21 0,13 0,41 0,19 3,17 1,00 7,23 1.153 2.833 363 
KAP LAMIN -0,10 -0,36 0,69 -0,08 -1,91 1,61 6,79 1.551 2.236 -810 
KARSU 0,10 0,06 0,15 0,08 2,30 0,80 7,18 536 3.613 233 
KARTONSAN 0,17 0,07 1,33 0,20 17,83 0,32 7,52 16.452 12.383 923 
KELEBEK 0,19 0,01 0,48 o, 12 44,90 2,50 6,91 860 1.792 19 
KENT GIDA 0,19 -0,25 2,05 0,23 -8 ,19 2,94 7,67 2.817 1.374 -344 
KEREViT AS 0, 11 0,01 1, 11 0,24 151,46 1,71 7,60 4.333 3.899 29 
KIPA 0,09 0,13 1,49 0,05 11,58 1,86 7,37 3.597 2.410 311 
KLIMASAN 0,39 0,35 0,26 0,39 0,74 0,60 6,93 5.598 21.580 7.574 
KONFRUT 0,14 0,00 0,63 0,14 -640,42 0,99 6,93 2.242 3.577 -4 
KONITEKS 0,25 -2,59 3,56 0,16 -1,38 78,55 6,64 1.673 469 -1 .214 
KONYA CIMENTO 0,19 0,24 0,64 0,24 2,64 0,51 7,29 3.420 5.347 1.295 
KORDSA 0,16 0,07 0,95 0,21 14,10 0,72 7,91 2.813 2.964 199 
KRiSTAL KOLA 0,22 0,24 3,74 0,16 15,61 0,59 6,97 9.168 2.450 587 
KUTAHYA PORSELEN 0,05 -0 ,16 0,28 0,05 -1,76 1,97 7,29 2.164 7.610 -1.232 
LUKS KADiFE -0,01 -0,51 0,67 -0,02 -1,31 2,40 6,51 1.056 1.572 -808 
MAKINA TAKIM 0,22 0,04 0,48 0,57 12,46 1,78 7,49 632 1.322 51 
MARDiN CIMENTO 0,43 0,41 0,27 0,61 0,67 0,30 7,32 1.076 3.928 1.615 
MARET 0,18 0,06 0,16 0,07 2,53 0,38 7,03 2.900 18.621 1.148 
MARSHALL 0,31 0,25 1,75 0,27 6,95 1,07 7,57 14.478 8.267 . 2.082 
MERKO 0,05 0,08 0,14 0,06 1,74 1,23 7,53 1.255 8.705 720 
MEGES 0,02 131,08 -110,33 0,02 -0 ,84 -454,91 6,52 811 -7 -964 
MEN SA 0,08 -1, 11 0,33 0,11 -0,30 9,06 7,69 959 2.883 -3.191 
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MET AS -0,03 -3,31 1,40 -1, 11 -0,42 4,41 7,01 3.742 2.677 -8.849 
MIGROS 0,19 0,34 2,58 0,10 7,56 1,89 8,33 61.859 23 .998 8.183 
MILPA 0,16 O, 17 0,83 0,18 4,99 1,92 7,69 1.525 1.839 306 
MUTLU AKÜ 0,10 -0,08 1,05 0,08 -12,49 1,45 7,13 2.145 2.039 -172 
NET TURiZM 0,33 0,00 0,13 0,80 105,69 1,38 7,68 516 4.051 5 
NET AS 0,22 0,25 2,97 0,19 11,75 1,36 7,93 16.351 5.514 1.392 
OKAN TEKSTiL 0,02 -0,17 0,02 0,03 -0,15 0,63 7,06 144 5.891 -986 
OLMUKSA 0,14 0,06 0,36 0,10 5,63 1, 15 7,25 2.328 6.537 413 
OTOKAR 0,32 0,35 1,1 5 0,24 3,30 2,59 7,59 5.244 4.552 1.589 
OYSA NIGDE 0,53 0,49 1,60 0,50 3,29 0,57 6,96 5.276 3.299 1.606 
PARK TEKSTiL -0, 13 2,75 -0 , 18 -0,40 -0,06 -5,35 7,27 313 -1 .780 -4 .898 
PARSAN 0,19 0,00 0,40 0,23 168,38 0,72 7,01 1.641 4.106 10 
PETKIM 0,19 O, 11 1,51 0,27 13,65 0,20 8,60 4.334 2.867 318 
PETROL OFiSi 0,51 0,60 4,52 0,09 7,56 0,88 8,34 26.506 5.861 3.508 
PIMAS 0,14 -0,30 1, 11 O, 11 -3,72 4,85 7,39 1.242 1.117 -334 
PINAR SU 0,26 0,16 0,27 0,20 1,69 0,91 6,77 1.071 3.951 635 
PINAR SUT 0,25 0,22 0,39 0,13 1,76 1,52 7,57 1.114 2.878 631 
RAKS ELEKTRiKLi EV -0,31 1,41 -0 , 11 -0 ,26 -0,08 -1,89 6,78 2.523 -22.675 -31 .984 
RAKS ELEKTRONiK -0,18 2,30 -0,59 -0 ,43 -0,26 -3,44 7,54 1.531 -2.598 -5.970 
SARKUYSAN 0,27 0,17 0,37 0,14 2,19 0,63 7,58 2.197 5.862 1.005 
SASA SUN'I 0,18 -0 ,01 1,64 0,21 -226,28 1,95 8,22 6.394 3.895 -28 
SOKTAS PAMUK 0,03 -0,58 0,55 0,04 -0,94 2,61 7,40 1.587 2.910 -1 .690 
SONMEZ FILAMENT 0,13 -0,46 0,12 0,18 -0,25 1,73 7,26 795 6.877 -3.198 
SONMEZ PAMUKLU 0,13 -0,01 0,02 0,21 -1,58 0,55 7,36 442 20.192 -280 
TURK DEMiR DOKUM 0,10 -0,36 1,17 0,08 -3 ,28 2,96 7,72 1.561 1.333 -477 
SiSE VE CAM 0,05 0,02 0,84 0,94 45,21 0,07 7,95 881 1.049 19 
TUBORG 0,16 0,12 0,66 0,24 5,75 1,33 7,39 1.255 1.888 218 
TANSAS 0,01 -0,53 1,49 0,00 -2,82 13,37 7,66 1.593 1.072 -564 
TAT KONSERVE 0,22 0,11 1,53 0,23 14,39 0,96 7,49 3.452 2.263 240 
TiRE KUTSAN 0,12 0,09 1,06 0,10 11,35 0,37 7,14 1.835 1.725 162 
TOFAS OTO -0,03 -0,63 0,95 -0,02 -1,51 1,75 8,21 882 933 -586 
TRAKYA CAM 0,15 0,08 0,56 0,26 7,13 0,68 8,12 948 1.682 133 
TUKAS 0,25 0,04 1,21 0,29 32,01 2,31 7,14 1.550 1.286 48 
1999 Financial Ratios 
COMPANY (1999) ROA ROE MV/BV NOPM P/E D/E Size Stock BV per EPS Price share 
TÜPRAS 0,31 0,47 1,25 0,23 2,67 1,63 9,08 7.606 6.068 2.849 
TURCAS 0,08 0,02 1,34 0,05 71,22 4,22 8,01 3.601 2.678 51 
UKI 0,25 0,30 1, 18 0,21 3,99 0,76 7,04 6.224 5.268 1.558 
USAK -0,07 -0 ,29 0,09 -0 ,08 -0 ,32 1,89 6,66 721 7.595 -2.227 
UZEL MAKINA 0,15 0,05 2,09 0,14 39,52 2,04 7,76 2.993 1.430 76 
UNAL TARIM 0,14 0,23 0,62 0,08 2,63 2, 11 6,97 935 1.517 356 
ÜNYE CIMENTO 0,19 0,32 0,28 0,54 0,88 0,98 7,71 511 1.847 584 
VESTEL 0,33 0,40 0,09 0,30 0,22 2,90 8,45 1.560 18.174 7.230 
VIKING 0,01 -0,27 1,1 2 0,02 -4,12 5,79 7,39 936 839 -227 
YATAS 0,19 0,20 0,54 O, 16 2,74 1,60 7,40 2.134 3.978 779 
YÜNSA 0,32 0,06 1,29 0,40 19,81 2,18 7,55 7.919 6.155 400 
1999 Financial Ratios 
COMPANY (2000) ROA ROE MV/BV NOPM P/E D/E Size Stock BV per EPS Price share 
ABANA 0,12 O, 11 5,76 0,08 53,80 0,82 6,45 36.378 6.310 676 
ADANA -0,08 0,15 1,53 -0 ,12 10,41 0,45 8,03 4.200 2.747 403 
ADEL 0,38 0,27 1,62 0,26 6,10 1,04 7,03 5.654 3.480 928 
AFYON 0,18 0,22 7,99 0,08 35,60 1,20 6,66 139.725 17.491 3.925 
AK-AL 0,04 0,00 0,54 0,03 2022,37 1,21 7,73 5.508 10.176 3 
AKÇANSA 0,05 0,03 4,04 0,06 148,00 0,37 8,10 9.848 2.436 67 
AKIN TEKSTiL 0,14 -0,09 0,58 O, 11 -6 ,20 1,39 7,57 1.066 1.853 -172 
AKSA AKRILIK 0,23 0,23 2,69 0,17 11,87 0,71 8,15 12.892 4.792 1.086 
AKSU iPLiK 0,08 0,02 0,70 0,07 44,95 0,85 7,49 2.665 3.803 59 
ALTINYILDIZ -0,13 0,02 2,67 -0, 14 121,97 3,08 7,84 18.775 7.038 154 
ANADOLU CAM 0,02 0,05 1,19 0,04 25,55 0,68 8,10 1.856 1.563 73 
ANADOLU 0,22 0,30 1,41 0,1 4 4,68 0,62 7,65 5.631 4.004 1.204 
ANADOLU ısuzu 0,28 0,37 1,55 0,17 4,20 1,03 7,81 17.486 11.299 4.163 
ARAT TEKSTiL 0,04 -3,33 2,78 0,05 -0,83 32,24 7,47 979 352 -1.174 
ARCELIK 0,18 0,22 1,90 0,1 3 8,73 1, 19 8,80 9.125 4.792 1.045 
ASELSAN 0,16 0,08 1,80 0,24 21 ,26 2,94 8,32 9.728 5.412 458 
AYGAZ 0,22 0,29 2,22 O, 11 7,76 1,04 8,23 9.144 4.117 1.178 
BAGFAS 0,17 0,13 2,13 O, 11 16,64 1,06 7,65 23.109 10.856 1.389 
BANVIT 0,07 0,04 6,61 0,04 159,89 1,34 7,71 16.022 2.424 100 
BATICIM BATI 0,17 0,08 2,72 0,13 35,40 0,39 7,72 4.921 1.812 139 
BEKO 0,19 0,17 1,02 0,12 6,13 3,18 8,23 2.623 2.563 428 
BERDAN -0,26 -0,42 0,30 -0 ,42 -0,71 2,39 7,84 2.322 7.821 -3.278 
BISAS -0,03 1,56 -1 ,69 -0 ,07 -1,08 -6,45 6,91 1.394 -826 -1.290 
BOLU CIMENTO 0,10 0,09 0,94 O, 11 10,35 0,34 7,73 1.498 1.599 145 
BORU SAN 0,18 0,14 1,01 0,09 7,12 1,57 7,70 3.153 3.110 443 
BOYASAN -0,24 0,52 -0,02 0,00 -0,03 -1,61 6,64 156 -9.487 -4.925 
BOSSA 0,20 0,19 0,25 0,18 1,32 0,46 8,14 3.191 12.715 2.411 
BRISA -0,06 -0,44 20,09 -0,05 -45,30 3,03 6,60 30.961 1.541 -684 
BURCELIK BURSA 0,14 0,07 1,77 0,1 3 25,05 0,53 7,50 6.163 3.474 246 
BURSA CIMENTO 0,20 0,12 2,12 0,17 18,12 1,41 6,79 7.526 3.549 415 
CEYLAN GIYIM 0,09 0,02 1,09 0,10 43 ,94 0,40 7,15 2.306 2.122 52 
CEYT AS CEYHAN 0,15 0,12 1,82 0,08 15,39 10,83 7,84 2.171 1.194 141 
2000 Financial Ratios 
---
COMPANY (2000) ROA ROE MV/BV NOPM P/E D/E Size Stock BV per EPS Price share 
!CARSI 0,39 0,18 -2 ,49 0,21 -14,08 -3,14 7,17 6.638 -2.671 -472 
ICBS BOYA 0,06 -0,48 1,64 0,07 -3,41 5,74 6,99 958 586 -281 
ICBS PRINTAS 0,41 0,38 0,65 0,13 1,70 0,69 7,21 4.177 6.398 2.458 
!CELEBi HAVA 0,07 -0 ,07 4,00 0,05 -55,74 2,55 7,26 10.355 2.590 -186 
ICELIK HALAT 0,10 0,09 1,61 0,06 17,29 0,32 7,20 3.266 2.027 189 
ICEMTAS CELIK O, 10 0,05 1,57 0,14 33,40 0,85 7,79 4.917 3.141 147 
ICIMENTAS IZMIR 0,20 0,18 2,06 0,27 11 , 16 0,41 8,01 8.894 4.316 797 
ICIMSA -0,95 1,38 -1,78 -1 ,74 -1,29 -2,15 7,62 5.348 -2 .997 -4 .149 
DARDAN EL 0,02 -0 ,25 0,52 0,03 -2, 11 2,92 7,38 1.594 3.046 -754 
DEMISAS 0,13 0,10 3,24 0,1 1 33,19 1,76 7,08 5.433 1.675 164 
DENiZLi CAM 0,03 0,01 1,82 0,03 221,24 1,21 6,93 2.338 1.284 11 
DERIMOD 0,17 0,28 0,35 0,22 1,23 1,55 7,05 3.019 8.703 2.462 
DİTAS DOGAN 0,07 -7,75 216,53 0,45 -27,93 71,01 6,81 24.743 114 -886 
DOGUSAN BORU -0,01 -0 ,22 1,38 -0 ,01 -6,29 1,40 7,74 3.330 2.410 -530 
DÖKTAS -0,02 -0,36 1,24 -0,01 -3,45 3,22 6,64 3.228 2.599 -937 
DURAN OFSET 0,16 0,07 0,18 0,19 2,57 1, 17 8,10 863 4.786 335 
ECZACIBASIILAC O, 11 0,08 1,08 0,1 0 13,16 1, 14 7,84 14.054 12.970 1.068 
ECZACIBASI YAPI 0,07 -0 ,08 10,73 0,1 0 -141 ,79 1,46 7,51 18.521 1.727 -131 
EDiP iPLiK 0,20 0,15 0,56 0,12 3,76 0,80 6,98 954 1.692 254 
EGE ENDÜSTRİ 0,16 0,17 2,16 0,08 13,05 2,24 7,20 5.231 2.426 401 
EGE GUBRE 0,22 0,30 2,35 0,16 7,93 2,49 7,07 4.937 2.097 622 
EGE PROFiL 0, 11 0,04 0,96 0,12 25,73 2,71 7,72 2.225 2.316 86 
EGE SERAMiK 0,18 0,12 2,10 0,21 17,33 4,87 7,61 2.445 1.164 141 
EGE PLAST -0,06 -2,61 4, 11 -0, 11 -1,58 15,61 7, 11 1.715 417 -1 .089 
EMINIS AMBALAJ 0,13 0,01 0,63 0,18 73,57 0,93 7,02 2.792 4.420 38 
ERBOSAN 0,13 0,12 0,74 0,10 6,20 2,55 7,30 3.563 4.825 575 
EREGLI DEMiR 0,15 0,13 1,75 0,24 13,31 0,81 9,00 21.646 12.382 1.627 
ESEM SPOR 0,16 -0,03 0,35 0,18 -11, 19 1,51 7,26 2.138 6.064 -191 
FEN IS 0,33 0,22 2,51 0,33 11,38 3,81 7,41 12.771 5.096 1.122 
FRiGO-PAK 0,01 -0,07 1,89 0,01 -25,45 2,60 7,00 4.404 2.326 -173 
GENTAS 0,25 0,17 0,37 0,33 2,17 0,27 7,15 1.014 2.737 468 
GİMA 0,07 0,07 5,69 0,04 80,89 3,20 7,98 5.158 907 64 
GIMSAN 0,01 -0,12 2,46 -0 ,01 -19,98 0,87 7,12 3.606 1.464 -180 
2000 Financial Ratios 
COMPANY (2000) ROA ROE MV/BV NOPM P/E D/E Size Stock BV per EPS Price share 
GOL TAS 0,20 0,1 3 0,73 0,29 5,57 0,44 7,58 5.344 7.326 960 
GOODYEAR 0,01 -0,40 7,02 0,00 -17,55 3,89 7,98 11.488 1.637 -655 
GORBON ISIL 0,04 -0 ,73 15,32 0,05 -21 ,01 11, 14 6,41 11 .371 742 -541 
GUBRE 0,19 0,10 3,40 0,10 34,88 2,65 7,57 13.695 4.030 393 
HAZNEDAR 0,25 0,22 3,03 0,1 5 13,60 1,50 6,82 4.598 1.519 338 
HEKTAS 0,1 6 0,1 2 1, 17 0,1 3 9,52 0,37 7,27 1.541 1.315 162 
iHLAS EV 0,21 0,33 2,81 0,17 8,48 2,81 7,31 6.261 2.226 739 
INTEMA 0,05 0,08 1,85 0,01 23,86 2,73 7,33 10.996 5.947 461 
IZMIR DEMiR 0,05 0,00 0,91 0,06 308,67 0,39 8,12 1.386 1.518 4 
IZOCAM 0,24 0,26 0,85 0,22 3,21 0,64 7,40 2.914 3.438 908 
KAP LAMIN 0,10 0,10 2,51 0,07 25,27 0,94 7,00 8.186 3.263 324 
KARSU 0, 11 0,13 0,28 0, 11 2,14 1,08 7,41 1.513 5.311 708 
KARTONSAN 0,19 0,1 6 1,79 0,1 9 11,24 0,26 7,69 34.748 19.372 3.090 
KELEBEK 0,05 -0,54 1,39 0,03 -2,57 4,90 7,07 2.122 1.527 -825 
KENT GIDA 0,1 9 -0,03 2,59 0,31 -88,33 2,61 7,79 5.058 1.953 -57 
KEREVITAS -0,23 -7,67 11 ,41 -0,43 -1 ,49 19,29 7,63 6.400 561 -4.306 
KİPA 0,08 0,06 1,91 0,05 34,52 0,78 7,69 5.765 3.022 167 
KLIMASAN 0,15 0,09 0,43 0,13 4,78 0,59 6,97 10.145 23.406 2.123 
KONFRUT 0,01 -0,06 0,89 0,00 -15,34 1,02 7, 11 4.700 5.270 -306 
KONITEKS 0,05 -17,08 32,80 0,04 -1,92 240,04 6,91 1.878 57 -978 
KONYA CIMENTO 0, 11 0,13 1,89 0,13 14,04 0,53 7,46 7.352 3.895 524 
KORDSA 0, 11 0,1 5 3,01 0,14 19,98 1,01 8,09 7.635 2.536 382 
KRiSTAL KOLA 0,05 0,06 6,27 0,03 113,49 0,69 7,02 16.103 2.568 142 
KUTAHYA 0,10 0,06 1,49 0,07 25,08 1,66 7,51 7.001 4.694 279 
LÜKS KADİFE -0,13 -1,31 2,37 -0 , 13 -1,80 3,70 6,43 2.261 953 -1 .253 
MAKINA TAKIM 0,14 -0,05 1,10 0,36 -21,45 1,09 7,61 1.268 1.149 -59 
MARDiN CIMENTO 0,43 0,41 0,74 0,52 1,81 0,32 7,49 2.814 3.804 1.555 
MARET 0,10 0,08 1,88 0,04 23,37 0,37 7,20 10.282 5.456 440 
MARSHALL 0,28 0,29 3,46 0,22 11,90 0,70 7,69 46.21 o 13.345 3.884 
MERKO 0,01 0,01 1,26 0,02 132,23 1,76 7,77 2.651 2.101 20 
MEGES 0,08 -0,74 7,54 0,06 -10, 15 19,72 6,73 1.938 257 -191 
MENSA 0,09 -0 ,03 1,35 0,10 -47,08 3,39 7,86 2.647 1.960 -56 
MET AS -0,14 0,57 -0 ,64 -5, 11 -1,12 -1,48 6,63 7.958 -12.480 -7.126 
2000 Financial Ratios 
-COMPANY (2000) ROA ROE MV/BV NOPM P/E D/E Size Stock BV per EPS Price share 
MIGROS 0,09 0,08 9,58 0,04 126,33 1,93 8,46 103.291 10.786 818 
MILPA 1,44 0,27 1,55 1,74 5,76 1, 15 7,83 3.562 2.304 618 
MUTLU AKU O, 12 0,08 3,24 0,08 39,89 1,44 7,37 11.552 3.561 290 
NET TURiZM 0,19 0,06 0,63 0,40 10,02 1,30 7,87 1.642 2.625 164 
NET AS 0,22 0,33 8,43 0,16 25,49 1,02 8,03 69.760 8.274 2.737 
OKAN TEKSTiL 0,01 -0,06 0,08 0,01 -1,38 0,89 7,30 724 8.774 -524 
OLMUKSA 0,21 0,15 2,48 O, 11 16,95 0,47 7,41 10.601 4.268 625 
OTOKAR 0,35 0,36 4,00 0,23 11,01 1,64 7,70 16.002 4.005 1.453 
OYSA NIGDE 0,43 0,39 3,22 0,32 8,33 0,48 7,03 13.286 4.121 1.595 
PARK TEKSTiL 0,02 0,57 7,85 0,02 13,80 1,80 7,43 7.873 1.003 570 
PARSAN 0,14 0,09 2,09 0,1 6 22,87 1,05 7,27 4.365 2.087 191 
PETKIM 0,02 -0,02 2,60 0,02 -105,01 0,45 8,79 9.403 3.610 -90 
PETROL OFiSi 0,31 0,48 10,68 0,05 22,42 1,26 8,54 32.532 3.046 1.451 
PIMAS 0,14 -0 ,08 2,00 0,08 -25,00 3,99 7,45 2.957 1.480 -118 
PINAR SU 0,10 0,16 0,30 0,13 1,92 1,55 7,17 2.258 7.428 1.176 
PINAR SÜT 0,13 0,18 0,62 0,09 3,48 2,39 7,89 2.756 4.457 792 
RAKS ELEKTRiKLi 0,04 0,46 -0 ,13 0,09 -0,27 -1,97 6,99 4.175 -33.316 -15.366 
RAKS ELEKTRONiK 0,01 0,86 -0,88 0,10 -1 ,03 -3,02 7,71 4.088 -4.663 -3.986 
SARKUYSAN 0,17 0,13 0,92 0,07 7,15 0,96 7,72 6.151 6.704 861 
SASA SUN'I 0,20 0,14 2,34 0,20 16,96 1, 18 8,38 17.785 7.608 1.049 
SOKTAS PAMUK -0,03 -0,38 1,08 -0,03 -2,85 2,48 7,55 4.563 4.243 -1.599 
SONMEZ FILAMENT 0,20 0,09 1,69 0,16 19,19 0,41 7,42 4.134 2.441 215 
SONMEZ PAMUKLU 0,10 0,05 1,57 0,18 32,12 0,27 7,52 2.709 1.725 84 
TURKDEMİR 0,16 0,15 1,54 0,15 10,60 2,69 7,98 4.008 2.605 378 
ISISE VE CAM 0,03 0,03 1,44 0,76 56,17 0,38 8,29 2.409 1.675 43 
TUBORG 0,10 0,09 0,95 0,13 10,86 1,42 7,56 2.549 2.687 235 
TANSAS -0 ,09 54,08 -188,46 -0,04 -3,48 -431,07 8,20 4.196 -22 -1 .204 
TAT KONSERVE 0,16 0,15 1,93 0,16 12,79 0,90 7,63 6.143 3.175 480 
TiRE KUTSAN 0,21 0,17 2,50 0,14 14,39 0,29 7,30 4.369 1.746 304 
TOFAS OTO O, 11 0,20 1,63 0,08 7,98 1,73 8,56 3.408 2.088 427 
TRAKYA CAM 0,20 0,16 1,81 0,24 11,60 0,54 8,25 3.145 1.741 271 
TUKAS 0,19 0,00 1, 17 0,21 1284,36 2,24 7,29 1.528 1.304 1 
TUPRAS 0,26 0,39 1,04 0,1 0 2,67 1,59 9,21 8.691 8.352 3.251 
2000 Financial Ratios 
COMPANY (2000) ROA ROE MV/BV NOPM P/E D/E Size Stock BV per EPS Price share 
TURCAS O, 11 -1, 11 5,27 0,02 -4,75 8,48 8,02 7.983 1.515 -1.682 
UKI 0,04 -0,16 2,32 0,03 -14,67 1,17 7, 11 11 .538 4.983 -787 
USAK -0,06 -0,33 2,00 -0, 07 -6,15 1,53 6,80 2.017 1.007 -328 
UZEL MAKINA 0,15 0,20 2,54 0,08 12,41 1,96 7,90 5.095 2.009 411 
UNAL TARIM 0,15 0,35 0,86 0,08 2,46 2,99 7,29 2.101 2.429 853 
UNYE CIMENTO 0,16 0,25 0,96 0,54 3,77 1,08 7,96 1.666 1.741 442 
VESTEL 0,19 0,21 3,45 0,21 16,65 1,62 8,73 4.438 1.288 267 
VIKING -0,03 -2 ,91 11,95 -0,04 -4 ,10 23,35 7,43 3.076 257 -750 
YAT AS 0,18 0,17 0,70 0,14 4,12 1,96 7,59 3.839 5.457 932 
YUN SA 0,17 0,08 1,73 0,25 20,41 2,04 7,70 15.945 9.236 781 
2000 Financial Ratios 
COMPANY (2001) ROA ROE MV/BV NOPM P/E D/E Size Stock BV per EPS Price share 
ABANA 0,31 0,30 1,73 0,36 5,74 0,15 6,44 17.010 9.827 2.961 
ADANA 0,33 0,21 0,94 0,52 4,39 0,42 8,24 3.319 3.537 756 
ADEL 0,50 0,23 1,74 0,37 7,71 1,05 7,20 5.972 3.429 774 
AFYON 0,08 -0,23 7,12 0,03 -30,83 1,58 6,69 112.225 15.769 -3.640 
AK-AL 0,24 0,18 0,23 0,20 1,30 0,98 7,95 4.490 19.278 3.462 
AKCANSA 0,14 0,05 2,05 0,14 41,68 0,34 8,23 6.835 3.341 164 
AKIN TEKSTiL 0,38 0,23 0,87 0,27 3,75 1,59 7,86 2.887 3.317 771 
AKSA AKRILIK 0,42 0,41 1,30 0,30 3,16 0,77 8,43 11.323 8.681 3.587 
AKSU iPLiK 0,21 0,04 0,48 0,17 12,04 0,98 7,68 1.897 3.912 157 
ALTINYILDIZ 0,26 -1,53 1,33 0,29 -0,87 6,64 8,05 7.979 6.009 -9.189 
ANADOLU CAM 0,16 0,03 0,65 0,20 22,60 0,76 8,26 945 1.456 42 
ANADOLU 0,25 0,16 1,61 0,19 9,82 0,99 7,88 4.526 2.804 461 
ANADOLU ısuzu 0,22 -0,76 2,19 0,22 -2,88 1,67 7,83 6.569 2.995 -2.280 
ARAT TEKSTiL 0,07 1,57 -0,19 0,07 -0,12 -2,98 7,56 483 -2.493 -3.915 
ARCELIK 0,16 0,06 1,54 0,12 25,37 1,49 8,94 5.962 3.874 235 
ASELSAN 0,28 -0,17 0,65 0,37 -3,89 4,58 8,53 4.034 6.193 -1.036 
AYGAZ 0,37 0,18 2,34 0,10 13,00 0,62 8,37 7.768 3.323 598 
BAGFAS 0,36 0,21 1,04 0,24 4,91 1,50 7,92 17.466 16.779 3.561 
BANVIT -0,10 -0,71 4,78 -0,07 -6,71 4,47 7,92 8.067 1.686 -1.202 
BATICIM BATI 0,30 0,22 1,63 0,21 7,28 0,44 7,90 4.269 2.611 586 
BEKO 0,43 0,01 0,76 0,24 121,05 3,54 8,37 1.641 2.149 14 
BERDAN 0,10 2,77 -0,28 0,10 -0,10 -4,85 7,86 1.028 -3.659 -10.131 
BISAS 0,25 0,46 1,15 0,14 2,54 1,93 7,27 1.156 1.002 456 
BOLU CIMENTO 0,24 0,25 0,57 0,37 2,23 0,50 8,00 1.133 1.993 508 
BORU SAN 0,32 0,23 0,37 0,16 1,64 1,50 7,92 1.975 5.294 1.206 
BOYASAN -0,26 0,75 -0,08 0,00 -0,10 -1,30 6,79 237 -3.040 -2.268 
BOSSA 0,44 0,24 0,57 0,35 2,38 0,90 8,16 2.416 4.239 1.017 
BRISA 0,28 0,20 1,44 0,27 7,33 0,49 8,29 25.544 17.683 3.485 
BURCELIK BURSA -0,19 0,02 2,08 -0,13 87,38 2,99 6,78 4.808 2.309 55 
BURSA CIMENTO 0,23 0,17 1,12 0,21 6,41 0,50 7,69 6.155 5.512 960 
CEYLAN GIYIM 0,39 0,10 3,23 0,24 30,81 1,61 7,00 5.901 1.825 192 
CEYT AS CEYHAN 0,14 -0,10 0,76 0,27 -7,35 0,47 7,25 1.919 2.534 -261 
iCARSI -0,58 5,24 -8,04 -0,35 -1,53 -21,02 7,99 2.002 -249 -1.305 
2001 Financial Ratios 
COMPANY (2001) ROA ROE MV/BV NOPM P/E D/E Size Stock BV per EPS Price share 
ICBS BOYA -3,70 0,82 -0,12 -2,39 -0,15 -1,47 7,20 638 -5.180 -4.267 
ICBS PRINTAS 0,11 12,84 -10,14 0,19 -0,79 -40,87 7,16 1.496 -148 -1.895 
ICELEBI HAVA 0,71 0,76 2,18 0,32 2,87 0,59 7,75 17.198 7.896 5.992 
ICELIK HALAT -0,29 -0,03 0,43 -0,25 -16,04 2,83 7,42 1.484 3.418 -93 
ICEMTAS CELIK 0,09 0,07 1,14 0,06 16,32 0,26 7,34 3.267 2.863 200 
ICIMENTAS IZMIR 0,21 -0,05 5,01 0,26 -111,12 1,09 7,94 20.058 4.003 -181 
ICIMSA 0,34 0,23 1,36 0,42 5,89 0,41 8,24 4.982 3.663 845 
DARDAN EL -0,65 0,77 -0,07 -1,29 -0,09 -1,23 7,53 648 -9.575 -7.360 
DEMISAS 0,45 -0,45 1,36 0,39 -3,00 4,58 7,59 4.679 3.451 -1.558 
DENiZLi CAM 0,24 0,29 0,84 0,23 2,84 2,01 7,39 2.6ı4 3.118 9ı9 
DERIMOD -0,26 -O,ı8 ı ,92 -0,27 -ı0,89 ı,69 7,0ı 2.429 1.264 -223 
DITAS DOGAN 0,09 0,03 0,98 0,11 35,76 ı,46 7,13 ı0.644 ı0.842 298 
DOGUSAN BORU -0,07 -ı,85 -2,84 -0,40 ı,54 -4,76 6,84 2.ıs6 -758 1.399 
DOKTAS o,ıs -0,23 ı,35 o, ı2 -6,0ı ı,7ı 7,92 2.ı73 ı.604 -36ı 
DURAN OFSET 0,19 -0,12 2,54 0,11 -20,88 3,36 6,82 962 378 -46 
ECZACIBASIILAC o,ı9 -0,52 1,84 0,23 -3,58 2,6ı 8,24 7.329 3.975 -2.049 
ECZACIBASI YAPI 0,28 o,ı9 0,86 0,24 4,60 ı,ı9 8,07 18.458 21.436 4.011 
EDiP iPLiK 0,23 o,ıo 0,25 0,22 2,40 ı,54 7,78 777 3.085 323 
EGE ENDUSTRI 0,36 0,35 1,05 0,25 2,98 0,46 7,16 3.275 3.108 1.100 
EGE GUBRE 0,12 -0,05 1,35 0,09 -25,28 5,35 7,56 3.822 2.835 -ısı 
EGE PROFiL 0,20 23,38 -65,20 o, ı6 -2,79 -82,45 7,30 3.578 -55 -1.283 
EGE SERAMiK 0,04 -65,47 66,03 0,04 -1 ,oı 202,53 7,94 1.146 17 -1.136 
EGE PLAST 0,36 2,78 -1,65 0,37 -0,59 -19,21 7,85 1.075 -653 -ı.8ı6 
EMINIS AMBALAJ 0,03 -ı,32 0,38 0,04 -0,28 3, ıo 7,22 1.234 3.274 -4.33ı 
ERBOSAN 0,54 0,25 0,30 0,26 1,20 1,05 7,28 2.450 8.ıo9 2.047 
EREGLI DEMiR 0,15 -0,13 0,82 0,27 -6,51 1,17 9,2ı 13.925 16.915 -2.140 
ESEM SPOR 0,01 3,32 -0,77 0,01 -0,23 -7,09 7,37 1.000 -1.296 -4.297 
FEN IS 0,61 0,23 0,94 0,92 4,16 5,98 7,74 7.175 7.609 1.726 
FRiGO-PAK 0,14 -0,06 0,94 0,14 -16,39 3,57 7,24 3.015 3.199 -ı84 
GENTAS 0,29 0,24 0,25 0,38 1,07 0,40 7,40 1.130 4.437 1.058 
GIMA 0,06 34,53 -82,11 0,03 -2,38 -239,19 8,21 2.217 -27 -932 
GIMSAN 0,09 0,02 0,90 0,12 57,07 0,6ı 7,31 1.597 1.765 28 
GOL TAS 0,14 0,05 0,43 0,14 8,21 0,43 7,64 3.672 8.510 447 
2001 Financial Ratios 
COMPANY (2001) ROA ROE MV/BV NOPM P/E D/E Size Stock BV per EPS Price share 
GOODYEAR 0,10 -0,91 4,28 0,06 -4,70 7,20 8,20 6.979 1.631 -1.485 
GORBON ISIL -0,24 11,75 -66,95 -0,36 -5,70 -162,11 6,59 5.642 -84 -991 
GUBRE 0,38 0,15 1,59 0,17 10,40 3,11 7,74 8.560 5.375 823 
HAZNE DAR 0,46 0,01 1,42 0,25 139,11 2,38 7,07 2.831 1.994 20 
HEKTAS 0,22 0,09 0,77 0,23 8,46 0,59 7,50 1.132 1.472 134 
iHLAS EV 0,17 -0,25 0,52 0,16 -2,06 5,62 7,52 1.081 2.061 -525 
INTEMA 0,03 0,04 0,66 0,01 16,93 1,35 7,39 7.150 10.769 422 
İZMIR DEMiR CELIK -0,11 -0,32 0,55 -0,10 -1,74 0,81 8,25 873 1.577 -500 
IZOCAM 0,27 0,24 0,61 0,25 2,50 0,91 7,66 2.406 3.943 963 
KAP LAMIN 0,03 -0,28 1,36 0,03 -4,83 1,60 7,19 5.000 3.686 -1.034 
KARSU 0,15 0,04 0,13 0,13 3,45 1,83 7,66 878 6.893 255 
KARTONSAN 0,30 0,24 1,46 0,35 5,96 0,29 7,91 45.012 30.934 7.554 
KELEBEK 0,09 -2,56 3,05 0,07 -1,19 13,74 7,23 1.172 384 -983 
KENT GIDA 0,40 -3,63 52,18 0,33 -14,38 16,97 7,93 14.333 275 -997 
KEREVITAS 0,04 1,21 -0,18 0,07 -0,15 -2,39 7,70 1.725 -9.685 -11.728 
KIPA 0,21 0,18 1,02 0,11 5,58 0,84 7,87 4.491 4.420 805 
KLIMASAN 0,27 0,14 2,03 0,35 14,61 1,45 7,31 6.746 3.327 462 
KONFRUT -0,17 -0,56 1,01 -0,21 -1,81 1,98 7,27 5.246 5.219 -2.905 
KONITEKS 0,23 1,55 -0,87 0,11 -0,56 -4,63 6,94 1.196 -1.370 -2.128 
KONYA CIMENTO 0,05 0,02 0,92 0,06 46,25 0,32 7,57 5.273 5.752 114 
KORDSA 0,29 0,17 2,10 0,31 12,46 1,33 8,36 5.656 2.697 454 
KRiSTAL KOLA 0,06 -0,05 2,26 0,05 -47,72 0,43 7,06 7.483 3.315 -157 
KUTAHYA 0,36 0,21 0,62 0,28 2,98 0,91 7,61 5.173 8.303 1.738 
LUKS KADiFE 0,22 -1,80 5,14 0,13 -2,85 3,86 6,56 2.121 413 -745 
MAKINA TAKIM 0,31 -0,23 0,36 1,80 -1,59 2,02 7,69 350 973 -220 
MARDiN CIMENTO 0,50 0,48 0,74 0,71 1,56 0,33 7,72 3.189 4.292 2.045 
MARET -0,01 -0,07 0,78 0,00 -10,99 0,58 7,35 5.327 6.789 -485 
MARSHALL 0,25 0,05 1,79 0,17 34,95 0,46 7,71 29.206 16.346 836 
MERKO -0,08 -1,20 0,82 -0,09 -0,68 5,25 8,03 1.363 1.666 -2.006 
MEGES 0,33 -2,29 -5,80 0,13 2,53 -3,29 6,55 3.447 -594 1.363 
MEN SA 0,16 -0,60 0,73 0,21 -1,21 7,05 8,09 1.308 1.802 -1.083 
MET AS -0,29 0,52 -0,16 -49,75 -0,30 -1,27 6,66 3.769 -24.228 -12.650 
MIGROS 0,15 0,12 5,42 0,08 44,82 1,91 8,63 86.781 16.015 1.936 
2001 Financial Ratios 
COMPANY (2001) ROA ROE MV/BV NOPM P/E D/E Size Stock BV per EPS Price share 
MILPA 0,30 -0,27 0,91 0,68 -3,31 1,45 7,84 1.179 1.296 -356 
MUTLU AKU 0,16 0,04 1,25 0,09 34,00 1,55 7,56 6.588 5.252 194 
NET TURiZM 0,31 -0,72 1,44 0,48 -2,00 4,94 8,09 1.198 834 -600 
NET AS 0,16 0,18 4,12 0,17 23,17 1,19 8,22 48.138 11.675 2.077 
OKAN TEKSTiL 0,03 -0,08 0,31 0,06 -4,11 0,53 7,42 894 2.857 -218 
OLMUKSA 0,14 0,09 0,75 0,14 8,14 0,34 7,82 6.804 9.047 835 
OTOKAR 0,42 0,32 1,88 0,52 5,91 2,31 7,97 7.493 3.980 1.269 
OYSA NIGDE 0,49 0,46 1,43 0,42 3,13 0,57 7,23 8.820 6.174 2.820 
PARK TEKSTiL 0,50 0,45 3,02 0,53 6,64 0,83 7,65 7.738 2.564 1.166 
PARSAN 0,12 -0,63 1,70 0,18 -2,68 2,05 7,39 3.158 1.856 -1.177 
PETKIM 0,10 0,00 2,13 0,12 486,27 0,35 8,95 6.857 3.222 14 
PETROL OFiSi 0,43 0,63 7,46 0,07 11,76 1,15 8,80 43.881 5.880 3.732 
PIMAS -0,07 3,94 -4,14 -0,04 -1,05 -7,46 7,34 1.418 -343 -1.349 
PINAR SU 0,26 -0,07 0,93 0,40 -13,64 2,92 7,46 1.734 1.868 -127 
PINAR SUT 0,41 0,09 0,97 0,32 11,25 2,70 8,08 2.023 2.090 180 
RAKS ELEKTRiKLi 0,16 0,71 -0,03 0,41 -0,04 -1,44 7,10 2.408 -94.690 -67.503 
RAKS ELEKTRONiK 0,02 0,91 -0,13 0,06 -0,14 -1,63 7,85 2.713 -20.629 -18.719 
SARKUYSAN 0,37 0,21 0,43 0,17 2,08 1,22 7,99 4.762 10.966 2.290 
SASA SUN'I 0,33 -0,08 1,25 0,28 -14,82 1,52 8,54 11.810 9.415 -797 
SÖKTAS PAMUK 0,13 -0,16 0,66 0,12 -4,07 2,80 7,80 4.579 6.901 -1.125 
SONMEZ FILAMENT 0,34 0,08 1,10 0,20 13,36 0,21 7,48 3.540 3.212 265 
SONMEZ PAMUKLU 0,15 0,05 0,65 0,20 14,13 0,28 7,68 1.588 2.440 112 
TURK DEMiR 0,22 -0,06 0,59 0,22 -9,31 3,19 8,15 1.993 3.353 -214 
SiSE VE CAM 0,06 -0,01 0,55 1,15 -58,31 0,66 8,57 1.457 2.673 -25 
TUBORG 0,11 -2,70 12,76 0,17 -4,73 12,02 7,83 5.846 458 -1.236 
TANSAS -0,25 2,63 -2,35 -0,14 -0,89 -6,21 8,40 1.719 -731 -1.921 
TAT KONSERVE 0,26 0,25 1,76 0,26 7,10 0,95 7,82 5.694 3.230 802 
TiRE KUTSAN 0,26 0,21 1,12 0,19 5,33 0,40 7,48 2.773 2.466 521 
TOFAS OTO 0,02 0,00 2,79 0,02 -1067,13 2,65 8,92 3.750 1.343 -4 
TRAKYA CAM 0,41 0,26 1,40 0,55 5,35 0,58 8,50 2.880 2.058 539 
TUKAS 0,24 0,26 0,74 0,29 2,79 3,28 7,73 1.282 1.733 459 
TUPRAS 0,15 0,26 2,96 0,05 11,46 1,99 9,34 8.636 2.922 753 
TURCAS 0,24 2,10 -2,34 0,04 -1,11 -4,69 8,12 3.207 -1.371 -2.885 
2001 Financial Ratios 
COMPANY (2001) ROA ROE MV/BV NOPM P/E D/E Size Stock BV per EPS Price share 
UKI 0,35 -0,19 1,49 0,22 -i ,53 1,i6 7,ii 7.458 5.016 -977 
USAK 0,05 -0,17 0,96 0,05 -5,73 1,61 7,03 1.040 1.087 -182 
UZEL MAKINA 0,04 -0,79 2,03 0,05 -2,58 6,91 8,11 2.484 1.223 -962 
UNAL TARIM 0,25 0,15 1,00 0,14 6,81 2,44 7,48 1.273 1.267 187 
UNYE CIMENTO 0,21 0,22 0,79 0,83 3,60 1,32 8,20 1.322 1.671 367 
VESTEL 0,39 0,19 1,64 0,41 8,46 2,43 8,99 2.910 1.776 344 
VIKING 0,10 -7,76 10,73 0,16 -1,38 28,61 7,71 1.880 175 -1.360 
YAT AS 0,24 -0,25 0,75 0,22 -3,03 3,40 7,72 1.480 1.981 -488 
YUN SA 0,00 0,05 0,80 0,46 15,82 1,76 7,80 10.252 12.811 648 
2001 Financial Ratios 
COMPANY (2002) ROA ROE MV/BV NOPMI P/E D/E Size Stock Price BV per EPS 
share 
ABANA 0,04 0,01 17,66 0,11 2537,22 6,59 0,13 22.611 1.281 9 
ADANA 0,23 0,19 1,34 0,31 7,25 8,29 0,30 4.245 3.160 585 
ADEL 0,28 0,30 1,03 0,27 3,46 7,49 1,60 5.432 5.264 1.568 
AFYON 0,39 0,50 2,78 0,19 5,51 7,02 1,13 114.250 41.163 20.733 
AK-AL 0,11 0,10 0,65 0,10 6,57 8,11 0,97 5.983 9.150 911 
AKÇANSA 0,12 0,09 4,29 0,12 48,01 8,39 0,25 8.771 2.045 183 
AKIN TEKSTiL 0,22 0,15 2,68 0,15 17,66 8,04 1,73 4.262 1.591 241 
AKSA AKRILIK 0,29 0,33 1,35 0,24 4,03 8,62 0,74 14.674 10.900 3.640 
AKSU iPLiK 0,07 0,01 0,83 0,06 70,68 7,82 1,57 2.311 2.784 33 
AL TINYILDIZ 0,15 0,02 8,27 0,15 442,32 8,16 2,88 8.567 1.036 19 
ANADOLU CAM 0,20 0,18 0,75 0,23 4,21 8,47 0,61 1.419 1.902 337 
ANADOLU 0,16 0,11 0,92 0,10 8,56 7,98 0,70 3.750 4.095 438 
ANADOLU ısuzu 0,08 -0,02 1,66 0,06 -69,51 7,96 1,15 8.305 4.991 -119 
ARAT TEKSTiL ·-0,12 -1,28 4,60 -0,13 -3,58 7,53 4,54 1.037 226 -290 
ARCELIK 0,23 0,30 2,16 0,17 7,10 9,16 1,35 9.190 4.264 1.294 
ASELSAN 0,17 0,33 1,71 0,36 5,20 8,82 3,37 8.730 5.115 1.678 
AYGAZ 0,19 0,25 1,97 0,09 7,87 8,74 1,25 7.329 3.728 931 
BAGFAS 0,19 0,17 0,85 0,13 5,17 7,98 0,95 21.125 24.716 4.090 
BANVIT 0,07 0,09 1,85 0,04 21,80 8,04 1,82 7.960 4.293 365 
BATICIM BATI 0,21 0,18 3,77 0,16 21,19 8,06 0,36 5.667 1.503 267 
BEKO 0,16 0,03 2,47 0,08 73,54 8,67 4,15 3.770 1.528 51 
BERDAN 0,09 1,02 -0,37 0,08 -0,37 7,93 -4,80 1.615 -4.339 -4.411 
BISAS 0,24 0,20 0,65 0,13 3,19 7,38 0,88 1.318 2.037 413 
BOLU ÇiMENTO 0,27 0,23 0,74 0,38 3,28 8,12 0,40 1.519 2.054 464 
BORU SAN 0,22 0,23 1,25 0,11 5,51 8,11 1,44 3.459 2.762 628 
BOYASAN -0,05 0,22 -0,20 0,00 -0,90 6,84 -1,30 688 -3.468 -766 
BOSSA 0,30 0,28 2,05 0,25 7,21 8,33 0,80 5.410 2.645 751 
BRISA 0,27 0,24 1,08 0,22 4,41 8,44 0,41 28.364 26.364 6.437 
BURÇELIK BURSA -0,02 -0,63 2,31 -0,02 -3,67 6,95 4,47 5.860 2.535 -1.596 
BURSA ÇiMENTO 0,21 0,20 3,43 0,18 16,91 7,83 0,41 9.244 2.696 547 
CEYLAN GIYIM 0,16 0,02 2,03 0,08 91,19 7,08 1,25 5.215 2.573 57 
CEYT AS CEYHAN 0,08 0,01 1,63 0,17 135,50 7,48 0,23 2.100 1.289 ıs 
CARSI 0,18 -1,76 11,32 0,09 -6,45 8,03 18,68 1.545 136 -240 
2002 Financial Ratios 
COMPANY (2002) ROA ROE MV/BV NOPM P/E D/E Size Stock Price BV per EPS 
share 
CBS BOYA 0,06 0,32 -0,17 0,04 -0,52 7,31 -1,40 1.275 -7.639 -2.459 
CBS PRINTAS 0,12 0,81 -2,83 0,19 -3,48 7,25 -10,13 2.244 -792 -644 
CELEBi HAVA 0,59 0,64 2,43 0,30 3,82 7,79 0,54 21.394 8.804 5.597 
CELIK HALAT 0,17 0,19 1,17 0,14 6,27 7,52 1,90 2.213 1.887 353 
CEMTAS CELİK 0,10 0,08 0,65 0,05 7,94 7,50 0,25 2.718 4.203 342 
CIMENTAS IZMIR 0,21 0,11 9,25 0,19 81,20 7,93 0,30 19.190 2.076 236 
CIMSA 0,27 0,21 2,22 0,32 10,82 8,36 0,25 6.076 2.738 562 
DARDANEL 0,13 0,21 -0,05 0,13 -0,24 7,63 -1,25 567 -11.593 -2.378 
DEMISAS 0,03 -0,18 0,66 0,03 -3,69 7,78 2,91 5.065 7.646 -1.373 
DENiZLi CAM 0,22 0,12 1,35 0,18 11,68 7,41 1,21 2.632 1.949 225 
DERIMOD 0,04 0,00 1,13 0,04 -453,01 7,07 1,43 1.798 1.596 -4 
DİTAS DOGAN 0,11 -0,18 0,85 0,13 -4,74 7,15 1,21 10.790 12.727 -2.275 
DOGUSAN BORU 0,02 -0,96 4,06 0,11 -4,23 6,93 2,44 951 234 -225 
DOKTAS 0,08 0,03 0,92 0,06 32,79 8,09 1,38 2.503 2.719 76 
DURAN OFSET 0,17 0,05 1,64 0,09 35,33 6,97 2,14 1.221 744 35 
ECZACIBASIILAC 0,18 0,16 0,99 0,21 6,08 8,42 1,62 8.133 8.215 1.338 
ECZACIBASI YAPI 0,21 0,19 0,71 0,17 3,74 8,24 0,96 24.972 35.181 6.683 
EDiP iPLiK 0,20 0,11 0,56 0,19 5,17 7,85 0,61 1.410 2.498 273 
EGE ENDÜSTRi 0,15 0,16 1,90 0,11 12,25 7,21 0,39 6.989 3.674 571 
EGE GUBRE 0,13 0,06 0,96 0,11 17,23 7,69 4,37 4.350 4.516 252 
EGE PROFiL 0,22 0,68 6,17 0,17 9,07 7,53 6,41 6.278 1.018 693 
EGE SERAMiK 0,14 4,16 -6,06 0,15 -1,46 8,08 -35,26 875 -144 -600 
EGE PLAST 0,17 1,53 -2,07 0,21 -1,35 7,90 -14,09 1.164 -563 -862 
EMINIS AMBALAJ 0,02 -0,25 1,22 0,03 -4,97 7,44 1,50 2.181 1.785 -439 
ERBOSAN 0,15 0,29 1,14 0,10 3,99 7,52 1,18 3.299 2.885 827 
EREGLI DEMiR 0,07 -0,04 0,62 0,12 -16,05 9,37 0,91 17.306 27.873 -1.079 
ESEM SPOR 0,04 1,44 -1,70 0,03 -1,18 7,41 -5,96 1.073 -631 -909 
FEN İS 0,18 0,09 8,89 0,37 102,26 7,84 5,63 12.711 1.429 124 
FRiGO-PAK -0,07 -0,20 0,88 -0,05 -4,32 7,37 3,85 3.555 4.056 -822 
GENTAS 0,27 0,19 0,77 0,33 3,99 7,52 0,26 1.236 1.615 309 
GIMA 0,03 3,42 -7,81 0,01 -2,28 8,31 -21,59 1.555 -199 -681 
GIMSAN -0,04 -0,09 0,69 -0,05 -7,42 7,37 0,56 1.442 2.095 -194 
GOL TAS 0,29 0,28 1,01 0,30 3,63 7,86 0,44 7.087 7.041 1.955 
2002 Financial Ratios 
COMPANY {2002) ROA ROE MV/BV NOPM P/E D/E Size Stock Price BV per EPS 
share 
GOODYEAR 0,13 0,22 1,64 0,07 7,35 8,33 2,51 8.433 5.146 1.147 
GORBON ISIL -0,59 1,00 -0,68 -1,19 -0,68 6,33 -2,03 4.820 -7.137 -7.126 
GUBRE 0,14 0,09 1,06 0,06 11,93 7,85 1,87 10.417 9.861 873 
HAZNE DAR 0,20 0,09 1,25 0,13 13,70 7,11 1,38 3.856 3.094 282 
HEKTAS 0,15 0,12 0,68 0,16 5,76 7,71 0,61 1.099 1.619 191 
iHLAS EV 0,07 -0,05 0,81 0,07 -17,48 7,64 4,59 1.042 1.282 -60 
INTEMA 0,01 0,02 0,74 0,00 36,36 7,57 1,72 10.572 14.218 291 
IZMIR DEMiR CELIK -0,06 -0,03 0,44 -0,07 -15,96 8,41 0,80 1.019 2.311 -64 
IZOCAM 0,15 0,10 0,78 0,12 7,58 7,81 0,97 2.876 3.678 380 
KAP LAMIN 0,10 -0,28 1,53 0,08 -5,49 7,35 1,34 9.094 5.927 -1.657 
KARSLI 0,16 0,17 0,59 0,15 3,45 7,84 1,17 1.600 2.692 464 
KARTONSAN 0,27 0,21 1,00 0,30 4,69 8,08 0,24 48.225 48.244 10.290 
KELEBEK -0,60 6,99 -7,03 -0,41 -1,01 7,17 -12,83 1.043 -148 -1.038 
KENT GIDA 0,27 0,39 9,44 0,23 24,36 8,03 3,55 12.917 1.369 530 
KEREViT AS 0,03 0,51 -0,12 0,05 -0,24 7,77 -2,02 1.844 -15.213 -7.777 
KIPA 0,13 0,15 1,57 0,06 10,62 8,08 0,78 8.994 5.718 847 
KLIMASAN 0,22 0,13 3,41 0,16 25,85 7,47 1,50 6.767 1.986 262 
KONFRUT -0,02 -0,24 0,65 -0,03 -2,72 7,32 1,28 4.978 7.620 -1.833 
KONITEKS 0,22 -0,12 -8,68 0,10 73,59 7,10 -14,40 3.108 -358 42 
KONYA CIMENTO 0,28 0,23 0,69 0,29 3,04 7,79 0,22 7.111 10.331 2.337 
KORDSA 0,21 0,18 1,24 0,23 7,01 8,47 0,91 5.356 4.327 764 
KRiSTAL KOLA 0,08 0,04 4,43 0,05 103,54 7,20 0,17 12.622 2.847 122 
KUTAHYA 0,34 0,32 0,73 0,24 2,32 7,83 0,61 11.767 16.049 5.067 
LUKS KADiFE 0,46 0,46 1,79 0,24 3,86 6,83 0,60 2.572 1.435 666 
MAKİNA TAKIM 0,16 -0,39 0,75 0,63 -1,93 7,73 3,38 550 729 -285 
MARDiN CIMENTO 0,33 0,32 1,34 0,43 4,24 7,73 0,18 4.395 3.289 1.036 
MARET -0,03 -0,27 0,71 -0,01 -2,65 7,58 1,22 5.761 8.134 -2.170 
MARSHALL 0,25 0,10 1,16 0,16 11,93 7,88 0,46 27.669 23.803 2.320 
MERKO -0,01 -0,15 0,39 0,02 -2,51 8,11 2,88 1.261 3.251 -502 
MEGES 0,22 9,78 -89,01 0,17 -9,10 7,05 -68,85 2.945 -33 -324 
MEN SA 0,19 0,06 0,44 0,26 7,08 8,20 3,84 1.703 3.871 241 
MET AS -0,17 0,20 -0,12 -0,88 -0,59 6,71 -1,26 3.306 -28.427 -5.610 
MIGROS 0,07 0,05 21,17 0,03 385,81 8,72 1,38 85.358 4.033 221 
2002 Financial Ratios 
COMPANY (2002) ROA ROE MV/BV NOPM P/E D/E Size Stock Price BV per EPS 
share 
MILPA 0,11 a0,11 1,09 0,76 -9,54 7,99 2,06 1.060 975 -111 
MUTLU AKU 0,17 0,11 0,82 0,10 7,78 7,70 1,04 7.509 9.173 966 
NET TURiZM 0,14 -106,64 70,75 0,50 -0,66 8,16 493,09 841 12 -1.268 
NET AS 0,06 0,22 2,01 0,08 9,28 8,34 1,29 29.353 14.616 3.163 
OKAN TEKSTiL 0,01 -0,11 0,36 0,02 -3,41 7,56 0,46 1.514 4.199 -444 
OLMUKSA 0,17 0,12 1,18 0,12 9,96 8,01 0,34 8.195 6.949 823 
OTOKAR 0,32 0,15 1,76 0,36 11,49 8,09 2,09 8.991 5.118 782 
OYSA NIGDE 0,51 0,51 1,35 0,42 2,66 7,41 0,58 12.477 9.244 4.684 
PARK TEKSTiL 0,45 0,31 1,90 0,74 6,06 7,81 0,31 9.711 5.110 1.603 
PARSAN 0,15 -0,70 2,35 0,16 -3,36 7,51 3,50 3.950 1.682 -1.175 
PETKIM 0,05 0,00 1,43 0,06 458,03 9,08 0,41 5.922 4.142 13 
PETROL OFiSi 0,08 0,59 20,05 0,04 34,22 9,51 7,30 30.917 1.542 903 
PIMAS 0,27 -0,47 6,78 0,12 -14,58 7,34 4,56 1.486 219 -102 
PINAR SU 0,13 -0,13 0,67 0,25 -5,30 7,51 1,77 1.986 2.972 -375 
PINAR SUT 0,19 0,07 0,72 0,16 10,81 8,20 2,37 2.200 3.060 204 
RAKS ELEKTRiKLi 0,10 0,26 -0,04 0,26 -0,14 7,17 -1,43 4.156 -114.984 -29.617 
RAKS ELEKTRONiK 0,02 0,34 -0,10 0,13 -0,30 7,95 -1,66 2.525 -24.833 -8.524 
SARKUYSAN 0,20 0,17 0,86 0,09 4,97 8,07 0,92 5.279 6.149 1.063 
SASA SUN'I 0,21 -0,02 0,92 0,17 -49,30 8,59 0,88 13.139 14.323 -266 
SOKTAS PAMUK 0,16 0,22 0,67 0,15 3,06 7,96 1,30 11.028 16.581 3.598 
SONMEZ FILAMENT 0,23 0,17 0,83 0,15 4,83 7,67 0,29 3.917 4.707 811 
SONMEZ PAMUKLU 0,07 0,04 0,67 0,08 16,53 7,78 0,17 2.264 3.364 137 
TURKDEMIR 0,20 0,26 1,05 0,15 4,02 8,19 1,97 2.758 2.618 686 
SiSE VE CAM 0,08 0,08 1,03 1,73 13,27 8,71 0,26 1.471 1.434 111 
TUBORG 0,26 0,09 3,36 0,77 38,48 8,35 3,79 8.977 2.668 233 
TANSAS -0,19 -0,67 2,59 -0,11 -3,87 8,49 1,19 1.229 475 -318 
TAT KONSERVE 0,22 0,23 1,56 0,20 6,67 7,95 0,86 7.074 4.541 1.061 
TiRE KUTSAN 0,19 0,10 0,76 0,19 7,73 7,90 0,74 2.670 3.490 346 
TOFAS OTO 0,01 -0,05 1,84 0,01 -37,71 9,09 2,13 4.289 2.328 -114 
TRAKYA CAM 0,29 0,22 2,05 0,43 9,22 8,70 0,76 4.161 2.026 451 
TUKAS 0,11 0,09 1,25 0,13 14,16 8,03 5,16 1.906 1.523 135 
TUPRAS 0,09 0,15 1,71 0,04 11,04 9,48 1,68 7.664 4.482 694 
TURCAS 0,14 -1,26 -9,21 0,02 7,29 8,13 -14,93 3.389 -368 465 
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-COMPANY (2002) ROA ROE MV/ BV NOPM P/E D/E Size Stock Price BV per EPS 
share 
UKI 0,15 0,01 1110 0114 124,~5 7,J5 1;85 7.211 6.§82 58 
USAK -0,01 -0,28 1,06 -0,01 -3,85 7,19 1,50 1.031 973 -268 
UZEL MAKİNA 0,03 -1,28 7,13 0,03 -5,56 8,21 14,23 2.865 402 -515 
UNAL TARIM 0,05 -0,19 1,18 0,06 -6,24 7,43 1,68 1.189 1.012 -190 
UNYE CIMENTO 0,01 -0,55 1,46 0,00 -2,63 8,22 1,40 1.584 1.085 -601 
VESTEL 0,23 0,18 1,28 0,27 6,98 9,23 3,26 3.200 2.498 459 
VIKING 0,12 -0,11 1,02 0,22 -8,92 7,91 4,61 1.522 1.488 -171 
YATAS 0,21 -0,67 0,97 0,19 -1,44 7,81 6,20 1.414 1.461 -979 
YUN SA 0,29 0,21 6,32 0,27 29,45 7,90 0,94 16.130 2.551 548 
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APPENDIXC 
CORRELATION MATRIX FOR ALL 
VARIABLES 
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Average ROE ROA NOPM MV/BV 
Year 
ROE 1.00 
ROA -0.050 1.00 
NOPM 0.024 0.383** 1.00 
MV/BV -0.713** 0.155 0.022 1.00 
P/E -0.003 0.042 0.078 0.047 
BIGl 0.027 0.078 0.008 0.061 
BIG3 0.128 0.095 0.042 -0.022 
PUBLIC -0.198* -0.178* -0.056 0.082 
MGT 0.007 -0.032 0.030 -0.038 
STATE -0.014 O.ü30 0.011 0.019 
FOREIGN 0.240** 0.050 0.041 -0. 151 
INST -0.099 0.047 -0.017 0.056 
D/E -0.921 •• 0.124 0.031 0.746** 
SiZE -0.101 0.157 0.178* 0.054 
BETA -0.129 0.041 0.203* 0.039 
••correlation is signifıcıint at the level O.O 1 Jevel (2-tailed) 
*Correlation is signifıcant at the !evet 0.005 !eve) (2-tailed) 
P/E 
1.00 
0.060 
-0.006 
0.009 
-0.081 
0.113 
-0. 128 
0.082 
-0.009 
-0.049 
-0.009 
BIGl BIG3 PUBLIC MGT STATE FOREIGN INST D/E SiZE BETA 
1.00 
0.755** 1.00 
-0.458** -0.842** 1.00 
-0.401 •• -0. 190* -0.121 1.00 
0.278** 0.196* -0.138 -0.103 1.00 
0.234** 0.305** -0.228** -0.194* -0.048 1.00 
0.287** 0.402•• -0.398** -0.374** -0.320** -0.406** 1.00 
0.075 -0.026 0.105 -0.014 -0.021 -0.187** 0.066 1.00 
0.174* 0.159 -0. 150 -0.248** 0.424** 0.079 -0.032 0.060 1.00 
0.124 0.072 -0.024 -0. 155 0.136 -0.09 1 0.101 0.064 0.425** 1.00 
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